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ABSTRACTS

The Free Trade Epidemic of the 1860s and Other Outbreaks of Economic Discrimination

By DAVID LAZER

Why was there an abrupt increase in economic openness in Europe in the 1860s? This increase may have been the result of a contagion process, in which the Cobden-Chevalier treaty between Britain and France threatened to displace third-party exports to France with British exports. As a result, most European states signed similar treaties with France, which had further ripple effects.

This article outlines a formal model of this process, based on the assumption that an agreement between two states increases the desirability of similar treaties to third parties. Propositions regarding the rate and pattern of spread of treaties are derived from this model. This article then discusses the insights these propositions may offer into the rise and fall of the most-favored-nation network of treaties between 1860 and 1929.

At a theoretical level the model aims to link the microlevel processes underlying state preferences to system-level phenomena. At a substantive level this analysis offers insight into the current explosion of regionalism.

Old Political Rationalities and New Democracies

Compromise and Confrontation in Hungary and Poland

By ANNA SELENY

Studies of democratic consolidation tend to highlight the same factors previously used to explain countries' transitional dynamics. Yet one cannot properly understand success or failure in democratic consolidation—much less discern significant qualitative differences among consolidated democracies—by focusing exclusively on formal institutions, modes of transition, incentive structures, or exogenous factors. Close inspection of two newly consolidated democracies—Poland and Hungary—shows that despite radically altered institutional arrangements, legal structures, and political-economic incentives, the most important determinants of the models of democracy emerging today derive from pretransition conceptual frames and informal political settlements. Specifically, the core conflicts between ruling elites and society in communist Poland and Hungary, as well as the patterns of political accommodation that evolved in the management of those conflicts, continue to structure the political agenda and order debate in both countries. In Poland overlapping ethical-ideological cleavages and failures of political accommodation under the ancien régime have resulted in a confrontational-pluralist model of democracy. In contrast, Hungary's compromise-corporatist model stems from early informal accommodation between the party-state and society that recast most conflicts as "economic" in nature. These long-standing conflicts and political patterns explain striking contemporary differences in social mobilization, party competition, and constitutional development. The article concludes with a discussion of how these models are likely to shape each country's prospects for sustained governability and increased democratic legitimacy.

Africa's Overgrown State Reconsidered

Bureaucracy and Economic Growth

By ARTHUR A. GOLDSMITH

How close is the link between outsized states and economic stagnation in Africa? This article shows that African public bureaucracies are not as large as often portrayed, that they have been getting smaller, and that reducing their size alone has not been a prescription for economic revival. To the contrary, the countries with higher levels of public employment, such as Botswana and Mauritius, are apt to have the better economic records. These findings suggest that a superabundance of public personnel is not in *itself* a major impediment to growth in Africa. Too much attention has been paid to quantitative or "first-generation" bureaucratic problems, and too little attention has been given the "second-generation" issues of bureaucratic quality.

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Women in the Legislatures and Executives of the World

knocking at the highest glass ceiling

By ANDREW REYNOLDS

This article reports the results of a survey of women in legislatures and executives around the world as they were constituted in 1998 (N = 180). The chief hypotheses regarding the factors hindering or facilitating women's access to political representation were tested by multivariate regression models. The regression models juxtaposed a cocktail of institutional, political, cultural, and socioeconomic variables with the following dependent variables: (1) the percentage of MPs who are women and (2) the percentage of cabinet ministers who are women.

A number, although not all, of the cited hypotheses were statistically confirmed and more finely quantified. The socioeconomic development of women in society has an effect on the number of women in parliament but not in the cabinet. A country's length of experience with multipartyism and women's enfranchisement correlates with both the legislative and the executive percentage. Certain electoral systems are more women friendly than others. The ideological nature of the party system affects the number of women elected and chosen for cabinet posts. And last, the state's dominant religion, taken as a proxy for culture, also statistically relates to the number of women who will make it to high political office. However, other long-held hypotheses were not proved. The degree of democracy is not a good indicator of the percentage of women who will make it into the legislature or the cabinet, nor is the dichotomy between a presidential or parliamentary system.

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THE FREE TRADE EPIDEMIC OF THE 1860s AND OTHER OUTBREAKS OF ECONOMIC DISCRIMINATION

By DAVID LAZER*

PREFERENTIAL trade agreements (PTAs) have become an increasingly prominent feature of the international trade environment, with salient examples being the widening and deepening of the European Union (EU), the success of the Mercosur, and the formation of the North American Free Trade Association (NAFTA). In fact, a majority of the active agreements notified to GATT through 1995 were signed in the 1990s.[1] This systemic change, involving most of the states of the world but managed by none, echoes a period of even more dramatic change in the trade policies of the world's economies: the 1860s.

The great increase in economic openness in Europe in the 1860s was a swift break with centuries of protection. The instrument for this increase in economic openness was the unconditional most-favored-nation (MFN) clause, by which pairs of states agreed bilaterally to lower tariffs.[2] The fact that so many pairs of states signed MFN agreements at approximately the same time suggests that these were not independent processes. This article argues that changes wrought by the Industrial Revolution—increased scale of production and lowered transport costs—increased the costs of trade diversion to third parties left out of

* I acknowledge with gratitude helpful comments from Robert Axelrod, Lisa Bernt, Darcie Dennigan, George Downs, Ted Hopf, Douglas Irwin, Estelle James, Peter Marsh, Walter Mattli, Timothy McKeown, Andrew Moravcsik, and Robert Pahre, as well as participants in colloquia at Princeton and UCLA. However, I retain exclusive rights to any errors contained herein.

[1] World Trade Organization, *Regionalism and the World Trading System* (Geneva: World Trade Organization, 1995).

[2] Note that concessions became effectively multilateral because the unconditional (as compared with the conditional) MFN clause specifies that concessions made by the signatories to third parties must be granted to signatories of the treaty for no additional compensation; see S. K. Hornbeck, "The Most-Favored-Nation Clause in Commercial Treaties," *Bulletin of the University of Wisconsin* (February 1910), 343. States did develop means to keep concessions bilateral, for example, through minute subdivisions in tariff categories; see, e.g., D. C. M. Platt, *Finance, Trade, and Politics in British Foreign Policy, 1825–1914* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1971), 93.

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PTAs, with the result that a change in relations between one pair of states (Britain and France) had enormous ramifications throughout the European system. The following analysis presents a formal model of contagion that offers insight into the rate and pattern of the spread of MFN treaties in the 1860s.

That explosion of economic openness has been explained by a hierarchic view of international relations, according to which the dominant country of the period, Britain, had a preference for free trade, and the international system came to reflect that preference.[3] The abruptness of this change is a puzzle from the perspective of a structural analysis, however.[4] Further, Britain was not in a dominant position in this network of treaties.

This article takes an *emergent process* view, asserting that this pattern may have emerged from the microlevel processes of the system.[5] It links micro and macro by connecting state motivation at the microlevel (domestic politics) to the state's relationships to other states: the assumption is that governments seek political support from interest groups, including powerful economic sectors. The macrolevel outcome is the pattern of trade agreements among states. In particular, building on work by Oye, Gilligan, and Baldwin, this article emphasizes the role of political pressures from export sectors in causing states to seek bilateral trade agreements.[6] A simulation model of interdependent trade games is developed to demonstrate how a preferential trade agreement that has a domestic political impact on third parties leads to a contagion of

[3] This matches the argument of hegemonic stability theory. For example, see C. P. Kindleberger, *The World in Depression, 1929–1939* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1973); and Robert Gilpin, *War and Change in World Politics* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981). Also, for a valuable critique of hegemonic stability theory, see David Lake, "Leadership, Hegemony, and the International Economy: Naked Emperor or Tattered Monarch with Potential?" *International Studies Quarterly* 37 (December 1993).

[4] Notably, the tariff levels of European states in the nineteenth century were not correlated with the degree of concentration of power in the international system. See Timothy J. McKeown, "Hegemonic Stability and the Nineteenth Century Tariff Levels in Europe," *International Organization* 37 (Winter 1983).

[5] The first major work in the study of emergent systems was Thomas Schelling, *Micromotives and Macrobehavior* (New York: W. W. Norton, 1978). Recent efforts in this direction include Robert Axelrod, *The Complexity of Cooperation: Agent-Based Models of Competition and Collaboration* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1997); and Joshua M. Epstein and Robert A. Axtell, *Growing Artificial Societies: Social Science from the Bottom Up* (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1996). For economic models of this genre, see Paul Krugman, *The Self-Organizing Economy* (Cambridge: Blackwell Publishers, 1996); and J. A. Scheinkman and M. Woodford, "Self-Organized Criticality and Economic Fluctuations," *American Economic Review* 84 (May 1994), 417–21.

[6] Kenneth Oye, *Economic Discrimination and Political Exchange: World Political Economy in the 1830s and 1980s* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1992); Michael J. Gilligan, *Empowering Exporters* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1997); and Richard Baldwin, "A Domino Theory of Regionalism," in Jagdish Bhagwati, Pravin Krishna, and Arvind Panagariya, *Trading Blocs: Alternative Approaches to Analyzing Preferential Trade Agreements* (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1999).

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similar agreements. This theoretical apparatus is then used to explore the abrupt opening up of the 1860s, while also yielding fresh insights into the explosion of regionalism in the 1990s. The analysis can also offer some insight into the current burst of PTAs, including the deepening and expansion of the EU, the formation of NAFTA, and the revitalization of regional trade agreements in South America.

The first section of this article examines the existing political economy literature on the effects of PTAs, in particular, on influencing third parties to seek similar bargains. The second section offers a formal model of contagion based on the assumption that a PTA between two states increases the interest of third parties in entering into similar agreements. The analysis indicates that contagion is more likely in a highly interdependent and interconnected world and that it operates according to certain characteristic patterns in terms of the spread and rate of spread of treaties. Those insights are then applied in the third section to the rise and fall of the MFN network of treaties in Europe in the 1860s, where the timing, pattern, and robustness of this treaty network is shown to be consistent with the propositions that emerge from the simulations. The fourth section discusses the implications for the growth of trade blocs today. Finally, the conclusion examines the broader implications for international relations theory.

The Microlevel: The Politics of Protection and Preference

In a PTA two or more states grant each other greater access to their markets (for example, lower tariffs) than other states receive.[7] Examples of PTAs include customs unions, in which two or more states elim-

[7] There is a large literature on the economics of customs unions, with a welter of findings (often contradictory) regarding exactly when customs unions may be harmful to the welfare of members. The starting point of modern research on customs unions is Jacob Viner, *The Customs Union Issue* (New York: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1950). More recent landmarks include Raymond Riezman, "A 3 × 3 Model of Customs Unions," *Journal of International Economics* 9 (August 1979); P. J. Lloyd, "3 × 3 Theory of Customs Unions," *Journal of International Economics* 12 (February 1982); and Ian Wooton, "Preferential Trading Agreements: An Investigation," *Journal of International Economics* 21 (August 1986). For a striking illustration of the fact that a world dominated by a few customs unions may be associated with lower world welfare than a world of no trade blocs (even holding tariffs constant), see Paul Krugman, "The Move toward Free Trade Zones," in *Policy Implications of Trade and Currency Zones: A Symposium Sponsored by the Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City* (Kansas City, Mo.: Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City, 1991); and Eric Bond and Constantinos Syropoulos, "The Size of Trading Blocs: Market Power and World Welfare Effects," *Journal of International Economics* 40 (May 1996). Kemp and Wan demonstrate, however, that there is always a level of postunion tariffs that is Pareto-improving for both PTA members and nonmembers; see Murray C. Kemp and Henry Y. Wan, Jr., "An Elementary Proposition Concerning the Formation of Customs Unions," *Journal of International Economics* 6 (February 1976), 95–97.

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inate trade barriers among themselves and impose a common exterior tariff (CET) on third parties, and free trade areas (FTAs), in which two or more states eliminate trade barriers among themselves but do not impose a CET.

Why do states sign PTAs? This section offers a brief discussion of the economic and political benefits of a PTA to the signatories (a dyadic perspective);[8] of the economic and political impact of a PTA on third parties (a triadic perspective); and, finally, of the interdependence of all PTAs and potential PTAs in the international system (a systemic perspective).

Dyadic Perspective

What are the domestic political dynamics underlying the negotiation of a PTA? A PTA may have some distributional effects akin to unilateral changes in protection. For example, a PTA between a labor-rich country and a capital-rich country may result in various coalitions in the respective countries: the owners of the scarce factors of production may oppose the agreement, while the owners of plentiful factors of production may support it, à la Stolper-Samuelson.[9] Thus, in the United States labor strongly opposed NAFTA, whereas capital strongly supported it. Further, it is conceivable that a scarce factor of production that generally supports protection will also support lower barriers with a state in which that factor of production is even more scarce. Similarly, many of the variables found to be related to unilateral protection may also be related to dyadic protection/openness: import penetration by exporters in the other country, intrafirm trade between the two countries, and so on.[10]

From a domestic political perspective, then, why would a state pursue a PTA rather than make unilateral reductions in tariffs?[11] The an-

[8] In principle, dyadic in this context incorporates PTAs with more than two members. None of the treaties signed during the 1860s had more than two parties, however.

[9] See Ronald Rogowski, *Commerce and Coalitions: How Trade Affects Domestic Political Alignments* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1989). Notably, however, Rogowski demonstrated how long-run coalitions form around trade issues, whereas a coalition resulting from a particular PTA would presumably reflect a short-run congruence of interests.

[10] For example, Daniel Trefler, "Trade Liberalization and the Theory of Endogenous Protection," *Journal of Political Economy* 101 (February 1993); M. Finger and A. Harrison, "The MFA Paradox: More Protection and More Trade?" (Manuscript, World Bank, 1995); and Helen Milner, *Resisting Protectionism: Global Industries and the Politics of International Trade* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1988).

[11] There is a third alternative—multilateral reductions in tariffs, as has occurred under the auspices of GATT in the post–World War II period. There was no equivalent forum to pursue multilateral reductions in tariffs in the 1860s. Why there was no equivalent of GATT during the 1860s is an interesting question but one not pursued here.

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swer lies with the role of exporters. While exporters, along with all consumers, gain from unilateral reductions in tariffs by a state, they will gain even more when those reductions are reciprocated by another state.

Further, when a state negotiates for access to another state's market, the benefits of that access may be relatively concentrated. Unilateral tariff reductions are often successfully opposed by import-competing sectors because the benefits of protection are more concentrated than the costs of protection—allowing those sectors to overcome potential collective action problems. For bilateral tariff reductions, the benefits are similarly focused on a potentially small group of *exporters*—rather than on just a diffuse set of consumers—which allows those sectors as well to overcome potential collective action problems.[12]

Thus, much as unilateral tariff setting allows a government to discriminate among import competers by offering the most protection to those sectors whose political support is most responsive to protection, a PTA allows a government to offer improved market access to those exporters whose political support is the most responsive to such redistributional measures. A government may therefore improve its political standing by gaining more political support from the exporters whose fortunes it has promoted with a PTA than it loses from the import competers who are now subject to greater foreign competition.

Viewed as political support maximizers, governments thus *potentially* face a prisoners' dilemma when negotiating a PTA.[13] The preference ordering of each state would therefore be (1) preferential access to the other state's markets for no preferential treatment in return, (2) mutual preferential access, (3) mutual nonpreferential treatment, and (4) preferential treatment of the other state's exports in return for no preferential treatment for its own exports.

[12] Oye (fn. 6); and Gilligan (fn. 6). Closely related are the arguments of I. M. Destler and John Odell, *Anti-Protection: Changing Forces in the United States Trade Politics* (Washington, D.C.: Institute for International Economics, 1987). While they do not directly discuss PTAs, they do point out that potential retaliation from country A in response to protectionist measures in country B may have a very focused distributional impact on exporters in B.

[13] Political economy models illustrating the possibility of a prisoners' dilemma structure of payoffs of a PTA include Robert Pahre, "Reactions, Reciprocity, and Retaliation: A Model of Tariff Policy Linking State and Domestic Interests" (Manuscript, 1994); and Gene Grossman and Elhanan Helpman, "Trade Wars and Trade Talks," *Journal of Political Economy* 103 (August 1995). See also Robert Putnam, "Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-Level Games," *International Organization* 42 (Summer 1988). Closely related are H. G. Johnson, "Optimum Tariffs and Retaliation," *Review of Economic Studies* 21, no. 55 (1954); Raymond Riezman, "Tariff Retaliation from a Strategic Viewpoint," *Southern Economic Journal* 48 (January 1978); and John Conybeare, *Trade Wars: The Theory and Practice of International Commercial Rivalry* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1987). These last three assert that states may face a prisoners' dilemma with respect to the imposition of optimal tariffs to improve terms of trade.

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Triadic Analysis

Because of trade diversion, a PTA may harm third parties; that is, an agreement between A and B may adversely affect certain export sectors in C.[14] In fact, a trade-diverting PTA may be tempting to the governments of A and B, *because an agreement that displaces C's production (trade diversion) may be less politically costly than an agreement that displaces indigenous production (trade creation).*[15]

This may offer an answer to one puzzle in the literature on the political economy of trade: why is there an apparent redistribution bias toward import-competing sectors through protection rather than to export sectors through export subsidies?[16] Governments are in fact redistributing toward export sectors through PTAs, which may be the preferred instrument for this purpose because some of the costs may be shifted to third parties.

It is likely, then, that a PTA between two states will disrupt the political status quo in the third. Because exporters in the excluded state will suffer to the extent that their goods are pushed out of the markets of the parties to the PTA, export sectors will push for redistributive measures (such as a similar PTA) to compensate for their potential losses. These losses will be especially acute where production is characterized by large economies of scale and where the goods are differentiated in nature.

Baldwin has formally demonstrated that such losses will be substantial because the firms in those cases have invested in production capabilities predicated on equal access to export markets.[17] If those firms suddenly face discrimination in, and thus partial loss of, those export markets, they will have either to swallow those costs or to lower prices to increase sales at home. Because those firms stand to lose profits in either case, they are willing to make political investments to avoid these losses.[18] Further, as Milner has empirically shown, sectors characterized by increasing returns to scale are relatively more likely to seek preferred access to other states.[19]

[14] Oye (fn. 6) labels these "divertable externalities," in that the costs to a particular third party may be diverted to fourth parties by extending the market access to that third party.

[15] For example, Grossman and Helpman showed, using a median voter model, that free-trade areas are more likely to garner political support when trade diversion outweighs trade creation; see Gene Grossman and Elhanan Helpman, *The Politics of Free Trade Agreements*, Working Paper 4597 (Cambridge: National Bureau of Economic Research, 1993).

[16] For an insightful discussion of this point, see Dani Rodrik, "Political Economy of Trade Policy," in Gene Grossman and Kenneth Rogoff, eds., *Handbook of International Economics* (New York: Elsevier, 1995).

[17] Baldwin (fn. 6).

[18] Ibid.

[19] Helen Milner, "Industries, Governments, and the Creation of Regional Trade Blocs," in John G. Ruggie, ed., *The Political Economy of Regionalism* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1997).

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A key assumption in Baldwin's model is that C does not have alternative markets for its goods; if it did, there might simply be a trade reshuffling, where C's exports were redirected to other markets at the same price they received in the markets of A or B. However, if demand is characterized by a taste for variety (that is, the goods are differentiated in nature), C's goods will not flow to other markets for the same price they would receive in A and B's markets.

Losses will therefore be greater in those sectors where the goods are *differentiated* in nature because those goods will not flow elsewhere for the same price.[20] The French-Italian tariff war of 1887–92 offers two contrasting examples—Italian wine and raw silk producers—of why this is the case. "In 1887 France took from Italy 2,782,000 hectolitres of wine, and in 1888 only 817,000."[21] Italian wine, a differentiated good, did not find equally lucrative markets to replace the French market, which devastated the Italian wine producers. In contrast, the tariff war did not have a great impact on Italian producers of raw silk, a homogeneous good, because exports were merely diverted: "[I]n 1887 Italy exported to France 28,178 quintals of raw silk, and to Switzerland 7,300 quintals; but in 1888 France took only 9,188 quintals, whilst the amount sent to Switzerland rose abruptly to 29,621."[22]

An agreement between two states will therefore adversely affect third parties, increasing their motivation to sign a similar agreement—perhaps creating a bargaining space where none had existed before. This is especially likely to occur when the goods affected are differentiated in nature and their production characterized by economies of scale.

Systemic Analysis

The three-state analysis demonstrates that the international system is not simply decomposable into the pairwise interactions of its members, *because the payoffs in each pairwise interaction are contingent on what other pairs in the system do.* It is therefore necessary to build a systemic theory of PTAs that models the impact of one PTA on the behavior of other states.[23]

[20] For an early and insightful discussion of the interrelationship between preference/discrimination and product differentiation, see Frederic Benham, *Great Britain under Protection* (New York: Macmillan, 1941). For a discussion of why political mobilization of sectors is more likely when the goods produced are differentiated, see also Michael Gilligan, "Lobbying as a Private Good with Intra-Industry Trade," *International Studies Quarterly* 41 (September 1997).

[21] Percy Ashley, *Modern Tariff History: Germany-United States-France* (New York: E. P. Dutton, 1926), 326.

[22] Ibid., 327.

[23] For an intriguing analysis that applies coalition theory to customs-union formation, see Sang-Seung Yi, "Endogenous Formation of Customs Unions under Imperfect Competition: Open Regionalism Is Good," *Journal of International Economics* 41 (August 1996).

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The three-state analysis also demonstrates one likely impact of a treaty between two states: it will increase the desirability of similar treaties to other states.

Where the potential trade among states is largely in differentiated goods, and/or where the production of goods is subject to economies of scale, the trading system is *highly interdependent.*

This article advances the beginnings of a systemic theory of PTAs, outlining a very simple model to explore the systemic patterns that will emerge when A's agreement with B increases the desirability of a similar deal to C. In a highly interdependent trade system, it is far more likely that one PTA will spur further PTAs, possibly resulting in rapid growth in the number of PTAs.

The Macrolevel: A Threshold Model of Diffusion

The key assumption of this article is that a PTA between two states increases the likelihood of additional PTAs. As state A signs more PTAs, other states feel additional pressure to seek a similar agreement with A. At some threshold number of treaties, there will be a potential agreement that will improve the (domestic political) well-being of the governments of both state A and any given third party.

This article therefore proposes a threshold model of contagion.[24] In the classic model of diffusion (of innovation), actors may be in one of two states, one of which is terminal (informed) and one of which is potentially transitory (not informed). The number of people shifting from the transitory state to the terminal one is proportional to the product of the fraction of the population in the transitory state and the fraction in the terminal state. The plot of the fraction of the people who are in the terminal state will therefore produce a logistic-shaped (S-shaped) curve. For example, with the spread of innovation, there will be slow change at first, with a few informed individuals spreading the word to the many uninformed. Change will accelerate as more individuals spread the word, until half of the population is informed. At this point, with progressively fewer uninformed people, change will slow, until 100 percent of the population is informed. This simple model of diffusion assumes

[24] See Thomas Valente, *Network Models of the Diffusion of Innovations* (Cresskill, N.Y.: Hampton Press, 1995). For a discussion of diffusion processes and a consideration of diffusion through some central source versus diffusion via contagion, see Charles Lave and James March, *An Introduction to Models in the Social Sciences* (New York: Harper and Row, 1975). For a classic analysis of diffusion processes, see James Coleman, E. Katz, and H. Menzel, *Medical Innovation: A Diffusion Study* (Indianapolis, Ind.: Bobbs-Merrill, 1966). For a recent discussion, see Everett Rogers, *Diffusion of Innovations* (New York: Free Press, 1995).

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that the probability of shifting to the terminal state is a linear function of exposure, where exposure of all individuals at a given time is the same and is determined by the number of people already in the terminal state.

The model presented in this article differs from that model in two key ways: first, the probability of shifting from a transitory state (no treaty) to a terminal state (treaty) is assumed to be a step-function (that is, there is a threshold exposure level at which the state shifts); and second, different dyads have different levels of exposure. This section advances a threshold model of treaty contagion and develops a number of propositions from this model.

Threshold Models

In the model presented here it is assumed that two states will sign a treaty if and only if a Pareto-improving bargain can be struck.[25] Because of the interdependence of payoff functions, the following model assumes that the desire for a PTA with another state is positively related to the number of treaties the second state has. At some threshold number of treaties with third parties, two states will sign a PTA.

Threshold models have a long history in models of decision making. Simon introduced the idea that individuals "satisfice": an individual stays with his current consumption choice until it is determined to be unsatisfactory, at which point he changes his choice.[26] Essentially, there is a threshold up to which there is no change; when that threshold is reached, behavior changes. In models of collective behavior Schelling's model of segregation included a similar assumption of a threshold: each individual remained in his current residence until the proportion of different-race neighbors reached some predetermined threshold—at which point the individual moved. In a similar vein, individuals in cascade models do not engage in a particular activity until a predetermined fraction of the remaining population engages in that activity (where that fraction typically varies at the individual level).[27] And in an appli-

[25] This is a relatively reasonable assumption in the domain of trade, where iteration is high, fostering mutual cooperation. See Robert Axelrod, *The Evolution of Cooperation* (New York: Basic Books, 1984). Of course, there may be substantial conflict over the distribution of the gains of cooperation, sometimes leading to mutual defection, as the occasional trade wars of the 1880s and 1890s attest (e.g., France-Italy, Germany-Russia).

[26] Herbert Simon, *Models of Man* (New York: Wiley, 1957).

[27] Susanne Lohmann, "The Dynamics of Informational Cascades: The Monday Demonstrations in Leipzig, East Germany, 1989–91," *World Politics* 47 (October 1994); Mark Granovetter, "Threshold Models of Collective Behavior," *American Journal of Sociology* 83 (May 1978); Mark Granovetter and R. Soong, "Threshold Models of Diversity: Chinese Restaurants, Residential Segregation, and the Spiral of Silence," in C. Clogg, ed., *Sociological Methodology*, vol. 18 (Washington, D.C.: American Sociological Association, 1988).

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

(a) THRESHOLD MODEL OF DECISION MAKING

(b) THRESHOLD MODEL OF TREATY FORMATION

FIGURE 1

cation formally similar to that in this article, there are network threshold models of the diffusion of innovations, where individuals are disinclined to adopt an innovation until a certain fraction of people *with whom they interact* adopt that innovation (where individuals vary in how disinclined they are).[28]

In each of these models it is assumed that there is a threshold at which change occurs at the individual level (see Figure 1a). Similarly, in the formal analyses of the spread of PTAs below, it is assumed for each pair of potential treaty partners, i and j, that there is some threshold number of treaties with third parties ($g_{ij} = g_{ji}$), at which i and j will sign a treaty. The transition rule for whether two states that do not have a treaty at time t sign a treaty at time t + 1 is therefore: *If the number of treaties i and j have signed with third parties is greater than g_{ij}, then i and j will sign a treaty.* (See Figure 1b.)

A variety of factors would presumably affect this threshold, including the nature of the sectors involved, the political institutions of the states involved, the access each state has to the other's markets in the absence of a treaty, and so on. Ideally this would be directly modeled in g_{ij}. However, for the analyses below this threshold is simply drawn from a uniform distribution between 0 and δ.[29]

[28] Valente (fn. 24).

[29] As discussed below, this assumption regarding the distribution of g_{ij} greatly facilitates interpretation of the model. All thresholds are also assumed to be independent of each other. Note that in reality this is not likely to be the case; e.g., some states might be especially likely to sign treaties, and some especially unlikely, so one might expect g_{ij} to be correlated with g_{ik}.

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A	B	C
D	E	F
G	H	I

FIGURE 2
A 3 × 3 LATTICE

δ is a systemwide parameter that captures the interdependence of the international markets. That is, the lower δ, the more dependent states are (on average) on access to other states' markets, and the less they can tolerate being discriminated against in those markets. For the reasons discussed above, interdependence, in a political sense, will be especially great (that is, a low δ) in a world economy where production is characterized by economies of scale and traded goods are differentiated in nature.

In any model of contagion, it is necessary to specify (1) the probability of transmission (captured by δ) and (2) the social structure in question. This leads to the question of how the interaction pattern of states is structured.

In fact, states do not interact equally with all other states. One of the more robust empirical findings in international economics (from gravity models) is that states trade disproportionately with nearby states. This pattern occurs in part because transport costs and linguistic/cultural and other communication barriers are closely connected to distance. In the context of this model, for example, one would expect Belgium to be sensitive to its access to the Netherlands' market and relatively oblivious to its access to New Zealand's market. Thus, in the simulations below, except where noted otherwise, states are assumed to be arranged on a lattice and to interact only with their immediate neighbors.[30] For example, in Figure 2 state E is assumed to interact only with states B, D, F, and H; state A is assumed to interact only with states B and D.

Finally, it is necessary to specify the conditions under which the simulation begins and ends. It is assumed that prior to t = 0 no pair of states has signed a treaty and that therefore no dyad has exceeded the threshold number of treaties with other states. At t = 0, the system is given an exogenous kick, so that one state suddenly becomes more desirable as a treaty partner—by lowering the thresholds of dyads involv-

[30]A lattice also has the advantage of making it easier to visualize the process of contagion, as the example below illustrates.

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A	B	C	D	E
F	G	H	I	J
K	L	M	N	O
P	Q	R	S	T
R	V	W	X	Y

FIGURE 3
SAMPLE RUN AT TIME = 0[a]

[a] There are no treaties, as represented by heavy lines throughout.

ing this state by 1.[31] This initial state is labeled the "first mover." If the threshold of this state with any other state(s) drops below 0, it is assumed that the first mover and the other state(s) will sign a treaty at time t = 1. As outlined above, this increases the likelihood of other treaties involving those two states. The simulation reaches an equilibrium when no more treaties are signed.

To illustrate how the simulation works, it is useful to examine one run of the simulation. In this example it is assumed that twenty-five states exist on a 5 × 5 lattice. The parameter δ is set to 3, so that all g_{ij} are therefore drawn from a uniform distribution between 0 and 3. That is, different dyads have thresholds between 0 and 3, with an average threshold of 1.5. At time t = 0, none of the states on the lattice have treaties with each other. This is represented in Figure 3; in this and following figures, the absence of a treaty is represented by a heavy line, and presence of a treaty is represented by a thin line.

Suppose that, for exogenous reasons, at time t = 0 a treaty with state A becomes more likely (state A is the "first mover"). Specifically, it is assumed that the thresholds in dyads including state 1 (g_{AF} and g_{AB}) are lowered by 1. In each case, there is a 1 in 3 chance (= $1/\delta$) that $g < 1$ and a treaty will be reached in the first round. In this run of the simulation, state F signed a treaty with state A in the first round (Figure 4).

This treaty increases the likelihood of treaties between states A and F and their neighbors. In fact, in subsequent runs, state A signed a treaty with state B, and state F signed a treaty with state G. After six rounds, a total of eight treaties was signed (Figure 5).

[31] The exact amount the thresholds should be lowered is arbitrary. Lowering thresholds by 1 has the benefit in terms of ease of interpretation of the simulations in that when a state has δ partners, it will definitely sign treaties with its remaining neighbors.

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A	B	C	D	E
F	G	H	I	J
K	L	M	N	O
P	Q	R	S	T
U	V	W	X	Y

FIGURE 4
SAMPLE RUN AFTER 1 ROUND[a]

[a] The absence of a treaty is represented by a heavy line; the presence of a treaty is represented by a thin line.

At this point the process of treaty contagion accelerated, with fifteen treaties signed in the following five rounds (Figure 6).

Thirteen more treaties were signed in the next five rounds (Figure 7).

Finally, the system reached an equilibrium, where two more treaties were signed in the following two rounds, leaving one state (E) without any treaties, where 95 percent (thirty-eight out of forty) of the potential treaties had been consummated (Figure 8).

SOME PROPOSITIONS

This simple model of contagion allows the experimenter to study the impact of changes in model parameters on the probability of potential equilibria. Where possible, this probability will be deductively derived. Otherwise, this probability will be inductively derived, using sets of simulations based on certain scenarios. The outcome focused on below will be the proportion of potential treaties in the system that are signed, where at time t = 0 that proportion is 0. At time t = 0 a system otherwise in equilibrium is given the small exogenous kick: the thresholds involving a particular state are reduced by 1. The following are a set of propositions regarding the dynamics of what results.

PROPOSITION 1

Small stimuli can result in a large number of treaties being signed. As the preceding example illustrated, the small (relative to the sum of the thresholds in the system) initial exogenous shock may have dramatic ramifications.[32] This raises the issue of what conditions facilitate huge systemic change. Analysis of simulations below suggests proposition 2.

[32] The sum of the thresholds ≅ 40 (number of dyads) × 1.5 (average threshold) = 60.

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A	B	C	D	E
F	G	H	I	J
K	L	M	O	P
Q	R	S	T	U
V	W	X	Y	Z

FIGURE 5
SAMPLE RUN AFTER 6 ROUNDS[a]

[a] The absence of a treaty is represented by a heavy line; the presence of a treaty is represented by a thin line.

A	B	C	D	E
F	G	H	I	J
K	L	M	N	O
P	Q	R	S	T
U	V	W	X	Y

FIGURE 6
SAMPLE RUN AFTER 11 ROUNDS[a]

[a] The absence of a treaty is represented by a heavy line; the presence of a treaty is represented by a thin line.

PROPOSITION 2

The likelihood that a large number of treaties will be signed is positively related to (a) the interdependence of the world; (b) the centrality of the first mover; (c) the size of the first mover; and negatively related to (d) transportation costs. These four factors are discussed in turn below.

Interdependence. A simple version of the above model will suffice to illustrate the relationship between interdependence (defined as the dependence of states on access to other markets) and the potential for maximum systemic change. Assume N = 3 and all three states are interconnected. At time t = 0 the system is given the exogenous kick. The number of treaties in the resulting equilibrium may be 0, 1, 2, or 3. Figure 9 plots the probability that all three potential treaties will be signed as a function of δ.[33]

[33] The probability that three treaties will be signed is $\frac{6}{\delta^3} + \frac{2}{\delta^2}\left(1 - \frac{2}{\delta}\right) Min\left[1, \frac{1}{\delta - 2}\right]$ for $\delta > 2$ and otherwise $1 - \left(1 - \frac{1}{\delta}\right)^2$.

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A	B	C	D	E
F	G	H	I	J
K	L	M	N	O
P	Q	R	S	T
U	V	W	X	Y

FIGURE 7
SAMPLE RUN AFTER 16 ROUNDS[a]

[a] The absence of a treaty is represented by a heavy line; the presence of a treaty is represented by a thin line.

A	B	C	D	E
F	G	H	I	J
K	L	M	N	O
P	Q	R	S	T
U	V	W	X	Y

FIGURE 8
SAMPLE RUN AT EQUILIBRIUM (AFTER 18 ROUNDS)[a]

[a] The absence of a treaty is represented by a heavy line; the presence of a treaty is represented by a thin line. The following is a complete summary of this run of the simulation. Round 1: A and F. Round 2: A and B; F and G. Round 3: B and G; F and K. Round 4: G and H. Round 5: G and L. Round 6: L and Q. Round 7: K and L; P and Q; Q and V. Round 8: K and P; L and M; Q and R. Round 9: M and R; P and U; R and W. Round 10: H and M; R and S; V and W. Round 11: M and N; S and X; U and V. Round 12: N and S; W and X. Round 13: N and O; S and T; X and Y. Round 14: I and N; T and U. Round 15: H and I; I and J; O and T. Round 16: C and H; D and I; J and O. Round 17: B and C. Round 18: C and D.

Figure 9 demonstrates the relationship between δ and the probability of dramatic systemic change. As one would expect, there is a monotonically negative relationship between the two and therefore a positive relationship between the probability of systemic change and system interdependence.

Centrality. In the last example of the previous section, states were aligned on a 5×5 lattice, where the first mover was in the most peripheral position on the lattice (the corner). What might the impact on the system be if the first mover were relatively central? Centrality is defined as the number of neighbors a state has, and secondarily, the number of neighbors a state's neighbors have, and so on. The most central

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

FIGURE 9
PROBABILITY THAT ALL TREATIES WILL BE SIGNED AS A FUNCTION OF δ

position in a 5×5 lattice is therefore the spot in the third row, third column (see Figure 10).

Figure 11 presents histograms of the frequency of the proportion of treaties signed in the final equilibrium for two sets of one thousand simulations each: the first in which the first mover is assumed to be in the corner; the second in which the first mover is assumed to be in the most central position. In both cases, the system is assumed to be a 5×5 lattice and $\delta = 3$.

Figure 11 clearly illustrates that the centrality of the first mover has a large impact on the proportion of treaties signed in the final equilibrium, where a dramatically higher proportion of systems with a central first mover converges to a state where all potential treaties are signed. An alternative way of viewing the data is to compare the average number of treaties signed when the first mover is highly central (28.0) to when the first mover is peripheral (11.6).[34]

Size of first mover. In the preceding simulations all states were assumed to be the same size. However, one may ask what difference the relative size of the first mover would make to the likelihood that treaties will spread through the system. What if, for example, the first mover were a particularly large state? A treaty between large state A

[34] Note that there are six distinct degrees of centrality in a 5×5 lattice. Additional simulations indicate that centrality of the first mover is monotonically related to the average number of treaties signed in equilibrium.

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Periphery				
		Core		

FIGURE 10
CORE AND PERIPHERAL ACTORS IN A 5 × 5 LATTICE

and state B would likely have a particularly large impact on the exports of third parties to state B, making third parties especially desirous of similar treaties with B. Thus the larger the first mover the more likely contagion.

In order to examine the impact of the size of the first mover on the likelihood of contagion, the effect of a treaty between the first mover and other states on third parties is varied. The impact of a treaty between the first mover A (from Figure 3) and state B on the likelihood of treaties between B and G and B and C is varied. The amount an A-B treaty will lower g_{BC} and g_{BG} will vary between 0 and 3 (rather than being fixed at 1). If the impact on third parties is 0, then an A-B treaty does not change g_{BC} and g_{BG}, and there will be no additional treaty contagion after an A-B treaty. If the impact is 3, an A-B treaty guarantees that there will at least be treaties between B and G and B and C. Figure 12 plots the proportion of potential treaties signed, varying the impact of a treaty with a (peripheral) first mover between 0 and 3, in increments of .03 with 1,000 replications per increment.

As expected, as the first mover increases in size, contagion becomes more likely. Notably, the incremental impact of an increase in size decreases as size increases.[35]

Transportation costs. The parameter δ captures one aspect of interdependence: the impact of a PTA on third parties that interact with the signatories of the PTA. Another dimension of interdependence is connectedness, for example, the effective number of neighbors each state has. In a world with low transportation costs, each state effectively has more neighbors than it would have in a world with high transportation

[35] The probability that A will sign a treaty with either B or F in the first round is $1 - (2/3)^2 \approx .56$. The proportion of treaties signed in Figure 12 reaches a maximum of approximately .5, which means that if the first mover were large and signed a treaty with at least one other state in the first round, subsequently 90 percent of potential treaties would be signed (on average).

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

FIGURE 11
HISTOGRAMS OF NUMBER OF TREATIES SIGNED WITH PERIPHERAL AND CENTRAL FIRST MOVERS

costs. With very low transportation costs, every state is effectively the neighbor of every other state. More states will potentially be affected by trade diversion when a PTA is signed; further, in the limit, international trade would potentially dwarf intranational trade in importance. In contrast, with very high transportation costs, there are fewer potential trade partners.

Imagine that there are two types of worlds: a high-transportation-costs world and a low-transportation-costs world. In the high-transportation-costs world, states interact only with their immediate four neighbors (as in the scenarios discussed above). In the low-transportation-costs world states interact with their diagonal neighbors (for example, in Figure 2, if state E interacted with A, C, G, and I, in addition to B, D, F, and H).[36] Then imagine running "history" one thousand times for each of these types of worlds. Figure 13 repeats the histogram summarizing the set of simulations associated with the central first mover in Figure 11 (high-transportation-cost simulations) and also includes a histogram summarizing the set of simulations under the assumption that states interact with their diagonal neighbors (low transportation costs, again assuming a central first mover).

Figure 13 clearly indicates that a much higher proportion of treaties are signed in the low-transportation-costs condition than in the high-transportation-costs condition. Another way of viewing these data is to

[36] Note that this increases the number of potential treaties from forty to seventy-two; the analysis below, of course, examines the proportion of potential treaties that are signed.

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

FIGURE 12
IMPACT OF SIZE OF FIRST MOVER ON NUMBER OF TREATIES SIGNED

consider the average proportion of treaties signed in the highly connected world, 96 percent, as compared with 70 percent in the less highly connected world.[37]

As a further illustration of this dynamic, if it is assumed that there are zero transportation costs—that is, every actor may potentially sign a treaty with every other actor—the simulation is virtually certain to converge on an equilibrium where every state has signed a treaty with every other state. For example, in one thousand runs of the simulation under this assumption, it converged to such an equilibrium every time.[38]

The key intuition here is that when transportation costs are low, states have more potential trading partners. When a PTA is signed, there are more third parties to be affected by trade diversion and more dyads to whom the contagion might spread.

[37] If the initial actor to sign a treaty is in the corner, the analogous numbers are 29 percent and 69 percent, respectively.

[38] While it is prohibitively difficult in this model to analytically derive the probability that a certain number of treaties will be reached in equilibrium, it is simple to calculate the probability that zero treaties will be reached under a given set of assumptions. Specifically, that number is $(1-\frac{1}{\delta})^p$, where p is the number of treaty-eligible neighbors the first mover has. Thus, for $\delta = 3$, in the highly connected scenario (p = 8), this is 3.9 percent; in the less connected scenario (p = 4) this is 20 percent; in the totally connected scenario (p = 24), .006 percent.

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

FIGURE 13
HISTOGRAMS OF NUMBER OF TREATIES SIGNED UNDER ASSUMPTIONS OF LOW TRANSPORTATION COSTS AND HIGH TRANSPORTATION COSTS

Rate and Pattern of Diffusion. This model should also give some insight into where and when treaties spread:

PROPOSITION 3

When treaties do spread in the system, they will spread slowly at first, then rapidly, and then slowly again. An S-shaped propagation pattern is standard for an actor-to-actor diffusion process, as discussed above.

PROPOSITION 4

The first mover will initially tend to occupy a relatively core position in the network of treaties, as that network emerges. The first mover is in a unique position in the system, a position that is reflected in the emerging network of treaties. Figure 14 summarizes a set of simulations that illuminates this issue. In this set of one thousand simulations, δ was set at 10, N to 25, and transportation costs were assumed to be 0 (that is, every actor is connected to every other actor).[39] In 927 of the 1,000 simulations, every possible treaty was signed.[40] For these cases, Figure 14 plots the round number against (1) the average number of treaties the first mover had signed by that round and (2) the average number of treaties all other actors had signed by that round.

Figure 14 indicates that while the network of treaties is emerging, the first mover is party to significantly more treaties than are other

[39] Note this is different from the preceding assumptions regarding interconnectedness. The reason for this last assumption was that this way all actors in the system have the same level of interactions, thus eliminating geographic centrality as a factor in determining centrality in the network of treaties.

[40] There were 0 treaties 82 times ($\cong .9^{24} \times 1000 = 80$), and 1 treaty once.

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

FIGURE 14
AVERAGE NUMBER OF TREATIES SIGNED BY ROUND FOR THE FIRST MOVER AND OTHER ACTORS

states. After one round the first mover is party to 2.5 treaties, on average, as compared with .1 for other states. After two rounds these numbers are 8.5 and .8, respectively; and after three, 18.9 and 4.6. First-mover advantage largely disappears after the fourth round, by which time almost all pairs of states have signed treaties.

In terms of *network stability,* it might be asked whether the resulting network of treaties unravels as easily as it formed. Each simulation is started with an exogenous shock, where it is assumed that two states sign a treaty. As the simulations above have illustrated, this shock is often sufficient to result in every possible pair of states signing equivalent treaties. Would an equivalent negative shock be sufficient to cause the network of treaties to unravel? The answer is a strong no: the model unambiguously suggests that the resulting network of treaties should be stable.

PROPOSITION 5

An equilibrium where every state has signed a treaty with every potential partner is robust. An example will illustrate why. Consider the simulations summarized in Figure 14: a small increase in the desirability of a treaty (lowering thresholds of dyads involving that state by 1) with one state resulted in all pairs of states signing treaties in 92.7 percent of the simulations. In these cases it becomes especially difficult for pairs of

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states to eliminate a given treaty, because those two states will then be at special disadvantage in each other's markets; that is, in each case, twenty-three other states will be given preferred access to the other's market. If one assumed that the thresholds (g_{ij}) randomly changed on occasion and that a treaty would be abrogated if g_{ij} exceeded the number of treaties i and j have with third parties, *g_{ij} would need to increase by between 36 and 46 in order for i and j to abrogate their treaty.*[41] Thus, if one were to ask what stimulus would need to be applied to the first mover in order to reverse *any* treaties, the minimum amount would be thirty-six times the initial shock! Further, even if all treaties involving the first mover were subsequently abrogated, no other treaties would be affected—there would not be a reverse contagion.[42] Generally, the only circumstances under which there would be a reverse contagion is if there were a huge, *systemic* (for example, due to depression or war) reduction in the desirability of treaties (for example, if the thresholds of *all* treaties increased on the order of 36 in the above example). Simply a disruption of the trading relationship of one pair of states (for example, because of a trade war) would certainly not be enough to cause a collapse of the system.

The above analysis has examined the implications of an assumption that an agreement between two states increases the likelihood of similar agreements between those states and third parties. Below is a discussion of the emergence of the MFN network of treaties that existed in Europe from 1860 to 1929.

The Rise of the MFN Network of Treaties[43]

As noted above, the MFN network of treaties exploded onto the scene in the 1860s, consistent with proposition 1 above. The above propositions offer insight into (1) the timing of this explosion, (2) the rate and

[41] At t = 0, g_{ij} is drawn from a uniform distribution between 0 and 10. After the system reaches an equilibrium where every state has a treaty with every other state, the member of each dyad has 23 treaties with nondyad members, so g_{ij} = the initial $g_{ij} - (2 \times 23)$. Thus, to increase the postequilibrium g_{ij} to a positive number, one would need to add between 36 and 46. To put this in more general terms, in a system which has reached an equilibrium where every state has signed a treaty with every other state, and every state has M trading partners, and the initial g_{ij} is drawn from a uniform distribution between 0 and δ, in order to eliminate the treaty between i and j, g_{ij} will need to be increased by $(2 \times M)$—the initial g_{ij}. Thus, notably, the more interconnected the world (the larger M), the more robust the equilibrium where every state has signed a treaty with every other state.

[42] If all treaties with one state, I, were removed, g_{kl} would equal the initial g_{kl} (drawn from between 0 and 10) $- (2 \times 22)$, which would be between −34 and −44.

[43] For a perceptive discussion of the MFN network of treaties from 1860 to 1929, see Douglas Irwin, "Multilateral and Bilateral Trade Policies," in Jaime de Melo and Arvind Panagariya, eds., *New Dimensions in Regional Integration* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993).

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pattern of the spread of treaties, and (3) the robustness of the treaty network.

Setting the Stage: The Industrial Revolution

The most prominent feature of nineteenth-century Europe was the spread of the Industrial Revolution throughout the Continent. At the end of the eighteenth century "Europe was a conglomeration of small, semi-autarkic markets, each with its own fairly complete array of trades. The scale of operations of the individual enterprise was small enough to make locational resource and supply considerations almost irrelevant."[44]

By the mid-nineteenth century the spread of technology and industry had reached the point of takeoff. Consider, for example, the following changes in Germany, France, and Belgium in the period 1850–69: a three to sixfold increase in pig iron output, a two to fivefold increase in coal production/consumption, and a five to ninefold increase in (fixed) steam-power capacity. The United Kingdom, having started the industrialization process earlier, had somewhat less dramatic changes (see Table 1). Further, the scale of production at the firm level, driven by technological developments, had undergone a dramatic increase.[45]

Europe had also become a much smaller place. Railroad mileage increased dramatically, greatly reducing the costs of transportation within Europe. Table 1 illustrates the increase in railroad mileage in some of the major economies at this time; in all, fifty thousand miles of track were laid in Europe between 1850 and 1870, in contrast to fifteen thousand before 1850.[46] Similarly, advances in the steam engine spurred commerce. Important technological advances during this period include the single-screw steamer (1839), the double-screw steamer (1862), and the compound engine (1850s). The latter was especially important because its greater efficiency allowed more room to be devoted to cargo.[47]

By the 1860s, therefore, reduced transportation costs and increased economies of scale in production had substantially increased the possibilities and benefits of trade. What were the implications for the treaty system regulating (or not) commercial relations among states in Europe

[44] David Landes, "Technological Change and Development in Western Europe, 1750–1914," in J. H. Clapham, ed., *The Cambridge Economic History of Europe: The Industrial Revolution and After*, pt. 1 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1965), 363.

[45] Ibid., 450.

[46] Ibid., 429.

[47] See Ernest Bogart, *Economic History of Europe, 1760–1939* (London: Longmans, Green, 1942), 109, 118.

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TABLE 1
ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT IN EUROPE
(1850–69)

	Railroad Mileage (Statute Mileage)	*Coal Production or Consumption[a] (1,000 Metric Tons)*	*Steam-power Capacity (1,000 h.p.)*	*Pig Iron Output (1,000 Metric Tons)*
Germany				
1850	3,639	5,100	260	212
1869	10,834	26,774	2,480	1,413
France				
1850	1,869	7,225	370	406
1869	10,518	21,432	1,850	1,381
United Kingdom				
1850	6,621	37,500	1,290	2,249
1869	15,145	97,066	4,040	5,446
Belgium				
1850	531	3,481	70	145
1869	1,800	7,822	350	535

SOURCE: Data reproduced from Landes (fn. 44), 423.

[a] Production figures are given for Germany; consumption figures are given for other countries.

at this time? As of 1860 there were virtually no significant treaties regulating commerce among European states. Propositions 2a and 2c above suggest that the dramatic reduction in transportation costs and greater economic interdependence increase the probability of the spread of PTAs. That is, to mix metaphors, the Europe of the mid-nineteenth century was nearing a level at which some trigger event could set off an avalanche of commercial treaties.[48]

THE EMERGENCE OF ECONOMIC OPENNESS IN THE 1860S

> Every new Commercial Treaty was at once a model and a starting point, a pattern for imitation and a basis for further development.
>
> —*Lord Napier.*[49]

That trigger event occurred in 1860, when Britain and France signed the Cobden-Chevalier treaty, in which each state agreed to impose a

[48] Per Bak and K. Chen, "Self-Organizing Criticality," *Scientific American* 264 (January 1991).

[49] Lord Napier, British ambassador to Berlin, to Lord Russell, British foreign secretary, March 24, 1865; originally cited in Peter Marsh, *Bargaining on Europe: Britain and the First Approach to a European Economic Community, 1860–1892* (New Haven: Yale University Press, forthcoming), chap. 3.

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lower set of tariffs on the other.[50] Consistent with the analyses of political economists in the 1990s, Napoleon III, seeking to balance export-oriented interests against offended import-competing interests in 1860, did not unilaterally extend to other states the concessions France had made to Britain.[51] The net result was that third-party exporters were at a decided disadvantage in the French market. Thus, for example, "Edged tools from treaty states paid a duty into France of 18 francs per 100 kilo., but from the Zollverein [and other nontreaty states] 160 francs; the duties on paper were respectively 10 and 160 francs, on iron tools 12 and 60 francs."[52]

The preceding analysis suggests that third parties would seek similar treaties to avoid having their goods pushed out of France's markets. Note that due to France's geographic centrality in Europe, quite a few third parties were affected, further increasing the likelihood that additional treaties would be signed. The size of the British economy meant that there would likely be significant trade diversion in the French market, while the size of the French economy meant there would likely be trade diversion in the markets of states with which it signed treaties (propositions 2b and 2c). Belgium was the state that likely had the most to lose, due in part to its geographic proximity to France and also because, like Britain, it was highly industrialized (per capita it was the most industrialized state on the Continent at the time).[53] Its proximity made it especially dependent on the French market,[54] and, as argued above, the economies of scale in its industrial production meant that trade diversion would have been especially harmful to its producers. In

[50] An important antecedent condition to this treaty was the general increase in power of Napoleon III and a French constitution that gave the executive (Napoleon III) power to set tariffs in treaties that did not require ratification by the legislature. This institutional setting of executive autonomy determined what Nelson labeled the "supply" conditions of protection and would be exogenous in the model above; see Douglas Nelson, "Endogenous Tariff Theory: A Critical Survey," *American Journal of Political Science* 32 (August 1988). A second factor that increased Napoleon's desire to strike a deal with Britain was his aim to acquire Britain's cooperation with respect to his objectives in Italy. See McKeown (fn. 4); and Barrie M. Ratcliffe, "The Origins of the Anglo-French Commercial Treaty: A Reassessment," in Ratcliffe, ed., *Great Britain and Her World, 1759–1914: Essays in Honour of W. O. Henderson* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1975). As noted above, for each dyad there will be a variety of idiosyncratic factors that affect the tendency of that pair to sign a treaty.

[51] Arthur Louis Dunham, *Anglo-French Treaty of Commerce of 1860* (Norwood: Plimpton Press, 1930).

[52] Max Schippel, *Grundzuge der Handelspolitik* (Berlin: Akademischer Verlag für sociale Wissenschaften, 1902), 171, as cited in Ashley (fn. 21), 32.

[53] Paul Bairoch, "European Trade Policy, 1815–1914," in J. H. Clapham et al., *The Cambridge Economic History of Europe* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989).

[54] More than a third of Belgian exports went to France at this time—162m francs out of total exports of 470m francs; see Mitchell (1975), 489, 506. It exported about as much to France as to its next two largest trading partners combined; e.g., in 1860 its exports to France were valued at 162m francs, and to Germany and the U.K., at 169m francs.

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fact, in 1861 Belgium was the first state after Britain to sign an MFN treaty with France.

This put additional pressure on other states, especially those with substantial manufactures. The Zollverein (the German customs union) is a case in point. As Ashley states:

> The inauguration of this treaty system in 1860, and the avowed intention to extend it as widely as possible, made it absolutely necessary for the Zollverein to take action. . . . The German manufacturers hoped that by a treaty they would secure a greatly developed market in France for their iron and steel, textiles, leather goods, etc., many of which were practically prohibited by the French "autonomous," as distinct from the "conventional" or treaty tariff.[55]

As a result, as one British diplomat in Leipzig observed, iron and steel exports of the Zollverein to France disappeared shortly after the Cobden-Chevalier treaty. As this diplomat remarked, "Unless a speedy arrangement [is made] . . . between the states of the Zollverein and France a similar result will be produced as regards other products and manufactures."[56]

The ramifications of the Cobden-Chevalier treaty were not lost on German decision makers. As Rudolf von Delbrück, "president of the federal chancellory and probably most responsible for the detailed formulation of the Zollverein's tariff policy in this period,"[57] stated: "Due to our position and our developed industry, we could not have permitted our exclusion from the market of the richest country on the continent, located before our very door, *if this market would be opened, as it was expected, to everybody else.*"[58]

The Zollverein was therefore motivated to sign an MFN treaty with France shortly after Belgium (in 1862). Between 1863 and 1866 most European states had entered into this network of MFN treaties.[59] Among the major states only Russia and the United States remained at the periphery of this network of treaties. Russia signed only some minor agreements at the end of the decade, and the United States signed no significant treaties.

[55] Ashley (fn. 21), 32.

[56] Memo, Joseph Crowe (consul-general for the Kingdom of Lower Saxony) to Lord Russell, May 15, 1861, as originally cited in Marsh (fn. 49), chap. 3.

[57] Ivo Nikolai Lambi, *Free Trade and Protection in Germany, 1869–1879* (Wiesbaden: Franz Steiner, 1963), 35.

[58] Rudolf von Delbrück, *Lebenserinnerungen, 1817–1867*, vol. 2 (Leipzig: Duncker und Humblot, 1905), 201–3, as cited in Lambi (fn. 57), 5, emphasis added.

[59] Bairoch (fn. 53), 40; see also Figure 15.

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

FIGURE 15
NUMBER OF COMMERCIAL TREATIES SIGNED AMONG EUROPEAN STATES, PLUS U.S. (1860–72)

THE RATE OF DIFFUSION

The above model also makes specific predictions about the rate of diffusion of treaties, specifically, that the spread of treaties should follow an S-shape—slow, fast, slow. Figure 15 plots the number of treaties signed from 1860 to 1872 in Europe.[60] As predicted, the rate of diffusion follows an S-shape. There were three distinct periods in the spread of commercial treaties. In the first two and a half years, only 3 treaties were signed, or 1.2 treaties per year. In the next three and a half years, 25 treaties were signed—7 treaties a year. And finally, in the next seven years, 19 treaties were signed—2.7 treaties a year.

THE PATTERN OF DIFFUSION: THE POSITION OF FRANCE AND BRITAIN IN THE NETWORK OF TREATIES

This analysis should offer insight not only into the growth rate of openness in the system but also into the *pattern* of openness. Figure 16 plots the number of treaties signed by Great Britain, France, and the

[60] This period was chosen because many of the treaties stated that they would come up for renewal in ten to twelve years, and the data on the renewal of particular treaties are incomplete. It is at least possible to say with some reliability that the treaties captured in Figure 15 were actually in force during this time.

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

FIGURE 16
NUMBER OF COMMERCIAL TREATIES SIGNED
(1860–72)

average of other states over this time. A critical issue, from the perspective of hegemonic stability theory, is the position of Britain in the network of treaties—was it, for example, in a privileged position in the network?

The answer is an emphatic no. It was France, not Britain, that was the pivot of the MFN treaty network. In the 1860s France signed eight more MFN agreements; Britain signed only four more, and France had signed a treaty with three of those four countries before Britain.[61] By the end of the period examined Britain had signed fewer treaties than the average of the other European states. Similarly, in the 1890s, while the Caprivi treaties improved Britain's access to Central European economies by virtue of Britain's MFN treaties with many of the states there, Germany gained tariff concessions that helped it disproportionately.[62]

[61] On this point, see also Arthur Stein, "The Hegemon's Dilemma: Great Britain, the United States, and the International Economic Order," *International Organization* 38 (Spring 1984). The four states with which both Britain and France signed treaties were Germany/Zollverein, Italy, Belgium, and Austria-Hungary. The last was the one state that Britain signed a treaty with first. The four states with which France signed treaties during this period and with which Britain did not were Spain, Norway-Sweden, Switzerland, and the Netherlands.

[62] Carl Johannes Fuchs, *The Trade Policy of Great Britain and Her Colonies since 1860*, trans. Constance H. M. Archibald (London: Macmillan, 1905), 76.

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France's relatively pivotal position in the MFN treaty network in the 1860s is consistent with proposition 4 from the simulations above: first movers will tend to occupy a core position in the treaty system.

The relatively poor position of Britain is particularly striking, when one considers that it was the hegemon and therefore expected to be in a uniquely advantaged position.[63] Further, Britain was a first mover in the same sense that France was; the initial treaty should have increased the desirability of Britain as a treaty partner and spurred additional treaties with it. This relatively poor position apparently contradicts proposition 4. However, this is the exception that proves the rule. The above model assumed that all g_{ij} were randomly distributed. Although this assumption was clearly a poor match to reality, it was useful for illustrating basic systemic dynamics. In pairs of states involving Britain, Britain was repeatedly hamstrung in commercial negotiations because of its already low tariffs. *Other states did not need to pay the domestic political price of reciprocal tariff reductions in order to gain access to Britain's market because they received much of that access for free.* In the terms of this model, the g_{ij} involving Britain were relatively high because of Britain's low tariffs. As Fuchs states:

> In regard to all the nations with which France had concluded such treaties, and with which England had no previous treaty containing the most favoured nation clause, she stood at a decided disadvantage compared with France, who enjoyed under those treaties differential duties in her favour. It was the same in the case of treaties which these countries made among themselves. Here was a state of affairs which seriously threatened English industry in her most important continental markets, and it had to be remedied. Thus it came about that England, in spite of the aversion of her prevailing Free Trade school towards commercial and tariff treaties, found herself obliged, like the rest, to make other commercial treaties of the same sort. At once, however, a difficulty presented itself. By extending independently to all countries the tariff changes conceded to France, she had almost lost her "bargaining power."[64]

The domestic politics by which Britain came to seek MFN treaties is consistent with the trade diversion analysis above. There is strong evidence that export sectors in Britain played an important role in driving British trade policy in the 1860s. Marsh, in the most comprehensive diplomatic history of the trade treaties of this period, documents the

[63] Of course, this is less puzzling if one views Britain as the benevolent hegemon rather than as an exploitative hegemon; see Duncan Snidal, "The Limits of Hegemonic Stability Theory," *International Organization* 39 (Autumn 1985). One might hypothesize that Britain encouraged other states to sign treaties as part of its effort to decrease trade barriers in the international system. There is no evidence to support this hypothesis, and some that contradicts it, e.g., Fuchs (fn. 62); and Marsh (fn. 49).

[64] Fuchs (fn. 62), 29.

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intimate involvement of woolen textiles centered in Bradford in British trade negotiations in the 1860s, beginning with the 1860 Cobden-Chevalier treaty.[65] Representatives from the Bradford Chamber of Commerce accompanied Cobden in his negotiations for the original 1860 treaty, successfully securing important concessions from the French.

Subsequently, in 1862, this sector was mobilized to push for a treaty with Belgium. Belgium and France had signed a treaty that reduced Belgian tariffs on French woolens: French woolens faced less than half the duty levied on British goods in Belgium.[66] This pattern was repeated in 1863, after France signed treaties with Italy[67] and the Zollverein.[68]

The importance of woolen manufactures in British trade negotiations fits the economic logic outlined earlier: the worsted woolens centered in Bradford had undergone a dramatic increase in scale of production in the 1850s.[69] Further, textiles at this time were a differentiated good, with different states and regions producing markedly different products.[70]

The cases in which Britain was able to sign treaties are consistent with the underlying theory. Where there was the threat of trade diversion, particularly where economies of scale and differentiated products were involved, Britain was able to sign treaties. Because it had maintained significant tariffs in a few areas, notably wine (a differentiated good), it was able to conclude some treaties. These tariffs were then in part bargained away in the initial treaty with France.[71] While Britain unilaterally extended these concessions to third parties, it had maintained higher tariffs on different types of wines, creating de facto discrimination in favor of France, which put pressure on other wine exporters to make concessions to Britain, for example, Austria (1865)[72] and Spain (1886).[73] In addition, states were afraid of trade diversion with Britain in respect to its dominions. Thus Britain was able to offer a guarantee to states that their goods would be subject to the same du-

[65] Marsh (fn. 49), chap. 2.
[66] Ibid., chap. 3.
[67] Ibid.
[68] Ibid.
[69] Landes (fn. 44), 440.
[70] Thus, for example: "The particular blend of worsted wear in which Bradford specialized included warps of cotton, which remained cheaper than wool, to produce a hard and lustrous cloth which went well over the crinolines of the day, better than the more expensive all-woolen worsteds in which the French specialized"; Marsh (fn. 49), chap. 3.
[71] Dunham (fn. 51), 88.
[72] Fuchs (fn. 62), 31–32.
[73] Ibid., 59.

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ties as British goods in British colonies. Notably, the two treaties that included this guarantee were states with a similar profile of industrial (high economies of scale) exports as Britain: Belgium (1862) and the Zollverein (1865).[74]

Network Stability

As Irwin points out, one of the most striking things about the MFN treaty network was its relative robustness.[75] In the 1880s, under the onslaught of recession and a flood of cheap agrarian products from the U.S. and Russia, the system bent but did not break. The trade war between France and Italy had no broader impact on the system. In the 1890s, at Germany's initiative, the system went through a significant expansion into Central Europe. At this time Germany had been experiencing sharp increases in food prices, hampering manufacturers' competitiveness and reducing the agrarian demand for protection.[76] As a result, with the replacement of Bismarck by Caprivi, Germany sought "to imitate the example of France in 1860, and take the lead in a readjustment for a definite period of the economic relations of the European states."[77] Germany concluded a series of treaties, starting with the 1891 treaty with Austria-Hungary, "which for some time had been desirous of entering into closer relations with Germany, since the latter country was its most important market."[78] That treaty also induced other countries to seek agreements with Germany, and treaties with Italy, Belgium, Switzerland, Serbia, Spain, and Romania soon followed. Russia followed in 1894, which was particularly interesting, since it had largely avoided commercial treaties prior to that year. But because of its geographic proximity to Germany and the similarity of its exports to those of the signatories of the Caprivi treaties, Russia, unlike in previous years, now had an incentive to reach a similar agreement:

> Russia had hitherto stood apart from the treaty system, in her unwillingness to bind her customs tariff for any definite time, but now she was not disinclined to modify her policy, particularly as the treaties already made by Germany put her in an extremely difficult position. Those treaties had given reductions of duties on agricultural produce to other nations, who thereby enjoyed a distinct advantage over Russia. After the conclusion of the first series of treaties, Russian corn

[74] Ibid., 30–31.
[75] Irwin (fn. 43).
[76] Fuchs (fn. 62), 64.
[77] Ibid., 65.
[78] Ibid., 66.

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paid a duty 43 per cent higher than that imposed on the products of the favoured nations.[79]

The Caprivi treaties again highlight the contagion effect resulting from the threat of trade diversion. The series of treaties that Germany had signed increased the relative payoff of a treaty to Russia.

The First World War wrecked the MFN network, which was slow to reassert itself after the war. Arguably, this was because one of the major actors of the system, Germany, was required by the Treaty of Versailles to extend most-favored-nation status to all of the Allies. Because it was unable to discriminate, it could not threaten other states with trade diversion. In effect this requirement eliminated the possibility of contagion of MFN agreements in relations with one of the key actors of the international system (in terms of both geography and size), reducing the likelihood that MFN treaties would spread through the whole system. Germany was released from this obligation in 1925, and as a result, France abandoned its policy of a two-tiered autonomous tariff and signed an MFN agreement with Germany in 1927. This treaty had significant ramifications throughout the international system, in which "the number of countries linked by commercial treaties rose from thirty in 1927 to forty-two in 1928."[80] Because tariff rates were set in the treaties, this had a significant stabilizing effect on European tariffs.[81] For example, half the rates of the French tariff were set in the treaty with Germany; by the end of 1928 nearly three-quarters of the rates were set by international agreements.[82] Under the weight of the depression, however, the reborn MFN network collapsed.

While there were a number of trade wars between major actors of the system during this period, the only events that threatened the network were the First World War and the depression in 1929, the latter ultimately destroying it. This is consistent with proposition 5: the system of treaties, once formed, became self-reinforcing. It took truly systemic and cataclysmic events to undo the network.

Discussion

Implications: Snowballing Trade Blocs

Current PTAs are predominantly *multilateral* rather than *bilateral,* as they had been in the 1860s. These multilateral efforts should be char-

[79] Ibid., 70.
[80] Irwin (fn. 43), 105.
[81] Note that these levels were significantly higher than pre–World War I levels.
[82] Frank A. Haight, *A History of French Commercial Policies* (New York: Macmillan, 1941).

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acterized by the same contagion dynamics as those of bilateral PTAs.[83] As trade blocs grow, pressure should increase on nonmembers to join in order to prevent trade diversion.[84] Three cases will be briefly discussed below: the growth of the Zollverein, the EC/EU, and Western hemisphere PTAs.

The rapid creation of the Zollverein in the 1820s and 1830s offers some insight into bandwagoning effects that might result from the microlevel dynamics discussed in this article.[85] Once a few German states had formed a customs union (in the 1820s three unions were formed—between Bavaria and Wurttemberg, between Prussia and Hesse-Darmstadt, and one that included Saxony and a number of smaller German states), there was a rapid movement of German states to join the unions, and eventually to consolidate the customs unions into the Zollverein. The quandary of Saxony, which was a holdout in joining the Prussian-led bloc because it greatly desired to maintain its autonomy, captures the importance of trade diversion in its choice:

> In fact, Saxony had scarcely any course to take but to join the Union. She had lost many of her richest provinces by the peace; she was hemmed in by unfriendly tariffs; her manufacturing population found insufficient outlets for their productions. . . .[86] On the whole, Saxony is the portion of Germany which has most profited by the Commercial League, for in Saxony manufacturing industry was most developed, and in the competition with other states of the League Saxony had the vantage-ground. To her especially it has opened a market of 26,000,000 of consumers, and closed the gates to a great extent against foreign rivals.[87]

[83] There are, of course, other processes at work that might confound contagion. For example, in the case of the EC/EU, members at any given time will need to evaluate the policy preferences of potential members. If those preferences differ substantially from those of current members, current members may delay membership of potential members until those differences matter less. See George Downs, David Rocke, and Peter Barsoom, "Managing the Evolution of Multilateralism," *International Organization* 52 (Spring 1998). Also, since the EU allows free movement of factors, some potential members raise the possibility of large (and politically costly to current members) migrations to current EU members. The EU has developed "second class" citizenship for Turkey and many of the countries in Central Europe, offering, that is, much of the access to goods but not to people. From a research design perspective, the system of bilateral treaties conveniently eliminates some of the messiness involved in the process of adhesion to multilateral PTAs.

[84] See also Yi (fn. 23).

[85] For an intriguing analysis of the Zollverein and other multilateral PTAs, see also Walter Mattli, *The Logic of Regional Integration: Europe and Beyond* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999). Mattli's argument is that (1) customs unions represent an attempt to internalize externalities that cross borders within the customs union; and (2) decreased transportation costs increase externalities across borders (increasing the payoffs to a customs union) and decrease the costs of administering a larger geographic unit.

[86] John Bowring, *Report on the Prussian Commercial Union* (London: W. Clowes, 1840), 33–34, as cited in Ashley (fn. 21), 11.

[87] Bowring (fn. 86), 37, as cited in Ashley (fn. 21), 11.

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Similarly, in the case of Baden: "With the establishment of the Zollverein it became clear that Baden's agriculture and commerce would suffer. Trade with Switzerland and Holland was not adequate compensation for the loss of German markets."[88] Generally, the expansion of the Prussian-led customs union increased the isolation of nonmember German states. The threat of trade diversion to exporters within the Zollverein led to the eventual adhesion of these states.[89]

These factors can be generalized in an analysis of trade bloc formation today. The growth potential of a trade bloc depends on the threat of trade diversion in markets within the trade bloc. Britain in the 1950s is a case in point. Although Britain initially stayed out of the EEC to maintain political autonomy, it eventually sought membership when its share of intra-European trade declined due to trade diversion. These dynamics applied to intra-EC interactions as well. In negotiations over the future of the EC, Britain resisted plans that would have strengthened the power of the EC vis-à-vis its constituent states. Germany and France threatened to go ahead with a "two-tier" EC, in which the first tier (including Germany and France) would effectively have removed more barriers among each other than to the second tier.[90] Britain eventually acceded to most of France and Germany's demands. Arguably, the fear of trade diversion to potential first-tier members was an important factor in its decision.

The recent deepening of the EC/EU also increased pressures on nonmembers to join. A key political dynamic underlying the push toward the Single European Act originated with industrialists who saw the unification of the European market as essential for firms to reach the scale necessary to be competitive in the world market.[91] The deepening process thus created the possibility of trade diversion,[92] which increased pressure to join on third parties that exported goods characterized by economies of scale in production. In fact, among European Free Trade Agreement (EFTA) countries that considered joining the EU, there was a strong correlation between public support for membership and the importance of manufactured exports to the EU and EFTA.[93]

[88] William Otto Henderson, *The Zollverein* (London: Frank Cass, 1984), 107.

[89] Ibid., 103–49.

[90] Andrew Moravcsik, "Negotiating the Single European Act: National Interests and Conventional Statecraft in the European Community," *International Organization* 45 (Winter 1991).

[91] Maria Green Cowles, "Setting the Agenda for a New Europe: The ERT and EC, 1992," *Journal of Common Market Studies* 33 (December 1995), 507.

[92] Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, *Regionalism and Its Place in the Multilateral Trading System* (Paris: OECD, 1996), 76.

[93] Baldwin (fn. 6), 489.

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The case of the EU also highlights an additional contagion dynamic that may be more important today than trade diversion in causing the spread of trade agreements: investment diversion. In the above analysis it was assumed that producers of differentiated goods and goods characterized by economies of scale in production in a given state would, in response to a PTA among other states, exercise their voice and put pressure on their government to reach a similar agreement. However, exit is an increasingly viable option through foreign direct investment, and it can place great pressure on a government to join a PTA in order to prevent domestic producers from leaving. Further, the nonentry of foreign producers would place similar pressures on a government. Sweden in the 1980s is a case in point: what had begun in the early 1980s as a small gap between outward and inward investment had widened by 1990 to a 9:1 chasm. At the beginning of this period very little Swedish FDI was directed to the EC; by the end of this period, almost all of Swedish outward investment was headed in that direction.[94] The Swedish decision to join the EU may be contrasted to Norway's decision not to join. Norway's largest export is oil, and there is relatively little threat of trade diversion with respect to this good within the EU, nor is there any possibility that oil companies would move their production elsewhere in the EU.

In a more recent example of the snowball potential for trade blocs, the formation of the Canada–United States Free Trade Area diverted some trade from Mexico to the United States, increasing the payoff for Mexico to join the free trade area.[95] NAFTA, in turn, seems to be spurring increased efforts for treaties between the United States and Latin America, Europe and Latin America, and the U.S. and Europe.[96]

There have been many trade blocs that have not snowballed, especially among Third World states. In these cases current and potential members had less to worry about regarding trade diversion to states within a nascent trade bloc. These sets of states had similar endowments of factors of production, with a particular emphasis on primary production (in which there will be relatively little intraindustry trade). Further, the economies involved were much smaller.

[94] Karl-Orfeo Fioretos, "The Anatomy of Autonomy: Interdependence, Domestic Balances of Power, and European Integration," *Review of International Studies* 23 (July 1997), 313–14.

[95] Oye (fn. 6), 164. Note that customs unions also have the analytically distinct property that because there is a common exterior tariff, the collective might be able to reap gains through the imposition of an optimal tariff. Further, it is clear that at least in the case of the EC, a major objective of members was to allow EC firms to achieve economies of scale that would allow them to compete with U.S. firms; see Bela Balassa, *The Theory of Economic Integration* (Homewood, Il.: Richard Irwin, 1961).

[96] Robert Z. Lawrence, *Regionalism, Multilateralism, and Deeper Integration* (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1996), 77.

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For the same reason, attempts to tighten trade blocs among these countries (for example, by eliminating nontariff barriers)—two-tier types of threats, such as were used by France and Germany in the 1980s—would probably not have worked.

It is noteworthy that preferential trade agreements that were signed among South American states in the 1960s failed, when the main exports of the economies involved were largely commodities. Far more successful were preferential trade agreements by these same states in the 1990s, by which time their economies had undergone a substantial transition toward producing industrial goods.

The key distinction between the bilateral arrangements of the 1860s and current multilateral arrangements is that the former did not forbid concessions to third parties. In fact, any such agreement would have violated the MFN clauses of existing treaties with third parties. Some current multilateral arrangements, notably customs unions, explicitly forbid such bilateral treaties with third parties (for example, the EU). Other multilateral agreements implicitly reject additional treaties in the near future because certain producers benefit from the trade diversion effects of the treaty (arguably, the Mercosur).[97] It is therefore unclear whether snowballing will ultimately lead to a world with freer trade or to a beggar-thy-neighbor world full of exclusive PTAs.[98]

Conclusion: Bottom-Up Models of International Relations

The economic openness of the 1860s marked the beginning of the first relatively open international economic system. France was able to pursue commercial negotiations with Britain because of the presence of a free-trade executive who did not have to submit treaties to a protectionist legislature. The resulting Cobden-Chevalier treaty of 1860 increased the incentive of continental European states to sign commercial treaties with France to avoid trade diversion resulting from the 1860 treaty. Similarly, these treaties increased the incentive of additional states to sign treaties with each other. The ensuing network of treaties resulted in dramatically lower tariffs in most of Europe.

[97] Yeats finds that trade within Mercosur has grown fastest in those products that do not have a comparative advantage and concludes that Mercosur is therefore trade diverting; see Alexander Yeats, *Does Mercosur's Trade Performance Raise Concerns about the Effects of Regional Trade Arrangements*, Policy Research Working Paper, no. 1729 (Washington, D.C.: World Bank, 1997).

[98] Yi finds that if agreements are open to new members, trade blocs will snowball so that eventually all states will belong to one PTA (i.e., there will be multilateral free trade); see Yi (fn. 23).

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Young, in discussing the origins of regimes, distinguished among three regime types: spontaneous, negotiated, and imposed.[99] Negotiated and imposed regimes are both centrally planned, where imposed regimes are dictated by the elite power(s) of the system and negotiated regimes involve a more inclusive "explicit consent on the part of individual participants."[100] As mentioned earlier, the relative economic openness of the 1860s in Europe is sometimes interpreted as the result of such a central plan. It is, however, more plausible that the MFN network spontaneously emerged from each state's response to its particular placement in the system, and the opportunities and constraints that this placement created. Similarly, the explosion of regionalism today suggests that a contagion type of analysis might offer some insight into the growth of free trade areas and customs unions—where fear of being left out in the cold is driving the formation and growth of PTAs. Finally, it is increasingly apparent that such bottom-up processes account for important phenomena in the international system.

[99] Oran Young, "Regime Dynamics: The Rise and Fall of International Regimes," in Stephen Krasner, ed., *International Regimes* (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1983).
[100] Ibid., 99.

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OLD POLITICAL RATIONALITIES AND NEW DEMOCRACIES

Compromise and Confrontation in Hungary and Poland

By ANNA SELENY *

As authoritarian regimes crumbled around the world during the 1970s and 1980s, political scientists rushed to study the process by which societies made the transition to democracy, spawning a literature known awkwardly as "transitology." When these new democracies began to grapple with the concrete challenges of governance, however, scholars turned their attention to the study of how countries make democracy work. Unfortunately, many preliminary studies of democratic consolidation have been unsatisfying.[1] One reason for this is that scholars do not agree on how to trace or measure consolidation. The easiest and most obvious way—focusing on the frequency and competitiveness of elections—provides only a flawed and superficial picture of the true state of democracy.[2] Another reason is that many analysts had little

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[1] Scholars who have addressed this issue include Guillermo O'Donnell, "Illusions about Consolidation," *Journal of Democracy* 7 (April 1996); Juan Linz and Alfred Stepan, *Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation: Southern Europe, South America, and Post-Communist Europe* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1996); John Higley and Jan Pakulski, "Elite Power Games and Democratic Consolidation in Central and Eastern Europe" (Revised paper for the E.S.F. Network Conference on Social Transformations in Central and Eastern Europe, C.N.R.S., Paris, May 15–17, 1998); and Andreas Schedler, "What Is Democratic Consolidation?" *Journal of Democracy* 9 (April 1998).

[2] For a concise recent discussion of several different interpretations of consolidation, especially the distance in emphasis between Samuel Huntington's "two-turnover test" and Terry Lynn Karl's "fallacy of electoralism," see Michael Bratton, "Second Elections in Africa," *Journal of Democracy* 9 (July 1998). For an incisive analysis of "procedural" and "substantive" democracy in the postcommunist period, see Ellen Comisso, "Is the Glass Half Full or Half Empty? Reflections on Five Years of Competitive Politics in Eastern Europe," *Communist and Post-Communist Studies* 30 (March 1997).

World Politics 51 (July 1999), 484–519

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knowledge of the prior histories and cultures of those countries or of the variety of national trajectories within seemingly uniform political-economic regimes.[3] This problem has been especially acute in recent studies of Eastern Europe, a region that was routinely ignored in many political science departments before 1989.[4] Finally, many of the theoretical approaches to these democracies' consolidation and qualitative development highlight the very same factors previously used to explain their transitional dynamics[5]—from exogenous contingencies and elite smarts to institutional tinkering and actors' rational adaptation to changing incentives. Too often the result has been political analysis that is shallow, incomplete, or simply misinformed.

This article seeks to remedy some of these flaws by advancing an interpretation of recent political development in Eastern Europe that highlights the persistence of pretransition political patterns. I argue that we cannot comprehend why countries succeed or fail at democratic consolidation—much less discern significant qualitative differences *among* consolidated democracies—by focusing exclusively on formal in-

[3] Many assumed that even in the absence of contextual knowledge, their theoretical expertise would permit the rigorous application of models derived from other parts of the world to Eastern Europe. See Michael Bernhard, *Institutional Choice after Communism: A Critique of Theory-Building in an Empirical Wasteland,* Program on Central and Eastern Europe Working Papers Series 47 (Cambridge: Minda De Gunzberg Center for European Studies, Harvard University, 1998). For another detailed critique of this practice and an overview of some important methodological debates that have arisen in connection with it, see Valerie Bunce, "Should Transitologists Be Grounded?" *Slavic Review* 54 (Spring 1995), 111–27. See also the following in *Slavic Review*: Sarah Meiklejohn Terry, "Thinking about Postcommunist Transitions: How Different Are They?" *Slavic Review* 52 (Summer 1993), 333–37; Philippe C. Schmitter and Terry Lynn Karl, "The Conceptual Travels of Transitologists and Consolidologists: How Far to the East Should They Attempt To Go?" *Slavic Review* 53 (Spring 1994), 173–85; Terry Lynn Karl and Philippe C. Schmitter, "From an Iron Curtain to a Paper Curtain: Grounding Transitologists or Students of Postcommunism?" *Slavic Review* 54 (Winter 1995), 965–78; and Valerie Bunce, "Paper Curtains and Paper Tigers," *Slavic Review* 54 (Winter 1995), 979–87.

[4] See, for instance, Norman Naimark's observations in Heather Davis, "Reality Checks, New Knowledge, Critical Dialogues," *Frontline* (IREX) (Winter 1998–99), 13; and Ken Jowitt, "Really Imaginary Socialism," *East European Constitutional Review* (double issue) 6 (Spring–Summer 1997), 43–49, esp. 44.

[5] See, for example, the arguments of Karl and Karl and Schmitter, that "modes" of transition are *critical determinants* of democratic stability and consolidation; Terry Lynn Karl, "Dilemmas of Democratization in Latin America," *Comparative Politics* 23 (October 1990); and Terry Lynn Karl and Philippe C. Schmitter, "Modes of Transition in Latin America, Southern and Eastern Europe," *International Social Science Journal* 43 (May 1991). Others have also made plain the inadequacies of a "transitions" approach, among them Bunce (fn. 3, Spring 1995 and Winter 1995); Marcelo Cavarozzi, "Beyond Transitions to Democracy in Latin America," *Journal of Latin American Studies* 24 (October 1992); and Frances Hagopian, "After Regime Change: Authoritarian Legacies, Political Representation, and the Democratic Future of South America," *World Politics* 45 (April 1993). Of course, there are a number of studies that reasonably suggest a more balanced approach and argue that while transition processes per se may not be the critical determinants of successful democratization, they can nevertheless have important implications. See Guillermo O'Donnell and Philippe C. Schmitter, *Transitions from Authoritarian Rule: Tentative Conclusions about Uncertain Democracies* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986); Linz and Stepan (fn. 1).

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stitutions, modes of transition, incentive structures, or exogenous factors. My interpretation of recent political development in two East European countries is broadly compatible with historical institutionalist insights, but it is much more deeply rooted in the dynamics of *pretransition conceptual frames and informal political settlements.*[6] Specifically, I argue that the two most important determinants of the models of democracy emerging in Eastern Europe are the *nature of core conflicts* between communist political elites and society and the *patterns of political accommodation* that evolved in the course of managing those conflicts.[7] These core conflicts and patterns—call them old political rationalities—are institutionalized in postcommunist politics and state-society relations as specific political practices and discourses. Thus, despite radically altered contexts of political, legal, and economic incentives, and even where elite circulation has been significant, old political rationalities continue to structure the political agenda and order debate.

These claims imply, among other things, the need to rethink common classifications of new democracies. Such classifications contain, of course, the notion that democracies vary in quality, even though we are not agreed on what makes for a high-grade democracy. We do, however, agree on the minimum requirements. Thus most of the recent work on Eastern Europe divides the region into two relatively homogenous groupings: a cluster of stable and essentially consolidated

[6] The analysis is also broadly compatible with path-dependent analyses; see Jeffrey S. Kopstein and David A. Reilly, "Explaining the Why of the Why: A Comment on Fish's 'Determinants of Economic Reform in the Post-Communist World'" (Manuscript, Department of Political Science, University of Colorado at Boulder, August 1999), 1. But whereas such analyses emphasize how various equilibria result from institutional choices, I stress (1) informal patterns of politics and (2) the power of specific conceptual frames to organize and limit political agendas and institutional possibilities (at founding moments), *as well as* institutional interactions (once established). Daniel Chirot made an interesting variant of this criticism when he decried the neglect of the "ideological intent of those who take power" by sociologists working in the tradition of structural materialism; see Chirot, "Social Revolutions in Modern World" (book review), *Social Forces* 75 (March 1997). Finally, this study lends support to analyses focusing on the procedural elements of elite interaction, for example, Michael Burton, Richard Gunther, and John Higley, "Introduction: Elite Transformations and Democratic Regimes," in John Higley and Richard Gunther, eds., *Elites and Democratic Consolidation in Latin America and Southern Europe* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1992). But similar caveats should be observed: ideas and the discourses that link them to political practice—as well as the informal institutions that routinely give them expression—condition both elite behavior and that of their social interlocutors.

[7] Ekiert focuses on major political crises in post–World War II Central Europe, and his comprehensive analysis supports the approach used here. See Gregorz Ekiert, *The State against Society: Political Crises and Their Aftermath in East Central Europe* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1996), 325. Most experts who have long written about Eastern Europe eschew reductionistic explanations of East European politics, whether institutional choice explanations or other varieties. The list of scholars who have produced rich work on the region would require a separate, lengthy review article. While the present article helps explain several recent political developments in Hungary and Poland, at the theoretical level, it is the *recent* literature on Eastern Europe that makes it necessary.

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democratic systems (the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Slovenia)[8] and a highly problematic camp (Albania, Bulgaria, Romania, Russia, Slovakia, and most of the former Yugoslavia). This categorization captures an important division within the region, but it also obscures crucial differences within each camp.[9] In the problematic camp, despite recent hopeful developments in several cases, obstacles to consolidation have ranged from the feudalization of the polity and extremes of corruption (as in Russia, Bulgaria, or Albania) to fervid ethno-nationalism (Serbia) and, until recently, demagogic populism (Slovakia). In the camp of stable democracies, at least two distinct types of democratic regimes have evolved—a *confrontational-pluralist* model epitomized by Poland and a *compromise-corporatist* model epitomized by Hungary. This article describes these models and shows how and why each developed.[10] It also demonstrates how long-standing patterns of intraelite and state-society relations have shaped post-1989 political trajectories and discusses how these different patterns are likely to influence each country's prospects for sustained governability and increased democratic legitimacy.

Part I describes the emergent types, or models, of democracy in contemporary Hungary and Poland. Part II provides a historical analysis of the development of these models. Part III assesses the importance of the models' different features and speculates about their possible future impact on the Polish and Hungarian democracies.

[8] Increasingly, the Baltic countries are included in this camp. Rupnik actually sees a tripartite classification, with the Balkans and Russia in separate categories. Jacques Rupnik, "The Postcommunist Divide," *Journal of Democracy* 10 (January 1999), 57–62.

[9] For example, many analysts pair pre-1989 Hungary and Poland as "reformist," "pacted," "negotiated," or "national consensus" systems or transitions. On pacted and negotiated transitions in the region, see Samuel P. Huntington, *The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century* (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1991); on national consensus systems, see Herbert Kitschelt, "Formation of Party Cleavages in Post-Communist Democracies: Theoretical Propositions," *Party Politics* 1 (October 1995); and John Ishiyama, "Transitional Electoral Systems in Post-Communist Eastern Europe," *Political Science Quarterly* (Spring 1997), 112. But such studies cannot explain contemporary Polish or Hungarian politics, *precisely because* they adopt analytical categories that eclipse fundamentally different sociopolitical cleavages and core conflicts, and thus often confuse cause and effect. Take the common misconception that economic reforms are the primary object and cause of the most fundamental political conflicts in these new democracies. In fact, the core conflicts shaping contemporary politics issue not so much from reforms per se as from patterns of intraelite and state-society interaction *that motivate or block* reforms. Andrew János, for instance, suggests a useful distinction between developmental and reconstructionist regimes and offers a deep analysis of the variety of regimes that evolved in Eastern Europe (and in the Soviet Union over time). See János, "What Was Communism: A Retrospective in Comparative Analysis," *Communist and Post-Communist Studies* 29 (March 1996).

[10] It may yet prove too soon to employ the language of "models"—even loosely and for convenience' sake as I do here: some of the divergence that now appears fixed may yet turn out to be "transitional." But whatever important differences persist decades hence between the Polish and Hungarian democracies, their origins are likely to be found in the variables identified here.

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I. Models of Democracy

In the years since the disintegration of their communist systems, all the countries of Eastern Europe have struggled to consolidate their new democratic regimes. While Hungary and Poland are viewed as being more successful in this regard than many others in the region, the democracies that have emerged in these two countries differ greatly. As noted above, Poland's new democracy approximates a *conflictual-pluralist* model of consolidation[11] and is characterized by high levels of political mobilization, contentious party competition around several overlapping, deep ethical-ideological cleavages, relatively low levels of elite consensus, and a moralistic political discourse. The Hungarian *compromise-corporatist* model of consolidation, by contrast, is characterized by low levels of political mobilization, relatively high levels of elite consensus and bargaining, and a generally "economistic" or pragmatic political discourse.[12] Before discussing why these different types of democracy developed and how they may affect each country's future political development, it is worth examining more closely the characteristics of these emerging models of democratic consolidation.

Mobilization versus Bargaining

Perhaps the most striking feature of Polish democracy is its high level of political mobilization. Protest actions, especially by unions, and direct confrontation with the state by societal actors have become the hallmark of democratic Polish politics.[13] Hungary, by contrast, is re-

[11] Poland approximates but does not precisely fit what Giovanni Sartori called "polarized pluralism": systems characterized by highly polarized political entities that find it difficult to cooperate with one another. Sartori, "European Political Parties: The Case of Polarized Pluralism," in Joseph LaPalombara and Myron Weiner, eds., *Political Parties and Political Development* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1966).

[12] During the May 1998 election campaign, as in the previous two election cycles since 1989, other strains of moralistic politics more similar to the Polish variety could be heard in Hungary. Similarly, one finds myriad examples of political compromise in everyday Polish politics, as well as a few more dramatic ones: the political compromise of the 1989 roundtable agreement (discussed below), Adam Michnik's rapprochement with General Jaruzelski, and so on. Thus my characterization is intended only as shorthand for describing overall trends in the political development of the two countries. Moreover, in a deeper sense Polish politics rests on strong multiple corporate identities (the church, unions, "the nation") as much as on "individuals" as generally understood in the Western liberal tradition, while Hungarian politics seems to be more thoroughly based on a kind of "civic individualism." If Ken Jowitt is correct in asserting that "individual civic identities *do come at the exense of corporate identity*," then my characterization of the Hungarian and Polish democratic models as broadly "corporatist" and "pluralist" respectively raises a certain irony, which in this venue I can do no more than acknowledge. See Jowitt, "In Praise of the Ordinary," in Michnik, *Letters from Freedom: Post–Cold War Realities and Perspectives* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1988), xxii.

[13] The point here is not to draw conclusions about how *effectively* Polish unions defend the interests of their membership. Determining this would require an in-depth empirical study carefully specifying and contextualizing the definition of success. A few impressionistic points must suffice here. Given Poland's legacy of trade-union activism, it is somewhat ironic that since 1990 Polish unemployment

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TABLE 1
STRIKES IN HUNGARY AND POLAND

	Number of Strikes			*Number of Participants (Thousands)*		
	1991	*1992*	*1993*	*1991*	*1992*	*1993*
Hungary	3	10	17	250	25–30	20
Poland	305	6,362[a]	7,362	221	730	382

SOURCE: "Ha már elhallgat a csend," *Heti Világgazdaság*, February 24, 1994, cited in Makó and Simonyi (fn. 15), 224.

[a] This very large increase is due in part to the fact that Poland's Main Statistical Office (GUS) changed its method of counting in 1992. For a more detailed explanation, see Grzegorz Ekiert and Jan Kubik, "Collective Protest in Post-Communist Poland, 1989–1993: A Research Report," *Communist and Post-Communist Studies* 31 (June 1998), 96.

markably free of such activity. Indeed, many have commented on the political "quiescence" of Hungarian society, because rather than pressuring the state or government, Hungarians seem content to devolve much of the difficult work of politics to elites.[14] Of course, occasional strikes and demonstrations do occur in postcommunist Hungary. These strikes have been largely confined to state-owned sectors like transport, energy, and education.[15] But the most notable thing about them, apart from their infrequency, is how quickly they are resolved through compromise with the government or relevant ministry. Indeed, many of them give the impression of scripted theater.[16] (See Table 1.)

was several percentage points higher than in Hungary, and between the third quarter of 1993 and 1997 the percentage increase over Hungarian levels grew. Moreover, real wages in Poland fell further between 1990 and 1993. For unemployment figures, see Jan Winiecki, "East Central Europe: A Regional Survey—the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and Slovakia in 1993," *Europe-Asia Studies 46* (January 1994), 729. For real wages, see Béla Greskovits, "Hungerstrikers, the Unions, the Government and the Parties: A Case Study of Hungarian Transformation—Conflict, the Social Pact and Democratic Development" (Manuscript, Central European University, Budapest, 1994), 32. For time-series data since 1992, see the *Statistical Bulletin 1994/4–1997/4* (Budapest: Kozponti Statisztikai Hivatal (KSH), 1995). By comparison, at least in the early posttransition years, Polish workers' councils maintained a degree of influence in many enterprises and used this influence to establish numerous ESOPS, as well as to veto some privatization arrangements. See Ben Slay, "Privatization in Poland" (Paper delivered at the conference "Privatization and Democratization in Russia and Central Europe," Berlin, May 23–27, 1995); and Maria Jarosch, ed., *Employee-Owned Companies in Poland* (Warsaw: Institute of Political Studies, Polish Academy of Sciences, 1994).

[14] On voter turnout, organizational participation, and political engagement in the region, see János Simon, "Post-Paternalist Political Culture in Hungary: Relationship between Citizens and Politics during and after the 'Melancholic Revolution' (1989–1991)," *Communist and Post-Communist Studies* 26 (June 1993), 230–31.

[15] Csaba Makó and Ágnes Simonyi, "Inheritance, Imitation and Genuine Solutions (Institution Building in Hungarian Labour Relations," *Europe-Asia Studies* 49 (March 1997), 224.

[16] The railroad workers, for example, strike every year at the same time—just before the budget negotiations—in order to try to influence the budget. This is well understood by all relevant parties and, as one former MP said, has become "regular showbiz." Author interview with Zoltan Bretter, Princeton, February 1999.

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TABLE 2
POST-1989 PROTEST EVENTS IN POLAND AND HUNGARY

	1989	*1990*	*1991*	*1992*	*1993*	*1994*
Poland	314	306	292	314	250	—
Hungary	122	126	191	112	148	44

SOURCE: Ekiert and Kubik (fn. 17).

Recent work by Gregorz Ekiert and Jan Kubik on state-society relations in postcommunist Eastern Europe illustrates the different Hungarian and Polish patterns of protest in greater detail. For example, compared with Poland, Hungary averaged fewer than half as many overt protest events (strikes, protest campaigns, and demonstrations) between 1989 and 1994, as Table 2 shows.[17]

Moreover, as Table 3 illustrates, strikes as a proportion of all protest events were more than three times as common in Poland as in Hungary, and twice as common even controlling for population size. Furthermore, strikes tended to be more violent and forceful government interventions more frequent in Poland than in Hungary. Labor mobilization, then, has become a conspicuous and enduring characteristic of political life in Poland.[18] Not only have unions become powerful numerically, but they have also tended to confront the state directly through protest actions, rather than engage in Hungarian-style exclusivist negotiation.[19]

[17] According to Ekiert and Kubik's data, Poland also had seven times as many strikes as Hungary (432 versus 61) during this period. Grzegorz Ekiert and Jan Kubik, *Collective Protest and Democratic Consolidation in Poland, 1989–93*, Pew Papers on Central Eastern European Reform and Regionalism, no. 3 (Princeton: Center of International Studies, Princeton University, 1997), table 2, line 7. In contrast, according to Table 1 above, Poland averaged 390 times as many strikes as Hungary between 1991 and 1993. The absence of data for two years (1989–90) is insufficient to account for this significant difference; thus reconciling these two data sets would require further research into the assumptions and methods of the Hungarian journal that originally reported those reproduced in Table 1.

[18] The degree of unionization in Poland is remarkable by any measure. There are fifteen hundred trade unions (two hundred are national). Union penetration of enterprises is particularly high: many are represented *multiply* in enterprises; see Ekiert and Kubik (fn. 17), 22. The Hungarian union landscape is strikingly dissimilar. There are three groups of unions, comprising seven individual unions, and "in most cases only one . . . union has been present at [the] branch level and at the workplace"; see Greskovits (fn. 13), 10.

[19] We must, of course, judge the degree of political quiescence versus confrontation against the degree of unionization as a percentage of active earners. This figure is higher, though not dramatically so, in Poland for the years in question. Hungarian union membership is approximately 30 percent of active earners; see Greskovits (fn. 13), 10. Poland's is 38 percent; see Ekiert and Kubik (fn. 17). More importantly, we could not wholly explain a greater incidence of strikes *even if* the percentage of union members were *much* higher in Poland, since a "quantity theory of protest" would assume that workers and unions have no means of expressing their grievances other than strikes. Finally, the different strategies of protest prevailing in Central Europe cannot be explained by economic dissatisfaction or "relative deprivation." Protest continued to increase in Poland—which experienced the shortest reces-

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TABLE 3
PROTEST CHARACTERISTICS

	Poland	*Hungary*
Strikes (as % of all protest events)	29.3	8.3
Strike threats (% of all events)	27.6	20.0
Strikes/year/million population	2.26	1.18
Protest days/year (1989–94)	2,976	515
% of violent protest strategies	5.0	1.7
% of authorized forceful interventions against protestors (average, 1989–93)	5.7	1.9

SOURCES: Lines 1–3: Jan Kubik, "Institutionalization of Protest during Democratic Consolidation in Central Europe," in David Meyer and Sidney Tarrow, eds., *The Social Movement Society: Contentious Politics for a New Century* (Lanham, Md.: Rowman and Littlefield, 1998), table 9; line 4: Ekiert and Kubik (fn. 17), table 2; line 5: Ekiert and Kubik (fn. 17), table 4; line 6: Kubik, "Institutionalization of Protest during Democratic Consolidation in Central Europe."

In Hungary, by contrast, the absence of long-established and wholly legitimate strong labor unions[20] means that postcommunist governments have not had to contend with the same degree of open, society-wide conflict over economic issues outside the realm of party politics. Instead, the social compact has been renegotiated through methods both preemptive and ad hoc. Conflicts have tended to be solved without recourse to mass mobilization, and corporatist-style bargaining among representatives from government and business and labor peak organizations succeeded in keeping many issues from even emerging in the political arena.[21] Although the National Council for the Reconciliation of Interests, or Interest Reconciliation Council (IRC), is a post-1989 institutional arena for elite negotiation and compromise, the practice of corporatist-style bargaining is not new. Since the mid-1980s Hungary has been characterized by a "neo-corporatist tendency . . . in which economic and social policies [are] developed through consultation between party, government, the National Council of Trade Unions

sion—even as the economy improved; surveys consistently showed Hungarians to be far more dissatisfied with post-1989 changes than Poles, yet they protested much less; East Germans, the economic "winners" of 1989 in terms of living standards, protested more than Hungarians. Nor are the divergences explainable by type or sequencing of reforms or by purely structural-institutional factors; see Ekiert and Kubik (fn. 17), 31–33; and idem, *Contentious Politics in New Democracies*, Central and Eastern Europe Working Paper, no. 41 (Cambridge: Center for European Studies, Harvard University, 1997), 26.

[20] Hungary's main union, the National Federation of Hungarian Workers, is the successor to MSZOSZ, the former communist trade union, and now enjoys growing legitimacy. Clearly, however, it could not have played a role analogous to Solidarity's.

[21] Greskovits (fn. 13), 25.

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and other economic agencies."[22] Moreover, from 1989 until February 1999 the independent social insurance funds also had a quasi-corporatist structure that "manage[d] fully a third of general government expenditures."[23]

Of course by itself, the *formal* institution of tripartite bargaining tells us relatively little about the model of democracy emerging in a particular country.[24] Virtually all the Central and East European countries have adopted roughly similar formal institutions of bargaining between labor, business, and government. Poland, for example, has also had a tripartite commission since 1994, but it has been considerably less active or influential than the Hungarian commission. We know that West European corporatisms function in a wide variety of ways despite similar institutional configurations.[25] Thus we can sometimes learn more

[22] Bennett Kövrig, "Hungarian Socialism: The Deceptive Hybrid," *East European Politics and Societies* 1 (Winter 1987), 126. The direct precursor of the IRC dates to 1988, when the National Council of Coordination of Interests was established. Here the trade union (SZOT), the government, and the chambers of the economy (until 1985 the chambers of commerce) deliberated over wage determination.

[23] Stephan Haggard, Robert Kaufman, and Matthew Shugart, *Politics, Institutions and Macroeconomic Adjustment: Hungarian Fiscal Policymaking in Comparative Perspective*, Collegium Budapest Discussion Paper no. 51 (Budapest, November 1998), 16.

[24] Frank L. Wilson has criticized, for instance, the tendency of scholars to rely too heavily on formal institutional features of corporatism in analyses of the actual degree of corporatism at work in a particular country; Wilson, "Interest Groups and Politics in Western Europe: The Neo-Corporatist Approach," *Comparative Political Studies* 16 (October 1983), 118–19. Peter Katzenstein has also argued that a country in which the formal institutions of corporatism seem weak (e.g., Switzerland) can nevertheless be quite strongly corporatist in a variety of ways; Katzenstein, *Corporatism and Change: Austria, Switzerland and the Politics of Industry* (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1984). There remains considerable disagreement about just how to rank countries along a continuum between corporatist and pluralist. See Arend Lijphart and Markus M. L. Crepaz, "Corporatism and Consensus Democracy in Eighteen Countries: Conceptual and Empirical Linkages," *British Journal of Political Science* 21 (1990). Analogously, in their study of elite settlements, Burton, Gunther, and Higley (fn. 6), 32, wisely focus more on *procedural* elements and on elite interaction per se than on any particular institutional arrangement or the political inputs and outputs distributed through such arrangements.

[25] The Hungarian Tripartite Commission has been reminiscent of other corporatist models in terms of two broad intentions: (1) to craft agreements among business, labor, and the government, and (2) to do this in a manner that prevents allocative disputes from entering the parliamentary arena insofar as possible. It did not, however, comfortably fit classical conceptions of *fully institutionalized* corporatism in which both the actors and their interactions are clearly recognized and regulated by law, as in the paradigmatic (former) Austrian model. Hungarian employers' associations and trade unions do not have a constitutionally guaranteed position as bargaining partners with the government. Yet since 1989 the budget committee has consulted the Tripartite Commission before presenting its draft budget to parliament, and parliament has generally conformed to the commission's internal negotiations. As this article goes to press in July 1999, the government has decided to include a broader range of civil society institutions in the commission (e.g., nonprofit foundations). It is still unclear exactly what this will mean for the IRC's role, but in the short run it will likely weaken labor's position. This, at any rate, appears to be the government's intention.

Robert Jenkins suggests that the nonprofit sector's role in provision of social services will expand along with pressure to reduce central budgetary expenditure; see Jenkins, "The Role of the Hungarian Non-Profit Sector in Post-Communist Society," Meeting report no. 176, *East European Studies* (Washington, D.C.: Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, May–June 1999), 12. If he is correct, then there may be unintended consequences of including foundations and other societal actors in the IRC. The government may eventually find that it has strengthened the position of the actors

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from *the ways that political actors use or bypass these institutions*. Here, the central point is that the Hungarian IRC has regularly exerted considerable influence over parliament, especially in budget negotiations (some even viewed it as a shadow government),[26] and that it has done so without any marked tendencies toward internal pluralization or breakdown in negotiations.[27]

Constitutional Courts and Constitution Making

Old core conflicts and patterns of accommodation exert their power not only in labor politics but also in more formal arenas. The Hungarian preference for compromise helps account for the constitutional court's position in the political system and the prevailing pattern of judicial-legislative interaction. Also revealing are the rules legislators adopted to circumscribe their own efforts to amend the constitution and draft a new one. The court in Hungary, for example, has vigorously defended citizens' "social rights," helping to protect an extremely wide range of entitlements, including family and maternity allowances and unemployment subsidies.[28] To be sure, changes in some of these entitlements are virtually inevitable, since Hungary is a "premature welfare state" whose spending as a percentage of GDP well exceeds the OECD

to which it has newly granted institutional voice and be forced to respond to them on an increasingly broad variety of issues. A more important short-term consideration is that the government's action may radicalize the unions.

[26] János Kornai (Lecture, Center of International Studies, Princeton University, March 1996). As noted above, however, as this article goes to press in July 1999, the IRC is being reorganized to include other representatives of civil society (foundations, for example), and the new government is trying to reduce its political clout.

[27] It is not surprising that, by contrast, the Polish Tripartite Commission should be marked by precisely these tendencies. As both genuine sociopolitical movement and trade union, Solidarity was, and its successor institutions remain, far more complex and internally contradictory than any Hungarian party or trade union. Hungary's main pre-1989 union (MSZOSZ) remains dominant among Hungarian unions even after 1989, retains close ties with the postcommunist party, and, of course, was never a political movement. Contrast this with Solidarity's split into political party-cum-multiple trade unions (Solidarity '80, Rural Solidarity, and so on) plus an employers confederation (Confederation of Polish Employers, or KPP). Consider, too, the deep ideological and institutional divisions between Solidarity-as-union(s) and Solidarity political elites as legislators. Even Poland's counterpart of Hungary's MSZOSZ, the OPZZ, is considerably more internally differentiated (it is a confederation of trade unions). For more detail on East European tripartite bargaining arrangements, see Lajos Hethy, "Tripartism in Eastern Europe," in Anthony Ferner and Richard Hyman, eds., *New Frontiers in European Industrial Relations* (New York: Basil Blackwell, 1994).

[28] In communist systems these represented an unmonetized part of wages and were often listed in constitutions, though they lacked the legal status and weight of full rights. Péter Paczolay, "The New Hungarian Constitutional State," in A. E. Dick Howard, ed., *Constitution Making in Eastern Europe* (Washington, D.C.: Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 1993), 47. In Hungary family and maternity allowances, unemployment and other benefits, and social subsidies expanded even amid the economic crisis of the 1980s, and the first postsocialist government created a "range of entitlement" broader than that of many developed countries. Even so, the Hungarian court struck down attempts at sudden or wholesale revocation of the informal social compact between society and the old party-state.

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average, despite Hungary's status among the poorer "upper-middle-income countries."[29] But there can be no doubt that the court has been instrumental in placing a brake on rapid or unnegotiated change. It has repeatedly proved its effectiveness in blocking or mitigating changes it deems potentially destabilizing or contrary to human rights and has forced political actors to negotiate continually.

If the effect of the court's rulings in Hungary has been to force compromise and negotiation, the court in Poland has sometimes played a very different role. In accordance with the more confrontational style of Polish politics, the Polish tribunal, for example, was used to indict political enemies. Indeed, the tribunal's involvement has been a source of contention. On one view the tribunal's Committee on Constitutional Accountability became a "political instrument of rivals scheming to perpetuate political vendettas."[30] An alternative view held that the tribunal's work to indict those former communists who may have violated the constitution was entirely appropriate and not motivated by partisanship.[31] For our immediate purposes, it is important simply to note that, appropriately or not, the tribunal was in fact used to arbitrate such issues. Moreover, between 1989 and 1996 Wałesa (via Secretary of State Lech Falandysz) did his best to drag the tribunal into a range of political battles with the postcommunists. In addition to involving the tribunal in such struggles, however, the executive branch has also found ways of circumventing the tribunal's rulings.[32] In response, the tribunal sought broader jurisdiction, though with only partial success.

Some differences between the two courts result from the circumstances of their founding and their institutional structures. The Polish Constitutional Tribunal was unique in the region when it was established in 1986, and although it can be read as a well-intentioned attempt at institutional reform by Communist Party moderates, it was unable to function autonomously in an authoritarian context.[33] Be-

[29] *World Development Report* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1997), 215. Calculated at the end of September 1995, the court's rulings against various aspects of the Bokros package entailed the loss of potential savings of somewhere between 40 and 60 billion forints (then roughly U.S. $308,000,000–462,000,000 at a rate of HUF 130: U.S. $1). The state budget deficit for the first eight months of 1995 was HUF 206.2 billion (roughly U.S. $1.6 billion). See Rick Bruner, *The Hungary Report* (Online at hungary-report@hungary.yak.net; or at http://www.isys.hu./hrep/, 1995), 3.

[30] Jerzy Wiatr, "Executive-Legislative Relations in Crisis: Poland's Experience, 1989–1993," in Arend Lijphart and Carlos Waisman, eds., *Institutional Design in New Democracies* (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1997).

[31] Wiktor Osiatynski, "A Letter from Poland," *East European Constitutional Review* 4 (Spring 1995).

[32] Thanks to Tomasz Inglot for pointing this out.

[33] The tribunal was established along with the Office of the Ombudsman and the system of administrative courts, and although these institutions were unable to operate autonomously between 1986 and 1989, they did prove important in the internal dismantling of Polish communism during the same period; author's written communication with Agnieszka Rybcznska, Lublin, August 1997.

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tween 1989 and 1997, however, the "systemic position" of the Polish Constitutional Tribunal was "in itself . . . evidence of [the] confrontational character of Polish politics."[34] Unlike its Hungarian counterpart, the tribunal was unable to take a position above the political in-fighting of the other branches of government. Instead, it was "right in the middle of politics, used by politicians as a tool for [attaining] their goals."[35] In contrast to the Hungarian court, the Polish tribunal's jurisdiction and power were curtailed, for example, by a five-year limit on review of decisions and by lack of authority to decide constitutional disputes.[36]

The position of the Hungarian court is very different. Unlike the Polish tribunal, the Hungarian court is able to avail itself of sufficient political space to become the "other pole" in a system with a unicameral legislature. In fact, it has become an effective veto gate.[37] The court has established itself as "one of the most authoritative in the world"[38] and has been involved in shaping policy on a wide range of issues that in other countries would be the prerogative of political or social actors.[39] The history of its founding also partially accounts for its strength. The Hungarian court originated with the 1989 roundtable agreement between the government and the opposition. Both the former, uncertain of its ability to obtain a two-thirds majority in free elections, and the opposition, believing it would lose, wanted a strong constitutional court to protect them and in effect negotiated to maintain the status quo that had evolved in the power balance between opponents.[40] Over the next two years parliament essentially enshrined this

[34] Author's written communication with Agnieszka Rybcznska, Lublin, August 1997.

[35] Ibid.

[36] The new constitution somewhat increases the tribunal's powers (e.g., by the year 2000 its decisions will be final and binding). It has also slightly reduced the broad powers of the presidency; "Constitution Watch," *East European Constitutional Review* 6 (Winter 1997), 21. The 1997 constitution makes the constructive vote of confidence the only permissible means for unseating a government, as in Hungary (as well as in Germany and Spain). Such provisions should promote greater balance and stability among the branches of the Polish government, even if they cannot, in themselves, ameliorate core conflicts.

[37] Haggard, Kaufman, and Shugart (fn. 23).

[38] Stephen Holmes and Cass R. Sunstein, "The Politics of Constitutional Revision in Eastern Europe," in Sanford Levinson, ed., *Responding to Imperfection: The Theory and Practice of Constitutional Amendment* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1995), 300. Another author writes that the Hungarian court has "emerged as the boldest judicial actor in the former Soviet bloc (and perhaps the world)"; Nathan J. Brown, "Judicial Review and the Arab World," *Journal of Democracy* 9 (October 1998), 88.

[39] Anyone, including foreigners, *even without* involvement or interest, can challenge a law's constitutionality. No other court in the world offers such "unrestricted standing" to challenge "abstract norms." See Andras Sajo, "How the Rule of Law Killed Hungarian Welfare Reform," *East European Constitutional Review* 5, no. 1 (1996).

[40] For example, the decision to require a two-thirds majority dates from a 1990 constitutional pact made by political opponents, the MDF and the SZDSZ. The two parties agreed that certain categories of laws with potentially broad impact should be placed outside the framework of normal parliamentary business and that amending these laws should involve both the government and the opposition.

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balance between a strong cabinet and court, as well as an adequately effective presidency, abdicating "a great deal of [its] powers to other institutions, even though [it] did not have to."[41] The parties to this negotiation created a court strong enough to place itself above the fray of party politics and executive policy preferences.[42] The court can function, and has served, as a kind of "super arbiter" when political actors want to avoid decisions that would otherwise divide them.

Yet despite its great institutional strength, the Hungarian constitutional court reflects the same commitment to gradualism, social peace, and pragmatism found among reformers of the old regime, as well as within the ruling coalition of 1994–98. The long historical process of gradual amendment of the Hungarian constitution itself[43] is also reminiscent of the incremental process of socioeconomic compromise between the party-state and society during the state socialist period. Indeed, if the drafting and acceptance of a new constitution signals success, then Poland, which has enjoyed a new constitution since October 1997, was successful and Hungary failed. But my argument suggests that we must look beyond formal institutions to the *use* actors make of those institutions. This means shifting the focus to *conceptual frames, political processes*, and *discourses* of constitutional drafting and amendment—a shift that allows us to uncover a good deal about relative preferences for compromise versus confrontation and, more generally, about the core conflicts prevailing in the two countries.

Two things stand out about the Hungarian case. (1) The 1994–98 governing alliance consistently eschewed the unlimited constituent powers legally available to it (given its two-thirds majority). Instead, it included all parties in a fully consensual process—granting the opposition *overrepresentation* on the drafting committee. (2) Even the *derailment* of the constitution-making process testifies to the compromise preference of most major political actors. To uncover this preference, we must focus on the *informal* rules of legislative-judicial interaction. As mentioned above, the Hungarian court has a broad mandate to review and overturn laws. But this is only half the story. Given four years of

Among these were the media law, the law on local government, and the nomination of constitutional court members. Another effect of this pact was the likelihood that the president would always be a consensus figure. The election of the president requires a two-thirds majority of the parliament for the first two votes. Only on the third vote can a simple majority carry.

[41] Jon Elster, "Explaining Legislative Dominance," *East European Constitutional Review* 5, no.1 (1996).

[42] Quite obviously, however, the court has strong policy preferences of its own and in this sense is not at all above politics.

[43] Paczolay (fn. 28).

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adverse rulings (among them, the 1990–94 decisions already mentioned), why did a relatively unified and disciplined parliamentary coalition not exercise its power to overturn court decisions?[44] The Polish parliament, after all, had to meet the same two-thirds requirement, and yet its less disciplined parties managed to overrule the tribunal on key issues.[45] The answer is, simply, that most Hungarian parliamentary actors did not dare to do so, given the premium that all significant political players placed on stability and constitutional consensus.[46]

In fact, the 1996 procedural agreement to draft a new constitution went considerably beyond the two-thirds requirement to ensure consensual change. The SZDSZ had a clear, liberal conception of constitutional amendment, and on the basis of this conception the MSZP-SZDSZ coalition made a written offer to the opposition. It said, in essence: "Although we are entitled to amend the constitution with our two-thirds majority, we believe that the opposition should be fully involved in the drafting of a new constitution. *Therefore, we will only amend the constitution if we can achieve either a four-fifths majority or the support of all the parties minus one.*"[47] Why, then—given the self-restraint of the ruling coalition and ample opportunity for the opposition to influence the amendment process—did the draft constitution fall short of the votes needed for adoption? Like the conception behind it and the process by which it was assembled, the draft was a fundamentally liberal one, with no evidence of Polish-style cleavages. Yet from opposite sides of the political spectrum, two parties—MSZP and MDF—allied against the document they helped to write. This is because if the new constitution had been ratified, it would have been less socialist and less nationalist/conservative than the MSZP and the MDF, respectively, would have wished.[48]

[44] Again, the numbers alone cannot tell the story, since the MSZP and SZDSZ had a two-thirds majority.

[45] Parliament thwarted the tribunal's attempt to overturn the Balczerowicz plan, for instance, and to index pensions.

[46] Although the left faction of the MSZP was at times in favor of legislating at least some constitutional changes, moderate socialists and especially the SZDSZ blocked all such attempts. Indeed, the SZDSZ succeeded in imposing a moratorium on all attempts to overturn the rulings of the Constitutional Court between 1990 and 1995, with the exception of slight changes that were approved with the accord of the opposition parties.

[47] Author interview with Zoltan Bretter, Princeton, February 1999. Rudolf Tőkes also notes that the MDF made a pact with the SZDSZ-FIDESZ "to avoid recurrent legislative stalemate with respect to constitutional issues requiring a supermajority." On this point and for in-depth analysis of the history of Hungarian communism, the transition process, and parties, see Tőkes, *Hungary's Negotiated Revolution: Economic Reform, Social Change and Political Succession* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1996), and see p. 397 for the MDF/SZDSZ-FIDESZ pact.

[48] The socialists wanted the new constitution to integrate a deeper corporatism and a greater role for trade unions, but the IRC was not enacted as an institution belonging to the political decision-making process. The MDF wanted language more sensitive to national issues and at least symbolic attention to Hungarian minorities abroad.

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(The predictable upshot was that compromise politics produced a second-best but stable solution for all the major players.)

The more adversarial work of the Polish Constitutional Commission stands in sharp contrast. The commission included the four major parliamentary parties, plus representatives of Solidarity and the Committee for an Independent Poland. Even the main parties fought fiercely among themselves over issues both symbolic and substantive. The consensus that emerged after three years of work on the draft was a fragile one and was marked by a discourse consonant with the core conflicts in Polish politics. Even after the Sejm accepted the draft constitution, the AWS "confronted the SLD/PSL coalition . . . labelling [the draft] 'Soviet,' 'Stalininst,' and 'foreign.'" The AWS lost, but not by much (45 percent versus 53 percent).[49] Ratified in 1997, Poland's new constitution is an odd mix of social democratic welfare guarantees and sociopolitical conservatism. The language of the preamble, which links national history and culture to God and Christian heritage while making some concessions to nonbelievers, highlights some of Poland's most intractable core conflicts.[50] Indeed, a number of such conflicts are enshrined in the body of the Polish constitution.

The deeply embedded "us versus them" cleavage evident in final debates on the constitution can also be seen in the ongoing debates over "decommunization." This concept—almost never invoked in Hungarian politics—is still central to Polish politics. Recently the governing AWS-UW coalition passed a resolution claiming that the former Communist Party of Poland was "'in the highest degree responsible for the continuation . . . of the communist system in Poland.'" This was the *compromise* language: AWS had favored much harsher wording declaring the former Communist Party a *criminal organization.*[51]

In sum, Polish elites pursuing their political goals through confrontational strategies and Hungarian elites fighting their political battles within more circumscribed arenas of compromise have each in their own way endogenized their countries' high courts. Put another way, the courts have become procedural and substantive extensions of old political rationalities.

Pragmatic-Consensual versus Moral-Confrontational Party Competition

Another good illustration of these contrasting democratic models is the nature of party competition and coalition building in the two countries.

[49] Jasiewicz, *The Woodrow Wilson Center East European Studies Newsletter* (March–April 1997), 10.
[50] Thanks to Jan Kubik for pointing this out.
[51] Editors, *East European Constitutional Review* 7 (Summer 1998), 26.

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Core political conflicts are considerably clearer, run much deeper, and make stable alliances between ideological and historical opponents extremely unlikely in Poland. Markedly different conceptual frames, political discourses, and governing styles also predominate. Hungarians seem to be experts at splitting the difference and finding at least "minimalist" compromise solutions to political disagreements. Indeed, opponents among the mainstream political parties generally portray conflicts as susceptible to pragmatic negotiation. Polish political elites are, by contrast, often consummate activists—"maximalists" ready to wage political battles and to see conflicts in zero-sum terms. They often drench political action in meaning and symbol, creating a moralistic political discourse, typically with strong religious overtones. Moreover, posttransition Polish politics was highly personalized, and survey respondents tended to favor "a strong *leader*, while Hungarians tended to believe in strong *government*."[52]

Since the roundtable compromise of 1989, party politics in Poland has been indicative of a "broader process of repolarization" between neoliberalism and state welfarism, on the one hand, and between "confessional and secular visions of political order," on the other.[53] As Krzysztof Jasiewicz shows, however, it is the latter cleavage that explains the frequent changes of government in Poland since 1989, as well as their roller-coaster character. In fact, this cleavage profoundly shaped elites' electoral strategies and governmental coalitions. Moreover, between 1992 and 1997 polarization along the religious/secular dimension intensified more rapidly than along the neoliberal/state-welfare dimension.[54]

The religious/secular cleavage is also linked to "opposing stands on the issues of de-communization and assessing Poland's Communist past."[55] Thus many religious voters and others who espouse an "us versus them" anticommunist worldview tend to vote for post-Solidarity parties. Those who hold more secular views (or, at any rate, do not place opposition to the communist past at the center of their political identities) tend to vote for other parties, especially the postcommunist successor coalition, the SLD,[56] and for the liberal-centrist Freedom Union

[52] Mira Marody, "Three Stages of Party System Emergence in Poland," *Communist and Post-Communist Studies* 28, no. 2 (1995), 265; and author's interview with Marody, Warsaw, November 1994.

[53] Jasiewicz (fn. 49) explains that this cleavage overlaps with others, for example, nationalist versus pro-Western orientations.

[54] Radoslaw Markowski, "Political Parties and Ideological Spaces in East Central Europe," *Communist and Post-Communist Studies* 30 (September 1997), 22.

[55] Jasiewicz (fn. 49).

[56] Social Democracy of the Polish Republic (SDRP) formed the SLD coalition with the communist trade union OPZZ and other former communist groups. SDRP's platform emphasized separation of

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(UW). Indeed, in the parliamentary elections of 1997 increasing polarization resulted in an almost even split between the AWS and the SLD and in a diminished share of the vote for several parties that voters did not strongly identify with this main cleavage.[57]

In Hungary, however, these cleavages—especially the communist/anticommunist one—were far less salient in national politics in the same period and do not constitute core political conflicts. In fact, they had weakened long before the elections of 1989. In Hungary as in Poland, the period leading up to the transition was somewhat exceptional, and during the 1990–94 Hungarian Democratic Forum (MDF) coalition government, one prominent demagogue in particular reopened old political wounds and cultural cleavages (nationalist/religious versus foreign/Jewish and a partially overlapping urban-rural cleavage). In the end, however, his main achievement was to discredit thoroughly the center-right coalition that failed to expel him sooner.[58] More generally, attempts by rival elites to "translate" their "competitive strateg[ies] into a political (mass) culture" consistently run up against the demonstrable fact that the Hungarian citizenry—in an Eastern variant of Western "depoliticization"—shows "little interest in politics and much more in economic issues."[59]

The lower intensity of political cleavage in Hungary can also be inferred from other evidence. First, there is the stability of governments. In May 1998 Hungarians elected their third post-1989 democratic government without incident, the previous two having served out their terms without serious parliamentary upsets. Poland had seven governments during the same period and a "persistently high level of fragmentation of the party system."[60] After the Polish roundtable agreements and the first, partially contested elections, fragmentation became endemic to party formation as Solidarity split apart. More than "111 parties and groups participated" in the 1991 elections.[61] Although

church and state, secular education, and abortion rights. It refused to support special privileges for the Catholic church and called for a general decrease of clerical influence in Polish politics.

[57] This was especially the case for the Peasants Party (PSL), the Labor Union (UP), and to some degree Freedom Union (UW), although the latter has "relatively stable support from the old Polish intelligentsia and urban professionals—the nucleus of the emerging middle class"; Jasiewicz (fn. 49), 3.

[58] The MDF essentially faded away as a political force in the elections of 1994.

[59] András Körösényi, *The Divided Republic*, Program on Central and Eastern Europe Working Paper Series, 32 (Cambridge: Harvard University, 1993), 20.

[60] Katarzyna Stanclik, "Electoral Law and Party System Formation in New Democracies: The Case of Poland" (Manuscript, New York, Columbia University Institute on East Centeral Europe, March 1997), 7.

[61] Ibid.

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TABLE 4
PARLIAMENTARY ELECTION RESULTS AS PERCENTAGE OF TOTAL VOTES[a]

Poland 1993	SLD (Democratic Left Alliance) 20.4	UD (Democratic Union) 10.6	PSL (Peasant Party) 15.4	UP (Union of Labor) 7.3	KPN (Confederation for an Independent Poland) 5.8	BBWR (nonparty Bloc in Support of the Reforms) 5.4
Hungary 1994	MSZP (Hungarian Socialist Party) 54.14	SZDSZ (Alliance of Free Democrats) 17.88	MDF (Hungarian Democratic Forum) 9.84	FKGP (Independent Smallholders Party) 6.74	KDNP (Christian Democratic People's Party) 5.70	FIDESZ (Alliance of Young Democrats 5.18

SOURCES: Hungarian National Election Commission (www.election); and www-public.rz.uni-dusseldorf.de/~nordsiew/poland.html

[a] Since only parties with a mandate of 5 percent or greater are listed, percentages do not total 100. In Poland parties receiving over 5 percent of the vote garnered 64.9 percent of total votes, with a Loosemore-Hanby index for deviation from proportionality of 37 percent (average in established democracies = 1–9 percent). Stanclik (fn. 60), 10, 13. In Hungary parties meeting or exceeding the 5 percent threshold received fully 99.5 percent of the total vote.

changes in the electoral law prior to the 1993 elections clarified and strengthened the Polish party system (drastically reduing the number of parties, for example), we see in Table 4 that parties winning 5 percent or more of the vote in 1993 represented less than 65 percent of the total vote, resulting in very high disproportionality. Hungary, by contrast, saw little fragmentation of its main parties between 1990 and 1996. Second, the character of political campaigns, especially after the first postcommunist election in 1990, has been markedly lower key in Hungary than in Poland.[62] Third, recent sociological research shows that, in general, the cleavage structure of Hungarian politics is rather indistinct, and the citizenry is "consensus oriented."[63] And finally, as mentioned above, there is the alliance structure of politics in the two countries, which in Hungary allows former enemies to rule in coalition and in Poland largely forecloses this option. In other words, while the

[62] Recall only the extremes of political polarization and discourse of the mid-1995 initiative by Union of Freedom activists to block the socialist front-runner, Kwaszniewski.

[63] György Markus, "The Preeminence of the Centre-Periphery Cleavage in the Hungarian Party System" (Paper presented at the conference "Democratic Consolidation: The International Dimension—Hungary, Poland, Spain," Vienna, September 25–26, 1998), 19.

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"mechanical effects" of changes to the Polish electoral law were significant and positive, the "psychological effects" were not. As Katarzyna Stanclik explains: "Following Duverger and Riker, we would expect party leaders to form coalitions or merge parties whenever they could expect difficulties with passing the five percent threshold. However, this did not happen." Indeed, the "extremely high disporportionality index in the 1993 elections suggests that, on the whole, voters and party leaders failed to adapt to the new electoral rules."[64]

In 1994, following a victory that granted it more than enough seats to govern alone, the Hungarian Socialist Party (MSZP, the successor party to the Hungarian Socialist Workers' Party, or MSZMP) formed a coalition with the Alliance of Free Democrats (SZDSZ). This coalition held firm between 1994 and 1998, despite implementation of a major, painful stabilization program and several scandals. The coalition was responsible for a highly successful period of democratic consolidation and economic progress in Hungary. Yet even seasoned experts predicted that it would never happen,[65] since the leadership of the SZDSZ had been among the most prominent opponents of the old Communist Party. But the MSZP actively courted the SZDSZ and in the event agreed to a set of highly unusual concessions and controls ensuring that it would be unable to pass major legislation without the approval of its junior partner. In effect, the Socialist Party freely chose to decrease its own degrees of potentially unconstrained political freedom in return for the SZDSZ's willingness to govern in coalition with it.

How can we explain this degree of insistence on political compromise—uncommon even in much older, established party systems but extremely unusual in new democracies? Commenting on the fact that the Hungarian Democratic Forum and the opposition Free Democrats "struck a pact in 1990 to cooperate on constitutional issues, and both the Antall and Horn coalitions have contained more parties than necessary for a parliamentary majority," Haggard, Kaufman, and Shugart conclude that "the formation of oversized governments signals weakness rather than strength, since it reflects the anticipation of intra-party and inter-coalitional conflicts."[66] But even if this is true, it begs the deeper question of *how parties approach conflict.* Realistically, fairly serious battles over policy are inevitable in *any* party or coalition that con-

[64] Stanclik (fn. 60), 10–11.

[65] Paul Lewis, Bill Lomax, and Gordon Wightman, " The Emergence of Multi-Party Systems in East-Central Europe," in Geoffrey Pridham and Tatu Vanhanen, eds., *Democratization in Eastern Europe* (New York: Routledge, 1994), 163. István Deák, "A Fatal Compromise?" *East European Politics and Society* 9 (Spring 1995), 222.

[66] Haggard, Kaufman, and Shugart (fn. 23), 21.

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fronts the imperative of crafting major reforms. In this sense, the Antall and Horn governments are hardly unique. The real question is: why did Hungarian governments choose to *preempt* conflict—increasingly so by 1994?

To be sure, the MSZP hoped to share the blame for the major reforms that still had to be undertaken. It also hoped that governing in coalition would enhance its political legitimacy and further distance it from the ancien régime.[67] For its part, the SZDSZ did not fully trust the MSZP to undertake the economic reforms they believed the country needed and felt a responsibility to moderate the socialists' left wing.[68] Important as these explanations may have been, they still leave unanswered the question of why—since such coalitions of former enemies did not occur in other countries where ex-communist parties and oppositions faced the very same issues—such a coalition could be formed only in Hungary. We saw that even in Poland, despite the fact that the SLD's precursor—the PZRP—had been the only other Communist Party in Central Europe with a significant reform faction, an analogous coalitional strategy was simply not available to the SLD, though the electoral outcome would have warranted it far more than in Hungary. Winning 37 percent of seats and just 20 percent of the vote, the SLD was able to form a coalition only with the Polish Peasant Party, its former satellite (see Table 4).

Other types of elite political behavior in Hungary also evince a liberal conceptual frame and a commitment to consensual procedure. For instance, it has been the norm during the past decade for governing parties to extend two or three parliamentary vice presidencies to the opposition and to offer them key committee leadership positions as well—notably the leadership of the powerful budget committee. The explicit logic behind this decision was that, even beyond systemwide checks and balances, it is precisely at the points *within* each institution where power tends to congeal that it is important to create a counterweight—even to one's own power.[69]

[67] Certainly, the MSZP's rational self-interest must also be taken into account. The SZDSZ could have tried to block legislation proposed by the socialists from a position as an independent opposition party. Together with other opposition parties like the Young Democrats (FIDESZ) and, on some issues, with other parties, the SZDSZ could perhaps have posed greater problems for the socialists as an independent opposition party than as a coalition partner. It is quite likely, however, that the socialists could have pushed through a certain amount of legislation simply on the strength of their mandate and by consolidating even greater control of ministerial portfolios and administrative positions than they eventually did during their four years in office.

[68] Author interview with Iván Pető, Budapest, June 1994; author interview with Zoltán Bretter, Princeton, February 1999.

[69] Author interview with Zoltán Bretter, Princeton, February 1999.

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To summarize: while it is surely the case that Poland and Hungary have been more successful than Romania, Bulgaria, Slovakia, most of the former Yugoslavia, and even the Czech Republic[70] in making the transition from communism, the new political regimes in these two countries exhibit important differences—in patterns of interbranch, intraelite, and state-society relations, in the conceptual frames organizing political interaction, and in the temper of political discourse. Before discussing why such differences matter and the ways they may affect the stability and quality of democracy in Poland and Hungary, we must first investigate how they developed. At this point our inquiry takes a historical turn: in order to understand contemporary politics and to make assessments about the future of democracy in Poland and Hungary, we need to turn our attention to these countries' pasts.

II. The Historical Development of Compromise and Conflict in Hungary and Poland

The democracies emerging in Hungary and Poland today are the products of distinct historical-political trajectories. In other words, rather than being viewed as the product of developments since the mid-1980s (much less the transitions of 1989), the new democratic regimes that have developed in Poland and Hungary (and indeed in the rest of Eastern Europe) cannot be understood without delving into the more distant past of each country. By the end of the Second World War, Hungarians and Poles had reason to learn profoundly different lessons about the efficacy of open resistance and revolution. To begin with, during the modern era Hungary, as opposed to Poland, had never experienced a truly successful revolution. The uprisings in 1848 were crushed by troops from Austria and Russia and the revolutions after 1918 failed as well, while the short-lived communist experiment of 1919 was an especially violent and ultimately catastrophic episode. The experience of the Second World War itself, in particular the extent of wartime collaboration and the complexity of resistance activity, made it difficult for Hungarians to know "how to resist, and whom to resist."[71] Indeed, the experience of the Second World War may help explain the striking lack of moral clarity in Hungarian postwar politics and the relative weakness of the "us versus them" model of opposition after 1956.[72]

[70] At least on the vectors of deep institutional restructuring and on some important constitutional issues of citizenshp and human rights, notably, the effective disenfranchisement of the Roma population.

[71] Deák (fn. 65).

[72] Clearly, the historical failure of revolutions cannot, by itself, explain Hungarians' propensity to choose compromise politics, and the foregoing examples are only suggestive of possible early in-

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What is certain is that at the inception of communism in 1949, Hungarians had few, if any, successful or positive experiences of rebellion or revolution to look back on.

Poland's historical experiences were quite different. In 1920–21 the country prevailed in the Polish-Soviet war. Poles suffered far greater human losses than Hungary—six million (of whom three million were Jews) in World War II and under the German and Soviet occupations—and in this sense knew greater defeat. But Poland in 1945 was on the side of the victors, free of the weight of collaboration and concomitant issues of moral complexity that burdened Hungary. Furthermore, after the onset of communist rule, the Russians trod relatively lightly in Poland, something that many Poles interpreted as resulting from the fact that the Soviets believed that "the price [for invading Poland] would be too high . . . [a way of] thinking impossible to comprehend without knowing the Polish national spirit and Polish history."[73] In fact, the Soviet stance toward Poland probably resulted as much from other factors as from the perception of the Polish propensity to resist. Poland's geostrategic importance in Soviet policy toward Germany was certainly one such factor, and the "heavy shadow" cast by the Katyn massacre over USSR-Polish relations may have been another.[74] But whether accurately reflecting their actual domestic and international political constraints or not, many Poles entered the state socialist era with a firm belief in the efficacy and justice of rebellion.

While experiences before the Second World War profoundly affected Polish and Hungarian cultural and political life, even a cursory examination of the communist period reveals that during this time citizens and elites in both Poland and Hungary were socialized into different patterns of political and social interaction. These patterns, in turn, have shaped and continue to shape political development in the two countries.

In Hungary any attempt to understand contemporary political developments must begin with the legacy of 1956. Even martial law in Poland lacked "the gruesome finality" of 1956 in Hungary. Poles retained an active "political counterculture [and] the alternative of taking refuge in the Church even after the imposition of martial law." In con-

fluences. Especially if events predating the communist era are taken as part of the analysis, then 1956 is an important and unexplained exception—even though 1956 began from attempts to reform the system from within, not as a revolution.

[73] Jan Zielonka, "Let Poland Be Hungary?" *SAIS Review* 4 (Summer–Fall 1984), 119.

[74] Shlomo Avineri, "State Weakness as an Obstacle to Democratization," Review, *East European Constitutional Review* 6 (Winter 1997), 99.

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trast, all Hungarian revolutionary leaders were killed or imprisoned after 1956; thousands fled from an "exhausted, defeated society"; approximately two thousand were executed; and "tens of thousands imprisoned."[75] Indeed, Poland's more open "political opportunity structure"[76] and more successful history of resistance help explain how widescale opposition became a rational option and cleared the way for Solidarity's rise to a mass movement.

In the aftermath of the violence accompanying the Hungarian uprising and as a response to the legitimacy crisis it caused, the leadership crafted a pragmatic policy of societal reconciliation. By 1963 the party leadership explicitly pursued a policy of ideological-political compromise between Stalinist dogmatism and counterrevolutionary tendencies. This was Kádár's well-known Alliance Policy, which pronounced that "he who is not against us is with us." Contrast this with Poland, where a few years earlier Gomulka captured the party-state's very different view with the statement: "Those who are against socialism are against Poland."[77]

After 1963 the Alliance Policy helped bring in nonparty experts at many levels of government. By the early 1980s party ideologist György Aczél had declared that "the party must [function] as its own opposition"—a stance that probably helps explain, in turn, why in 1989 some party leaders felt they could both create and control credible negotiating partners. In addition, electoral reforms in 1966 and 1985 had permitted some political competition within the party, and by 1985 multiple candidates were mandatory and could be spontaneously nominated.[78] By 1985 Hungarian trade union shop stewards were elected by secret ballot for the first time, and unions were given the power to veto some management decisions.

With the Alliance Policy of the early 1960s, the period of collectivization was declared to be at an end, and "an alienated society [was reintegrated] into the political community" through material incen-

[75] Zvi Gitelman, "Is Hungary the Future of Poland?" *EEPS* 1 (Winter 1987), 146.

[76] Grzegorz Ekiert, *Rebellious Poles: Cycles of Protest and Mobilization under State Socialism, 1945–93*, International Institute Working Paper Series, no. 5 (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan, 1995). Ekiert synthesizes an enormous literature on Polish opposition activities and their significance from 1956 through the 1980s and demonstrates that even very early encounters between the authorities and opposition groups resulted in the creation of "unpatrolled spaces" that "became laboratories of experience that nurtured political dissent and opposition." Poland's 1956 de-Stalinization crisis gave rise to a much more open "political opportunity structure" than that found in Czechoslovakia or Hungary (p. 29).

[77] Ireneusz Bialecki, review of Michael Burawoy and János Lukács, *The Radiant Past*, in *Journal of Contemporary Sociology* 22 (January 1993), 43–44.

[78] In the 1985 elections over seventy such candidates ran for office and forty-five became deputies in the National Assembly; at the same time several party stalwarts were defeated; Kövrig (fn. 22), 125.

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tives.[79] The result was the New Economic Mechanism of 1968, which, together with the 1982 reform legalizing the second economy, created an economically differentiated society that came to perceive political compromise as rational, as a broad sector of the citizenry tacitly negotiated new degrees of freedom through participation in an increasingly institutionalized second economy.[80] Political leaders were thus relatively successful in co-opting workers through material incentives, and this resulted in a general depoliticization of society and a "recognition that social strata with separate interests coexist in the officially classless community."[81]

Indeed, the growing second economy played a critical role in shaping the "depoliticized" and relatively unorganized citizenry that remains such a prominent feature of Hungarian political life today. By their very nature, second economy interests and pursuits gave rise to primarily disorganized and individualistic patterns of behavior on the part of citizens. Such activities diverted the energies and attentions of many Hungarians from the political to the economic sphere (in contrast to underground political activities in Poland). Finally, if we shift our focus from individuals to institutions, we also see a change. By the 1980s a degree of symbiosis—indeed, of institutionalized cooperation—between the state sector and the second economy had developed. These mezzo-level links between the party-state and the populace primarily took the form of small private and quasi-private enterprises, but after 1982 a variety of different types of individual and group links developed. These links contributed, in turn, to the relatively early loosening of control by the Hungarian Communist Party.[82] By the late 1980s the

[79] Kövrig (fn. 22), 118.

[80] "Rational," because in exchange for political quiescence, their second economy activities would not be punished or blocked as in earlier years and thus would more likely yield economic payoffs.

[81] Kövrig (fn. 22), 123.

[82] See, for instance, Rudolf Andorka, "The Importance and Role of the Second Economy for Hungarian Economy and Society" (Manuscript, Budapest, Budapest University of Economics, 1990); István Gábor, "Second Economy and Socialism: The Hungarian Experience," in Edgar Feige, ed., *The Underground Economies* (Cambridge: Cambridge Univrsity Press, 1989); István Gábor and Péter Galasi, "Second Economy, State and Labour Market," in Péter Galasi and György Sziráczki, eds., *Labour Market and Second Economy in Hungary* (Frankfurt: Campus Verlag, 1985); János Kenedi, *Do It Yourself: Hungary's Hidden Economy* (London: Pluto Press, 1982); Maria Los, ed., *The Second Economy in Marxist States* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1990); Ákos Róna-Tas, *The Great Surprise of the Small Transformation: The Demise of Communism and the Rise of the Private Sector in Hungary* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1997); idem, "The Second Economy as a Subversive Force: The Erosion of Party Power in Hungary," in Andrew Walder, ed., *Departures from Central Planning: China and Hungary* (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1995); Anna Seleny, "The Foundations of Post-Socialist Legitimacy," in Aurel Braun and Zoltán Barány, eds., *Dilemmas of Transition* (New York: Routledge, 1999); idem, "The Long Transformation and the Point of No Return: The Socio-Political Impact of Hungarian Economic Reforms," in Walder; idem, "Hidden Enterprise and Property Rights Reform in Socialist Hungary," *Law and Policy* 13 (April 1991); Endre Sik, *From Second Economy to*

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process of internal party loosening had reached the point where the MSZMP's role was being challenged by reform circles within the party itself, and the outlines of Hungary's current party system could already be seen.[83] Thus, the political space that the party had begun to open up after 1963 allowed, first, economic mezzo-level institutions to develop and, later, incipient political organizations to emerge.

We have seen that Hungary developed a relatively dense network of individual and group links between the party-state and the populace, and nonparty experts participated at almost all levels of government. In Poland, by contrast, attempts by the government to co-opt the intelligentsia had the paradoxical effect of pushing its members to form a "counter elite, ready to take power."[84] So how, exactly, did confrontation come to be perceived as a rational option in Poland? A full account of the origins of conflictual politics in Poland would require revisiting the "specific resolution of the de-Stalinization crisis in 1956."[85] But even a cursory look at structural factors, as well as political actors' internalization of specific historical lessons, reveals some key reasons for the rationality of the very different political approach that gained prevalence in Poland. Since 1956 the Polish authorities faced different and greater challenges in controlling both indirect subversion and outright opposition than did their Hungarian counterparts. Among the structural and historical elements that help explain this are the autonomy of Poland's Catholic church after 1956; the peasants' relative independence given the predominance of private ownership of land; a long-established tradition of armed resistance;[86] and, in at least some important cases, a

Informal Economy: The Hungarian Case, Program on Central and Eastern Europe Working Paper Series no. 23 (Cambridge: Center for European Studies, Harvard University, 1994); Endre Sik and András Kelen, *Az "Örök" Kaláka: A Társadalmi Munka Szolciológiája* (Budapest: Gondolat, 1988); David Stark, "Coexisting Organizational Forms in Hungary's Emerging Mixed Economy," in Victor Nee and David Stark, eds., *Remaking the Economic Institutions of Socialism: China and Eastern Europe* (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1989); idem, "Rethinking Internal Labor Markets: New Insights from a Comparative Perspective," *American Sociological Review* 51 (1986); idem, "The Micropolitics of the Firm and the Macropolitics of Reform: New Forms of Workplace Bargaining in Hungarian enterprises," in Peter Evans, Dietrich Rueschemeyer, and Evelyn Huber Stephens, eds., *States versus Markets in the World System* (Beverly Hills, Calif.: Sage, 1985); and Iván Szelényi in collaboration with Robert Manchin, *Socialist Entrepreneurs: Embourgeoisement in Rural Hungary* (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1988); Anders Aslund, *Private Enterprise in Eastern Europe* (London: Macmillan, 1985); and Janine Wedel, *The Private Poland* (New York: Facts on File, 1986).

[83] Patrick O'Neil, "Presidential Power in Post-Communist Europe," *Communist Studies* 9 (September 1993).

[84] Iván Szelényi and Szonja Szelényi, "Circulation of Reproduction of Elites during Post-Communist Transformation in Eastern Europe" (Paper presented at Princeton University, Department of Sociology, April 3 1995), 9.

[85] Ekiert (fn. 76), 22.

[86] Recall that the Polish armed resistance came aboveground only after the amnesties of 1945 and 1947; Jakub Karpinski, "In Poland, a Long-Standing Tradition of Resistance," *Transition: Events and Issues in the Former Soviet Union and East-Central and Southeastern Europe* 3, no. 1 (1997).

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particular urban intellectual-industrial structure.[87] The sectoral structure of the Polish economy prior to 1989 made it particularly difficult for the authorities to control dissent. Over 70 percent of agricultural land was privately held; this meant that when peasants were dissatisfied with the regime they could not be easily intimidated by the central government. Furthermore, the government was not eager to suppress peasant activity since there was no alternative source of agricultural production.[88]

However, the political lessons that elites and citizenry derived from historical turning points were at least as important as structural distinctions in establishing patterns of accommodation in Hungary and resistance in Poland. After 1970, for instance, Polish workers learned that strikes could be a relatively successful strategy for extracting concessions from the authorities.[89] And by the late 1970s dissident intellectuals, industrial workers, and peasants had established some links through the Workers' Defense Committee (KOR), laying the groundwork for the broad-based antiregime opposition that would emerge in the 1980s.

By then, after thirty years of Kádárist socialism, most Hungarians would have immediately grasped the full import of a banner displayed in 1989 at an East Berlin church declaring, "I am Cain *and* Abel." Put another way, they knew that the line "usually did not run clearly between *'Us'* and *'Them.'*" It cut instead, as Václav Havel put it, "through the heart of each man and woman."[90] Of course, most Poles knew this, too. But many also had alternative experiences and interpretations of their ethical positions in the communist system. As increasing numbers of Polish citizens became involved in the social movements that were the precursors to Solidarity, or at least identified with them, they achieved a greater sense of moral clarity. By the late 1970s, Solidarity emerged as the best-developed explicitly political opposition in Eastern Europe. As it burst onto the international scene, it posed not only an organizational but also a clear discursive challenge to regime and system legitimacy—one with strong symbolic, moral, and oppositional

[87] For example, Gdansk and Nowa Huta combined the potential for strikes in major industrial centers with intellectual communities that could support them; for Gdansk, see Roman Laba, *The Roots of Solidarity* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1991). In Hungary, Tatabánya, Diósgyőr, and Paks lacked analogous intellectual centers on which to draw. Of course, dissident activity also occurred in cities without these features.

[88] Aslund (fn. 82), 225.

[89] Z. A. Pelczynski, "Solidarity and 'the Rebirth of Civil Society' in Poland, 1976–1981," in John Keene, ed., *Civil Society and the State* (New York: Verso 1993).

[90] Timothy Garton Ash, "The Haunted Land: Facing Europe's Ghosts after Communism" (book review), *New York Review of Books* 42 (July 13, 1995), 22.

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content—and one that virtually all observers could understand. Hungarian society was also extricating itself from the old regime, but in a manner so hidden, by comparison, that even many prominent Hungarian political actors overlooked it.[91]

During the communist period, then, different patterns of core conflict resolution developed in Hungary and Poland. These patterns seemed, however, to be on the verge of rupturing as the system began to collapse. For example, after decades of both overt and covert confrontation between broad sectors of Polish society and the authorities, the 1989 roundtable negotiations seemed to herald the end of confrontational politics. Similarly, in Hungary the opposition also seemed to break with long-established patterns by abandoning its initial preference for compromise with the leadership, opting instead for fully competitive elections—the very move that the better organized and much stronger Polish opposition rejected.[92]

In both countries, curiously, the opposition adopted the mirror image of its long-standing strategies. However, these proved to be isolated and fleeting moments. As the transition progressed, long-standing patterns of confrontation in Poland and of compromise in Hungary reemerged. Once the Polish negotiations achieved their immediate goal of relegalizing Solidarity and making concessions to other groups, participating actors saw no obvious reason to extend the compromise moment beyond the procedures necessary to ensure the implementation of the round table itself.[93] Similarly, once the uncharacteristically high levels of mobilization and confrontation subsided, Hungarian politics quickly returned to a pattern of pragmatic compromise much more closely resembling that of the 1963–88 period.

[91] None of the major parties made a serious effort to appeal to second economy entrepreneurs in their 1990 platforms. From my numerous conversations on the subject with politically active intellectuals between 1989 and 1992, it became clear that many still doubted (erroneously) that a stratum of truly successful indigenous private entrepreneurs actually existed in Hungary.

[92] Many analysts have emphasized the uncertainty regarding Gorbachev's reaction to the first Eastern bloc democratic elections as the main factor explaining the calculations of the opposition and the compromise outcome of the roundtable negotiations. This uncertainty, however, does not fully explain the compromise. Several equally important factors contributed to Solidarity's choices, not least among them Adam Michnik's conceptual frame, which had evolved in response to the political lessons he learned in 1980–81. "My political position during the Round Table had its origin in the memory of the collapse of the compromise of 1980–81 and in the feeling that it was now my obligation to make compromise possible and to remember why it had previously failed." See Michnik (fn. 12), 279. On the Hungarian opposition, see László Bruszt and David Stark, "Remaking the Political Field in Hungary: From the Politics of Confrontation to the Politics of Competition," in Ivo Banac, ed., *Eastern Europe in Revolution* (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1992), 21–23.

[93] On the calculations of Solidarity leaders, see Jan Gross, "Poland: From Civil Society to Political Nation," in Banac (fn. 92).

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By 1990 politics in Poland and Hungary was once again characterized by patterns of confrontation and compromise, respectively. In contrast, therefore, to the impression one might get from much of the literature on Eastern Europe, it is impossible to understand political developments in this region since 1989 without a careful consideration of these countries' pasts, especially during the communist period itself. Interestingly, it appears that even communist repression and the turmoil of transitions to democracy could not permanently eviscerate patterns of state-society relations in Poland and Hungary. There remains, of course, the question of how to connect these patterns and the different political models that have emerged from them to our study of democratic development and consolidation. It is to this question that the concluding section of this paper now turns.

III. The Corporatist-Compromise and Pluralist-Conflictual Models and Democratic Development

I have argued that over the past years distinct models of democracy have developed in Hungary and Poland, the nature of which can be understood only with reference to the pretransition histories of these countries. Indeed, I have claimed that it can be misleading to extrapolate from our knowledge of "founding moments" or transitions to build theories about consolidation. After all, the transition period itself turns out to have been something of an anomaly in both countries: for a relatively brief moment patterns of state-society relations seemed to shift in both countries, with actors taking a more consensual approach in Poland and a more conflictual one in Hungary. And yet, while no one would think of trying to understand democratic development and consolidation in Western Europe without a deep understanding of each country's pretransition past, transition-based theorizing about consolidation has been a particularly dangerous pitfall in the study of Eastern Europe. Clearly, the time has come for scholars interested in contemporary Eastern Europe to probe more deeply into the impact of patterns of political and social interaction dating back into the communist era and perhaps even earlier.

If one lesson of this analysis is that we need to pay more careful attention to history in our study of contemporary Eastern Europe, another may be that scholars studying the region would do well to pay more attention to some of the lessons learned by their counterparts studying Western Europe, rather than drawing comparisons only with

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other new democracies.[94] Scholars studying Western Europe have long recognized several distinct models within the broad category of "democracy." The analysis of corporatism, in particular, became quite important during the 1970s and early 1980s, as several scholars saw in this model a successful way of dealing with the problems associated with modern capitalist society. While idealized, the concepts of corporatism and pluralism served as heuristic devices that helped scholars understand the different dynamics of democratic development. It may be that countries like Poland and Hungary, which have been relatively successful in making the transition from communism, are in some ways repeating the experience of their Western counterparts, perhaps developing along broadly corporatist and pluralist lines.[95]

We should, however, begin not at the *start* of older debates about corporatism but at the *end*. Among other things, this means less of a focus on the formal institutions of corporatism or their absence, and more attention to informal political practices, the conceptual frames that give them coherence, and the political discourses that justify them.[96] In the present context this meant analyzing political relations *within* corporatist institutions, on the one hand, and *between* them and parliament and parties, on the other. A similar point holds for constitutional courts and for questions of amending and drafting constitutions. The formal powers of courts versus parliaments matter greatly. But so do the prevailing *patterns of interaction* between the legislative and the judicial branches and the *conceptual frames* and *discourses* adopted by political players to explain and justify these patterns. And, as we have seen, these cannot be read from the blueprints of formal institutions.

If we accept that the study of contemporary Poland and Hungary would be well served by paying greater attention to the distinct models

[94] This is especially so since the political referents for East Europeans were European, not Latin American. See Ghia Nodia, "How Different Are Postcommunist Transitions?" *Journal of Democracy* 7 (October 1996), 17.

[95] And arguably, they may be skipping or at least accelerating the prescribed "stages" of democratic and capitalist development often presumed to precede corporatism and pluralism. Thanks to an anonymous reviewer for pointing this out.

[96] It meant, in other words, understanding corporatism as just one "element of consensus democracy," as Markus Crepaz and Arend Lijphart have suggested. See Crepaz and Lijphart, "Linking and Integrating Corporatism and Consensus Democracy: Theory, Concepts and Evidence," in *British Journal of Political Science* 25 (April 1995), 288. In more detailed analyses of corporatism than it was possible to undertake here, it will also mean, as Kathleen Thelen has argued, paying attention to the "goals and strategies of employers . . . and looking at how politics at the local level shape and are shaped by macro level developments"; see Thelen, "Beyond Corporatism: Toward a New Framework for the Study of Labor in Advanced Capitalism, *Comparative Politics* 27 (October 1994), 122.

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of democracy developing in these countries—and to how the "old rationalities" carried forward from the pretransition past affect the present—then what, if anything, does this article have to tell us about the future of these countries? On the basis of the analysis presented here, what can we learn about the quality of or prospects for democracy in Poland and Hungary?

Obviously, neither conflict management nor democratic consolidation is a generic process, and we are not in possession of a formula that could determine which of these countries will have deepened its democracy most in another decade. We know, of course, that high-grade democracies do more than survive. They continuously engage government and people in a dynamic relationship of mutual empowerment and restraint.[97] For neither state-society consensus nor an active civil society is, in itself, always desirable. Exclusionary consensus can damage democracy, and a vibrant civil society—recall Germany in the 1930s—can also engender undemocratic ideologies that mobilize majoritarian hatreds against innocent minorities.[98] In such cases it matters if the state has the institutional capacity to check antidemocratic trends, say, through a judicial system that rules out abuses. Conversely, an unrestrained state, however democratic, can fall prey to internal manipulation and distortion—the peculiar psychology of Richard Nixon wreaked havoc on the American presidency in part because his silent majority surrendered its sense of civic duty.

Starting with Hungary, then, it is clear that its compromise-corporatist model has both pros and cons. On the positive side, Hungary's tradition of consensus politics and elite negotiation would seem to bode well for long-term democratic consolidation and stability. Many scholars have, for example, stressed that elite cooperation and political moderation are crucial for democratic development. Evidence from Europe and Latin America shows that "elite transformations from disunity to consensual unity" are both rare and "as consequential as social revolutions," since they create "patterns of open but peaceful competition among major elite factions, the result of which has historically

[97] For a more extensive discussion of possible ways to judge the quality of democracy, see Guillermo O'Donnell, "Illusions and Conceptual Flaws," *Journal of Democracy* 7 (October 1996), 160–68; idem, "Illusions about Consolidation," *Journal of Democracy* 7 (April 1996); Larry Diamond, "Is the Third Wave Over?" *Journal of Democracy* 7 (April 1996); Linz and Stepan (fn. 1); and Karen Remmer, "The Sustainability of Political Democracy: Lessons from South America," *Comparative Political Studies* 29 (December 1996).

[98] Sheri Berman, "Civil Society and the Collapse of the Weimar Republic," *World Politics* 49 (April 1997).

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been . . . stable limited democracy."[99] Hungary, unlike Poland, appears to have achieved such an elite settlement. Furthermore, as noted above, Hungarians in general seem quite experienced in the art of "divisibility,"[100] tending to see the potential compromises inherent in problems and favoring pragmatic rather than confrontational and moralistic discourse. Nevertheless, Hungary's compromise-corporatist model does have some obvious flaws, perhaps the most serious of which is the depoliticization of the citizenry. John Stuart Mill once noted that "in a country at all advanced in civilization, competent paternalism . . . depresses the healthy political impulse."[101] Clearly, our ideal view of democracy does not include citizens content to delegate much of the stuff of politics to elites. The active, engaged citizenry of Tocquevillian town meetings is the picture most of us probably have in mind when we think of a truly well functioning democracy. On this measure, Hungary does seem to fall short. It is worth noting that many students of West European corporatism have commented on a similar phenomenon. Finally, however desirable, the propensity of Hungarian elites to engage in consensus politics may not be sustainable in the second decade of postcommunist democracy. Paradoxically, under conditions of strong party discipline, entrenched consensual procedure may not provide sufficient space for debate and open dissent even *within* the government. Some socialists have now taken the position that they and their coalition partners, the SZDSZ, were "fools" not to have used the two-thirds majority available to them in the constitution-drafting process.[102] To be sure, this sharp retrospective assessment comes in the face of the new government's explicitly more confrontational ideology. After a narrow victory in 1998 parliamentary elections, FIDESZ, a former liberal party turned conservative, has tried to modify the entrenched model of consensus. Although there is as yet no indication that it will succeed in any fundamental sense, the model may be renegotiated, at least at the margins.[103]

[99] Higley and Gunther (fn. 6), 13, 32.

[100] Albert Hirschman, "Social Conflicts as Pillars of Democratic Market Society," *Political Theory* 22 (May 1994). See also Jon Elster, Claus Offe, and Ulrich K. Preuss, *Institutional Design in Post-Communist Societies: Rebuilding the Ship at Sea* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1998), 250.

[101] J. S. Mill cited in Körösényi (fn. 59),1993.

[102] Rather than unilaterally eschewing this right in favor of the four-fifths option (see p. 11). Author interview with Zoltán Bretter, Princeton, February 1999.

[103] FIDESZ, for example, refused to cede to the opposition leadership of the Committee on EU affairs, despite the fact that, thanks to the SZDSZ-MSZP coalition's self-restraint, FIDESZ itself held leadership of this committee when in opposition between 1994 and 1998. Indeed, Prime Minister Orbán was the head of that committee. FIDESZ has also attempted to reassert (indirect) government control over the media and has altered the procedural rules of parliamentary debate in its favor. But it has

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More troubling than FIDESZ's institutional innovations or policies, however, is some of its political discourse. There is, among some prominent figures in FIDESZ, a disturbing undercurrent of nationalism, which is stronger still among the Smallholders, one of the junior partners in the governing coalition. FIDESZ's leadership also exhibits a somewhat authoritarian governing style (at least when judged by recent standards of Hungarian compromise politics), but there is good reason to believe that the institutional changes through which it had hoped to express this style will be fleeting.[104] Moreover, FIDESZ's popularity is dropping—on several measures, precipitously. If the argument advanced here is correct, then the government will be forced to modify some aspects of its political discourse and some of its positions if it wants to remain in power. We have seen dramatic illustrations elsewhere of the power of political entrepreneurs to reawaken and harness the least desirable undersides of a dominant political culture. None of FIDESZ's leadership, certainly, means to engage in such destructive political entrepreneurship—though the same cannot be said with certainty of all of the Smallholders' leadership. But beyond the fortunes of the present governing coalition, the broader concern is that nationalist-confrontational political discourses can easily spin out of the control of those who may intend to employ them only expediently, in order to play to a particular constituency.

Poland's conflictual-pluralist model in many ways provides a sharp contrast to Hungary's compromise-corporatist democracy. Whereas governability and social conflict do not seem to be problems in the latter, it is by no means inconceivable that they will come to represent prominent challenges in the former. As noted above, labor mobilization has been very high in Poland and strikes and protest are a constant feature of the political landscape. Although the long-run implications of this state of affairs are difficult to predict, it is not hard to imagine that chronically high levels of mass mobilization could prove destabilizing

backed away from some of its more divisive campaign rhetoric. FIDESZ has a conception of well-functioning democracy somewhat different from that of previous governing parties, insisting that party stability will be enhanced by the clarification of party programs and ideologies through the crystallization of clear left-right alternatives; see Bernard Iván Tamás, "Party Competence: Hungarian Intellectuals in the Struggle for Political Survival" (Ph.D. diss., Rutgers, the State University of New Jersey, 1999), 372. FIDESZ's strategy is not, however, the result of the kind of bipolar communist/anticommunist conceptual frame that prevails in Polish politics.

[104] The government has amended the working process of parliament so that it meets in plenary session less often, resulting in less time for the opposition to make its proposals in full session. The opposition challenged this, and the constitutional court has ruled that two-thirds of the entire parliament must decide upon its working order, and must do so by December 15, 1999. In that event the governing coalition's amended working order will meet stiff opposition and may well be reversed.

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for the regime—especially if many citizens continue to regard such activity as a *substitute* for the formal channels of democratic politics.[105] It might be objected that strikes and other types of protest are quite frequent in, say, France; but the latter's longer experience of democracy may afford its democratic system greater legitimacy and the government greater leeway in dealing with social discontent and protest.[106] Moreover, in Poland the working class is now "the most distressed and the most averse to systemic change."[107] At the same time by some estimates, compared with Hungary, Poland has privatized only about half its state-owned sector in industry and has privatized only a "fraction" of its banking system.[108] Consequently, although I do not unreservedly adhere to the "moderation hypothesis"—the idea that "too much pressure from below can spoil the chances for democracy"[109]—it is clear that under certain conditions mass mobilization may both reflect and deepen the weakness of democratic institutions.[110] Repeated strikes reassert labor's claim to its traditional political space—the same space in which it resoundingly demonstrated its comparative advantage during the "prior game."[111] Stated differently, labor mobilization constantly recreates a large and visible presence for organized workers in a polity that owes its very existence to precisely the type of mass movement that in a reconfigured institutional setting might be dismissed as a vestigial nuisance or even come under attack as an impediment to structural re-

[105] Ekiert and Kubik (fn. 17); Berman (fn. 98).

[106] Since my concern here is with mobilization as a substitute for party politics and other democratic channels, Herbert Kitschelt's reminder is apposite. He points out that parties (as well as interest groups and social movements) are part of a "closely woven fabric of linkages between civil society and political institutions"; Kitschelt, "New Social Movements and the Decline of Party Organization," in Russel J. Dalton and Manfred Duechler, eds., *Challenging the Political Order: New Social and Political Movements in Western Democracies* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1990), 179. Clearly, this fabric is more tightly woven in older, better-established democracies. However, even France's venerable democracy has grappled with serious legitimacy problems and tensions in the relations between citizens and the state. See the classic analysis by Suzanne Berger, *The French Political System* (New York: Random House, 1974).

[107] Kazimierz M. Słomczyński and Goldie Shabad, "Systemic Transformation and the Salience of Class Structure in East Central Europe," *East European Politics and Societies* 11 (Winter 1997), 188.

[108] Kazimierz Z. Poznański, "Rethinking Comparative Economics: From Organizational Simplicity to Institutional Complexity," *East European Politics and Societies* 12 (Winter 1998), 184. Sarah Meiklejohn Terry also notes that "political volatility" has slowed privatization in Poland. See Terry, "Poland: A Troubled Transition," in Mary Ellen Fischer, ed., *Establishing Democracies* (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1996), 239.

[109] Nancy Bermeo, "Myths of Moderation: Confrontation and Conflict during Democratic Transitions," *Comparative Politics* 29 (April 1997), 311.

[110] Even high levels of strikes are compatible with *transitions* to democracy; Bermeo (fn. 109), 311. Yet what is not problematic during transitions and the early consolidation phase may present a major challenge later, if labor unrest combines with other forms of protest or more institutionalized pressure.

[111] On the influence of "prior games" in the construction of political culture, see Consuelo Cruz, "The Politics of Fate and Possibility: World-Making in the Tropics" (Manuscript, New York, Columbia University, 1998).

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form.[112] Labor mobilization may eventually come to represent a bid for prominence and esteem in a new democratic game.

Sociopolitical cleavages are also deeper and more problematic in Poland than in Hungary. Albert Hirschman has drawn a useful distinction between "divisible" and "indivisible" conflicts: the former, "split the difference" conflicts are those in which compromises "reached between classes, sectors and regions are temporary [and] tied to the particular circumstances in which they were made." That is, the compromises are discrete and often quantifiable, rather than "either-or conflicts" over highly charged or immutable categories like "religion, language, race or gender."[113] The former are relatively easy to deal with in a democracy, the latter more difficult; consequently, the more of the latter type of conflicts that prevail, the greater the pressure on the political system. Using this criterion, Poland could potentially face serious challenges, since it would score relatively high on any measurement of "indivisible" conflict.[114] In legislative-judicial relations and in party politics, the split between traditionally religious and secular groups is pronounced.[115] Another, more recent example is the seemingly intractable conflict over unauthorized crosses at Auschwitz, which has grown into an international incident. As Maryjane Osa makes clear, because this conflict "involves the symbolic representation of core elements of faith . . . no 'technical' solution is possible. Any compromise is treated as a betrayal of fundamental truths."[116]

Nevertheless, the 1997 elections show a rationalization of party behavior in a (lagged) response to a revamped electoral regime[117] (see the appendix). This is a hopeful development, given the apparently strong positive correlation between cabinet stability and system legitimacy, on

[112] As mentioned earlier, my argument about labor mobilization as a partial substitute for formal democratic channels should *not* be understood as a claim about labor's current strength. If anything, labor unions seem to have lost some of their earlier enterprise-level power to affect the transition process and especially to control privatization. Labor mobilization may represent frustration more than strength—a potentially troubling political state of affairs.

[113] Hirschman (fn. 100), 214.

[114] For a broad-ranging analysis of the long-standing tension between "advocates of collective rights" and "advocates of societal rights" in Eastern Europe, see Sabrina P. Ramet, *Whose Democracy? Nationalism, Religion, and the Doctrine of Collective Rights in Post-1989 Eastern Europe* (Lanham, Md.: Rowman and Littlefield, 1997), esp. 97–110.

[115] It is also evident in broader social controversies like the abortion debate. See Ramet (fn. 114), 97–110.

[116] The origin of the first cross at Auschwitz was "an act of anti-Communist opposition: in 1979 a memorial cross was placed at the site (where more than 150 Poles were shot by the Nazis) to commemorate Pope John Paul II's visit to Auschwitz during his triumphal return to Poland"; Maryjane Osa, "The Dynamics of Religion and Politics in Poland," *East European Studies*, Meeting Report 168 (Washington, D.C.: Woodrow Wilson Center, 1998), 2

[117] See Stanclik (fn. 60), 12.

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the one hand, and the negative correlation between polarization and popular support for democracy, on the other.[118] Such adaptation in party strategies may well hasten the development of more stable left-right blocs, though it remains to be seen whether it is enough to bring about sustainable cooperation among parties, especially given the intensity of indivisible conflict outlined above. "Woe to those moral absolutists who emerge victorious in political struggles," Adam Michnik warned. "Moral Absolutism is a great strength for individuals and groups struggling against dictatorship; but it is a weakness for individuals and groups active in a world in which democratic procedures are being built on the rubble of totalitarian dictatorships."[119]

In conclusion, as scholars move from the study of *transitions* to the study of consolidation, they need to develop new categories, analytic tools, and perspectives. For example, if we want to assess broadly the success or failure of transitions from communism, it makes sense to put Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic in one category and Russia, Albania, Romania, Yugoslavia, and other countries in another. But, if we are interested in developments *since the transition*—and in particular in patterns of consolidation and the nature of these evolving democratic systems, then these categorizations are less useful. Furthermore, when studying consolidation and democratic development, scholars of Eastern Europe and other areas of the world might find it fruitful to borrow some of the insights and analytical tools of their colleagues who study first- and second-wave democratizers. Not only might sophisticated versions of concepts like corporatism and pluralism be transferable, but something might also be gained from reexamining earlier studies of political mobilization, institutionalization, and state-society relations.[120] Finally, our perspective on political development needs to be pushed back in time, and we need to shift our analytical focus away from formal institutions and incentives to actors' informal practices and conceptual frames. Now that the turmoil and excitement of the transition years has passed, scholars should devote more effort to uncovering the deeper roots of the political patterns and trajectories characterizing Eastern Europe and other regions today.

[118] Robert Harmel and John D. Robertson, "Government Stability and Regime Support: A Cross-National Analysis," *Journal of Politics* 48 (1986); and Frederick D. Weil, "The Sources and Structure of Legitimation in Western Democracies: A Consolidated Model Tested with Time-Series Data in Six Countries since World War II," *American Sociological Review* 54 (1989), quoted in Stanclik (fn. 60), 1–2.

[119] Michnik (fn. 12), 322–23.

[120] Along the lines suggested by Thomas Ertman, "Democracy and Dictatorship in Interwar Western Europe Revisited," *World Politics* 50 (April 1998). It should prove particularly interesting over time to compare East European cases with Ertman's argument that a rough balance between the strength of civil society and political parties was a crucial factor in the ability of a majority of West European nations to sustain democracy in the interwar period.

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Appendix
Main Hungarian and Polish Parties and Most Recent Electoral Results

1997 Polish Parliamentary Elections

Party/Alliance	*Description*	*% of total votes*
Akcja Wyborcza Solidarnosc (AWS) Solidarity Electoral Alliance	conservative/nationalist	33.8
Sojuz Lewicy Demokratycznej (SLD) Democratic Left Alliance	social democratic (postcommunist party)	27.1
Unia Wolnosci (UW) Freedom Union	liberal	13.4
Polskie Stronnictwo Ludowe (PSL) Polish People's Party	peasant populist	7.3
Ruch Odbudowy Polski (ROP) Movement for Poland's Reconstruction	nationalist/populist	5.6
Unia Pracy (UP) Union of Labour	social democratic	4.7
% of all votes cast for parties winning parliamentarly seats		91.9

1998 Hungarian Parliamentary Elections

Party/Alliance	*Description*	*% of total votes*
Független Ifjusági Demokratikus Szövetsége (FIDESZ) FIDESZ-Hungarian Civic Party	conservative	29.27
(FIDESZ)/*Magyar Demokrata Forum* (MDF) FIDESZ/Hungarian Democratic Forum	conservative/ conservative	12.95
Független Kisgazdapárt (FKGP) Independent Smallholders Party	conservative nationalist/agrarian	12.44
Magyar Igazság és Élet Pártja (MIEP) Hungarian Truth and Life Party	conservative nationalist	3.63
Magyar Szocialista Párt (MSZP) Hungarian Socialist Party	social democratic (main postcommunist party)	34.72
Szabad Demokratak Szövetsége (SZDSZ) Alliance of Free Democrats	liberal	6.22
% of all votes cast for parties winning parliamentary seats		99.2

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AFRICA'S OVERGROWN STATE RECONSIDERED

Bureaucracy and Economic Growth

By ARTHUR A. GOLDSMITH*

INTRODUCTION

OVERGROWN government bureaucracies are widely seen as one reason behind the undergrown economies in sub-Saharan Africa (SSA). Seldom is the exact relationship between bureaucracy and growth examined more closely in these countries, probably because a negative correlation seems self-evident. But how strong is the correlation? To what extent can we link outsized African bureaucracies to languishing African economies?

This paper, from a comparative perspective, looks at the evidence that supports those conclusions and finds it wanting. The data show instead three unexpected things about bureaucracy and growth in Africa. First, regarding their size, African public bureaucracies are not as large as often imagined. To the contrary, relative to other states, African states deploy a small stock of personnel to manage their territories and populations.[1] Second, as to the trend in public employment, the number of bureaucrats has been falling rather than rising in much of SSA since about 1980. Africa's small state bureaucracies for the most part have been getting smaller. Third, with respect to larger bureaucracies being associated with lagging national incomes, the inverse comes closer to the truth. At least two countries with higher levels of public employment have had superior economic records.

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[1] The point is not unknown in the literature, but it is seldom sufficiently emphasized. An exception is Robert H. Jackson and Carl G. Rosberg, "Why Africa's Weak States Persist," *World Politics* 35, no. 1 (1982).

World Politics 51 (July 1999), 520–46

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This last point does not mean that big bureaucracies directly produce development and rising national incomes. The relationship between the scale of a country's bureaucracy and the pace of its development is doubtlessly not a case of mechanistic cause and effect. More than likely, honest and socially responsive bureaucracies contribute to favorable climates for commercial activity, which in turn provide resources to augment the size of the civil service. The keys are honesty and responsiveness.[2]

These findings suggest that too much attention has been paid to quantitative or "first-generation" bureaucratic issues in Africa. Not enough attention has been given to the more subtle and challenging "second-generation" issues of bureaucratic quality.[3] State bureaucracies are a problem in Africa, mostly because they underperform, not because they are overexpanded. Societies need a capable administration to keep order, collect revenue, and carry out programs. The sub-Saharan region lacks these administrative endowments.

In other words, the issue of African bureaucracy has usually been framed superficially. Due to financial exigencies, policymakers have put more stress on controlling numbers and cost than on making the bureaucracy more useful for society. The concern with size is abetted by contemporary ideological fashions and by the fact that retrenchment and pay freezes lend themselves to precisely definable targets. But there is little empirical basis for saying that SSA bureaucracies are too big or that simply making them smaller yields economic dividends.

This is not to make a blanket argument against reductions in force or the reassignment of government personnel in Africa. There is always organizational fat, and any government agency can outlive its usefulness. In Africa, these agencies often strain to keep up with procedures that are left over from the colonial era and that lack any discernible value today. Still, no bureaucracy can get rid of all paper shuffling and make-work. The important thing is that the public's work gets done. Africa's experience shows that in this sense a condensed civil service is not necessarily a more effective civil service.[4]

[2] Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes, Andrei Shleifer, and Robert W. Vishny make a similar point in a recent paper. Their econometric analysis shows that bigger governments are also better governments (in the sense of being good for capitalist development), which is not to make a case for expanding any particular state. See La Porta et al., "The Quality of Government," NBER Working Paper, no. 6727 (Cambridge: NBER, 1998).

[3] Lapido Adamolekun, "A Note on Civil Service Personnel Policy Reform in Sub-Saharan Africa," *International Journal of Public Sector Management* 6, no. 3 (1993); E. Philip Morgan and Roy Shen, "From Retrenchment to Reform: Civil Service Reform in Africa," *International Journal of Public Administration* 18, no. 9 (1995).

[4] In this paper, the term "civil service" is used broadly to include core public administration (economic policy-making and management, law enforcement, and adjudication) and other public services,

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TABLE 1
BOTSWANA AND MAURITIUS
BASIC STATISTICS

	Population (1995)	*Per Capita GNP (1995)*	*Per Capita GNP Average Growth (1985–95)*	*Human Development Index (1995)*
Botswana	1.5 mil.	$3,020	6.1%	0.678
Mauritius	1.1 mil.	$3,380	5.4%	0.833
All SSA	583 mil.	$490	−1.1%	0.378

SOURCE: World Bank, *World Development Report 1997: The State in a Changing World* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1997); United Nations Development Program, *Human Development Report* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1998).

To gain insight into the conditions that do make bureaucracies more effective, pointed references will be made in this paper to Botswana and Mauritius, the pair of African "Tigers" (perhaps "Lions" would be more appropriate) whose economic performances over the past twenty-five years resemble more closely the economic boom in the newly industrialized East Asian "Tigers." Botswana and Mauritius challenge much of what is assumed to be true about the continent as a whole.[5] If we look at just the years 1985–95, both countries exhibited strong increases in per capita income—a period when the SSA region as a whole was registering declines. Accordingly, Botswana and Mauritius fare better than the African average in human development as calculated by the United Nations (see Table 1). Both countries also are the oldest democracies in Africa and have made their economic and social gains within a framework of civil rights and open political competition. Significantly for this paper, neither of them went the route of civil-service austerity followed elsewhere. They serve as models of how sizable but comparatively well-managed bureaucracies can support development, even in Africa, a region better known for its administrative pathologies.

such as education and health. "Bureaucracy" will be used as a synonym. When distinctions are made, as, for example, between central and local government employment, they will be noted in the text. The discussion by and large does not include either military employees or employees of state-owned corporations. To avoid tediousness, this paper uses "Africa" and "sub-Saharan Africa" interchangeably.

[5] According to World Bank and IMF data, average GDP growth in Botswana was 11.1 percent from 1970 to 1995—the highest in Africa (and the world). Mauritius averaged 5.3 percent per year during the same period, the third best in Africa (Lesotho was number two, with a 6.9 percent GDP growth rate). One might object that Mauritius is only nominally an African country, and it does bear a close resemblance to many other small island states, for example, in the Caribbean. Still, it became independent with "Africa-like" strikes against it, including overpopulation, dependence on a single export commodity, ethnic tension, physical isolation, and destruction wreaked by cyclones. Botswana also entered into nationhood inauspiciously. Thirty years ago it was one of the poorest countries in the world with drought and being landlocked among its many problems.

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I start with a review of competing theoretical perspectives regarding the economic functions of bureaucracy. A quantitative analysis of trends in African administrative systems follows. I then turn to qualitative issues, focusing on the Botswana and Mauritius cases for insight into the process of building effective bureaucracies. The paper concludes with suggestions for how other African countries might emulate the successes of Botswana and Mauritius in the administrative realm.

The Mixed Blessing of Bureaucracy

Bureaucracy (literally meaning "rule by office holders") is subject to widespread criticism with two leading lines of attack. The first stresses the internal logic of bureaucratic aggrandizement. Perhaps its best spokesperson is C. Northcote Parkinson, an English political scientist who, shortly after World War II, humorously analyzed why bureaucracies malfunction. First proposed facetiously, "Parkinson's Law" has come to be accepted wisdom. It states that government organizations get bigger for no good reason. The driving force is managers who want to improve their status by building up their staff, which leads to increases in positions that bear little relationship to the purpose or amount of work to be done. Each superfluous worker generates another, and offices and bureaus multiply over time without adding any value.[6]

The second main avenue for criticizing bureaucracy stresses the external factors behind bureaucratic enlargement. Public choice theorists argue that privileged groups of rent seekers ask for advantageous government programs and that leaders are keen to say yes to keep their hands on power. The bureaucrats hired to carry out these programs naturally develop alliances with the external constituency groups. All work together to protect their pet programs and to secure more resources for them. An inexorable process of bureaucratic expansion ensues.[7]

For both internal and external reasons, therefore, countries are believed to be saddled with too many government bureaucrats, who seldom do anything useful. They are an economic deadweight. Getting rid of them frees resources for productive activity in the private sector.

Such antibureaucratic arguments can be applied with good effect to Africa. African public sector employment exploded after independence, often as a means to provide patronage to groups of political supporters.

[6] C. Northgate Parkinson, *Parkinson's Law and Other Studies in Administration* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1957).

[7] See, for example, James M. Buchanan, *The Limits of Liberty: Between Anarchy and Leviathan* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1975), 155–61.

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Robert Bates points out that bureaucrats are never perfect agents of their leaders' will, and in Africa they corrupted significant aspects of government programs and survived off the proceeds.[8] National economies sank in the region. Spending on African bureaucrats must have come at the expense of economic growth with centralized political institutions stifling private entrepreneurship.[9] The international community became convinced that many government workers had to be let go to rejuvenate African economies.[10]

There is an older and less disparaging tradition in bureaucratic studies, however, associated with Max Weber. For him, the problem with government bureaucracy was not its tendency to smother the private sector. A far more serious issue was the *absence* of bureaucracy. "Rational states" and "calculable" administration (characterized by a graded hierarchy, formal rules, written files, and salaried, full-time staff) were preconditions for capitalist economic health, according to Weber. These organizational arrangements provided the private sector a sanctuary within which to develop. Capricious public administration, by contrast, undermined the private sector's confidence and willingness to save, invest, and innovate. By making the legal consequences of acts easier to foresee, the machinery of the bureaucratic state improved the investment climate and encouraged commercial activity.[11]

Weber's themes resonate today in the statist school of international and political studies. This school looks at late-developing countries and observes a pattern of activist, developmental states. In particular, strong, pragmatic public bureaucracies that execute well-planned industrial policies mark East Asia.[12] One need not accept the brief for industrial policy, however, to see that the civil service has irreducible functions in development. The voluntary and profit sectors depend on certain public goods—notably a stable constitutional and legal order, a system for mass education, a network for public health, a physical infrastructure for commercial activity, and a means to protect the natural environ-

[8] See Robert H. Bates, "The Impulse to Reform in Africa," in Jennifer Widner, ed., *Economic Changes and Political Liberalization in Sub-Saharan Africa* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1994).

[9] This argument can be found in James Wunsch and Dele Olowu, eds., *The Failure of the Centralized State* (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1990); and in David Abernethy, "Bureaucratic Growth and Economic Stagnation in Sub-Saharan Africa," in Stephen K. Commins, ed., *Africa's Development Challenges and the World Bank* (Boulder, Colo.: Lynne Reinner, 1988).

[10] World Bank, *Accelerated Development in Sub-Saharan Africa: An Agenda for Action* (Washington, D.C.: World Bank, 1981); idem, *World Development Report 1983* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1983).

[11] Max Weber, *General Economic History*, trans. Frank C. Knight (Glencoe, N. Y.: Free Press, 1950).

[12] Alice Amsden, *Asia's Next Giant: South Korea and Late Industrialization* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1989).

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ment. The official development organizations have lately begun to acknowledge how crucial the state is.[13]

Weber's point is that market economies cannot thrive unless a state bureaucracy helps provide public goods. Obviously, some public goods do emerge spontaneously from private exchange, but seldom in socially desirable quantities.[14] It takes government administration to make up the difference. From the Weberian viewpoint, therefore, the economic troubles in Africa are more likely related to aimless or inattentive, but not necessarily enlarged, bureaucracies. Conversely, the accomplishments of the more successful countries, such as Botswana and Mauritius, must have been built on a base of impartial, professional bureaucrats. The evidence suggests that these Weberian insights are correct on both counts.

Measuring Africa's Public Sector Workforce

There is no optimum dimension for the public service. Clearly, economic advancement has occurred under a broad range of state bureaucracies, from large to small. Still, while we cannot say that any particular amount of public employment is ideal, we can look for international benchmarks and ask how Africa compares with them. This can help us judge whether African bureaucracies are out of scale.

Before trying to establish these reference points, it is important to point out the dearth of reliable statistics on public service jobs and pay in Africa. The impoverished database makes it hard to compare across countries or even to establish trends over time within a single country.[15] A major issue in the SSA region is the presence of so-called ghost workers in the public sector—deceased, retired, or nonexistent people who nonetheless draw paychecks. The number of ghosts will never be known, but it must be significant.[16]

[13] See for example, World Bank, *World Development Report 1997: The State in a Changing World* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1997).

[14] In contrast to private goods, public goods tend to be nonexcludable (potential users cannot be kept away) and nonsubtractable (one person's use does not take away from another's). Therefore, private producers cannot capture the full production cost of public goods and lack material incentives to create them. Private, profit-seeking actors still may be motivated to produce and sell some public goods, particularly health care, education, and, increasingly, police services—but usually in suboptimal quantities. Private voluntary action also produces many of the same public goods.

[15] Sometimes the uncertainty is due to records being decentralized, though often individual departments lack accurate information on whom they employ. They may know the number of permanent posts they have but not how many are filled or whether casual workers have been hired as a stopgap. See Derek Robinson, *Civil Service Pay in Africa* (Geneva: International Labour Organisation, 1990), 9.

[16] Barbara Nunberg, "Experience with Civil Service Pay and Employment Reform: An Overview," in David L. Lindauer and Barbara Nunberg, eds., *Rehabilitating Government: Pay and Employment Reform in Africa* (Washington, D.C.: World Bank, 1994), 128. Uganda eliminated forty-four thousand

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To complicate cross-country comparisons further, governments have more than one way to carry out the same tasks. For instance, they may directly operate the health care system. Other governments may finance health services indirectly, subsidizing private health care providers. In the first type of system, medical staff is on the public payroll; in the second type they are not. But the comparison is meaningless as far as indicating which government is paying for more health care workers.[17]

Another source of misunderstanding relates to the level of government. More information is always available on employment in central government than in local government. This poses little problem when comparing unitary states, where central authorities carry out the bulk of government activity. The situation becomes more complicated when a federal state (Nigeria, for instance) is included because it delegates more public administrative duties to the subnational levels. Thus, international comparisons of central government employment must be made cautiously.

The Size of Africa's Civil Service

Although the data have inherent difficulties, they do show that government job levels in SSA are not excessive by world standards. At independence, none of the former African colonies had a substantial civil service. The colonial state rarely did much more than keep the peace and collect revenue—important tasks, to be sure, but not ones that took a huge staff to carry them out. Kenya's administrative apparatus was more elaborate than most due to the large settler enclave and the Mau Mau emergency. Still, there were only about sixty-three thousand civil service posts (many unfilled) in 1965 in a country of 10 million.[18] Nigeria, with a population more than four times larger, gained independence in 1960 with about seventy-two thousand federal and regional employees.[19]

ghosts (13 percent of the civil service) between 1991 and 1996. "Uganda Achieves Impressive Results in Reforming Public Service Sector," *IMF Survey,* May 25, 1998.

[17] Similar problems of comparability exist for the postal system, the railroad, and other services—sometimes provided by government departments, sometimes by autonomous government corporations and "quangos" (quasi-autonomous governmental organizations), to use a British term. The growing popularity of contracting for public services further blurs the distinction between the public and private sectors.

[18] Gøran Hydén, "Basic Civil Service Characteristics," in Hydén, Robert Jackson, and John Okumu, eds., *Development Administration: The Kenyan Experience* (Nairobi: Oxford University Press, 1970), 8.

[19] Lapido Adamolekun, "Postscript," in D. J. Murray, ed., *Studies in Nigerian Administration* (London: Hutchinson, 1978), 322.

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These were not large numbers, and they were bound to mount. Not only did the new regimes have to boost staffing levels to satisfy rising expectations for better public services, they also needed more government jobs to reward supporters. Soaring populations and government activism further pumped up demand for government employees. Thus, by 1979 Kenya had over two hundred fifty-eight thousand central-government employees (more than half being teachers and health workers) according to its Civil Service Reform Committee.[20] Growth in public services in Nigeria was even stronger. By 1974 its Public Service Review Committee put federal and state civil service employment at two hundred seventy-five thousand, with another three hundred eighty-three thousand public employees in schools, universities, police units, and other jobs.[21]

The high-water mark for public employment in many SSA countries was reached in the early 1980s. A rough estimate for the region is that employment in the regular line agencies of government topped 6.5 million, more than three times the figure two decades earlier.[22] This sounds alarming, but it is worth remembering that the population of Africa increased by 70 percent between 1960 and 1980. Given the base of rudimentary public services in the colonial era, a threefold rise in the number of civil servants over twenty years may not look unreasonable—provided that the government workers could be paid in a noninflationary way and that they did the jobs they were meant to do. Unfortunately, neither of these things happened. Economic growth proved too slow to fund these workers easily, and their performance was clearly lacking on many counts.[23] For reasons that I examine later, most countries' public officials failed routinely to do many allotted tasks.

Observers are apt to characterize the SSA state and civil services as "swollen" and "bloated," as suffering from "bureaucratic elephantiasis syndrome."[24] Do these charges hold up? World Bank researchers recently compiled a comprehensive dataset that permits an answer. Their data show that SSA does *not* have inordinate public employment by

[20] Civil Service Review Committee, Republic of Kenya, *Report* (Nairobi, 1980), 33.

[21] Public Service Review Commission, Federal Republic of Nigeria, *Main Report* (Lagos, 1974).

[22] Abernethy (fn. 9), 189.

[23] Gatian F. Lungi and John O. Oni, "Administrative Weakness in Contemporary Africa," *Africa Quarterly* 18, no. 4 (1979).

[24] Larry Diamond, "Class Formation in the Swollen African State," *Journal of Modern African Studies* 25, no. 4 (1987); Asmelash Beyene and Ejeviome Eloho Otobo, "Public Administration in Africa: Past Trends and Emerging Challenges," *African Journal of Public Administration and Management* 3, no. 2 (1994); Richard C. Crook, "Patrimonialism, Administrative Effectiveness and Economic Development in Côte d'Ivoire," *African Affairs* 88, no. 351 (1989).

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TABLE 2
GENERAL CIVILIAN PUBLIC SECTOR EMPLOYMENT [a]
DEVELOPING COUNTRY REGIONS

	Percent of Population Mid-1990s[b]
Asia (11 countries)	2.6
Latin America and Caribbean (9 countries)	3.0
Middle East and North Africa (8 countries)	3.9
SSA (20 countries)[c]	1.5
Botswana	5.8
Mauritius	5.5

SOURCE: Salvatore Schiavo-Campo, Giulio de Tommaso, and Amitabha Mukherjee, "An International Statistical Survey of Government Employment and Wages," World Bank Policy Research Working Paper, no. 1806 (Washington, D.C.: World Bank, 1997).

[a] General Civilian Public Sector Employment includes workers in all government organizations financed by government budgets (including health and education providers but excluding national defense and state-owned enterprises).

[b] Unweighted mean for countries in the group.

[c] Angola, Cameroon, Cape Verde, Central African Republic, Comoros, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea-Bissau, Ivory Coast, Kenya, Malawi, Namibia, Senegal, South Africa, Tanzania, Togo, Uganda, Zaire, Zambia, Zimbabwe.

world standards. This is true even after adjusting for the level of national income.[25]

To start with a head count, Africa actually has fewer government workers per capita than any other developing region (see Table 2). (Workers in public corporations are not included here. They are discussed in the section below dealing with parastatals.) The average Asian country, for instance, reports 2.6 civilian government workers for every one hundred people; the average Latin American country reports 3.0 government workers. For a score of African countries, the average ratio is only 1.5 government workers per one hundred people.

Our focus cases, Mauritius and Botswana, were different. As reported in Table 2, employees at all levels of government (excluding defense and state enterprises) represented 5.5 percent and 5.8 percent of the population respectively in these reasonably successful countries—nearly four times higher than in the typical African country.

To what extent do the data in Table 2 merely reflect different levels of development? The comparatively small bureaucracies in most of Africa might just represent the region's lower standard of living. Wag-

[25] Salvatore Schiavo-Campo, Giulio de Tommaso, and Amitabha Mukherjee, "An International Statistical Survey of Government Employment and Wages," World Bank Policy Research Working Paper, no. 1806 (1997).

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ner's Law states that government spending increases disproportionately as societies get richer. This tendency is due to public affairs being more complex to administer in more developed countries and to the fact that the demand for public services is income-elastic (richer people want more of them). So we would expect Africa to have small bureaucracies. They might still be large in relation to their domestic economic bases.

An IMF study sheds light on this issue. Peter Heller and Alan Tait calculate an International Government Employment Index using data from the late seventies and early eighties. The index shows whether a country has more or fewer employees than would be predicted, given its per capita income, population, type of economic system, and the patterns observed elsewhere. Specifically, the index is the ratio of actual employment to the predicted level (multiplied by 100). Thus, a typical country would score 100, meaning the size of its government workforce matches what would be expected based on income, population, and so forth.[26]

Heller and Tait estimated the International Government Employment Index in seventeen African countries. The average score (for general government employment) in these countries was 92, or 8 percent less than anticipated.[27] In other words, the mean number of government workers in SSA falls below the international norm after controlling for other factors. There was, of course, variation around the mean: seven countries in the sample scored over 100 and thus, by this measure, had too many civil servants according to the international benchmark. Both Botswana and Mauritius were in this "overbureaucratized" group.

A more recent World Bank paper examines data for the 1970s, 1980s, and 1990s, and makes a similar finding: public sector employment in Africa is about average for developing countries (Botswana is an exception on the high side) after adjusting for the level of development, urbanization, and exposure to external risk.[28] The gross numbers may still be larger than they should be in an ideal world. There also may be distortions in the kinds of civil servants employed, with too many people in some fields and too few in others; disaggregated comparative data are not available to analyze satisfactorily any misallocation of per-

[26] Peter S. Heller and Alan A. Tait, "Government Employment and Pay: Some International Comparisons," International Monetary Fund Occasional Paper, no. 24 (1983).

[27] A general government employee refers to a worker at the central, state, or local levels (excluding nonfinancial public enterprise) in the IMF study. It must be reemphasized that the quality of the underlying data prevents anyone from drawing firm conclusions about the "optimal" size of any country's civil service.

[28] Martín Rama, "Efficient Public Sector Downsizing," World Bank Policy Research Working Paper, no. 1840 (1997).

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sonnel. However, we can probably rule out the possibility that singularly large gross amounts of civil service workers explain the SSA region's singularly slow economic growth.

There is another sense in which the civil services may be overstaffed. Since 1980, most African governments have been in financial straits. The regional average government budget deficit was 2.2 percent of GDP that year, and rising.[29] When governments confront revenue shortfalls, their typical initial reaction is to defer spending on operations and maintenance (O and M) and to postpone capital outlays. Wages are usually the last budget item to be cut. The result is a distortion in the pattern of expenditures.[30] When wages gobble up O and M and new investment, even honest and hardworking civil servants will lack the wherewithal to do their jobs properly. Too many employees exist relative to other resources.

Most developing countries have faced this form of overstaffing in recent years.[31] Africa is no exception. Yet, it is not clear that public employment and complementary inputs are more out of balance in Africa than in the rest of the Third World. The IMF statistics on government spending are of mixed quality, but for what they are worth, they suggest that SSA public personnel expenditures crowd out *less* spending, compared to developing countries generally. As Table 3 reports, Africa's ratio of government wages and salaries to other goods and services (a proxy for government O and M) is below average for less developed countries. The same is true of the ratio of salaries to government investment. There may be definitional problems in these categories, but the implication is that excessive spending on personnel has not distorted African government budgets to an abnormal degree for the Third World. Explanations for Africa's much lower than average economic growth have to be sought elsewhere.

Civil Service Reform

The next logical question to consider is whether public services are delivered in a reasonably effective manner. African countries have long been trying to improve the delivery of their civil services. Between 1951 and 1974, for example, Ghana initiated no less than nine different ad-

[29] World Bank, *Africa Development Indicators 1997* (Washington, D.C.: World Bank, 1997).

[30] Clive Gray, "On Measuring the Shadow Price of Uncommitted Fiscal Resources in Africa," *World Development* 17, no. 2 (1989).

[31] Andres E. Marinakis, "Public Sector Employment in Developing Countries: An Overview of Past and Present Trends," *International Journal of Public Sector Management* 7, no. 2 (1994).

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TABLE 3
CENTRAL GOVERNMENT EXPENDITURES
WAGES VERSUS OTHER CLASSIFICATIONS

	All LDCs	*SSA*	
	1985–89	*1985–89*	*1990–95*
Ratio of wages and salaries to:			
Other goods and services	1.67	0.66	1.04
Capital spending	1.57	0.45	0.60

SOURCE: Sanjay Pradhan, "Evaluating Public Expenditure: A Framework for Public Expenditure Reviews," World Bank Discussion Paper, no. 323 (Washington, D.C.: World Bank, 1996); World Bank, *Africa Development Indicators 1997* (Washington, D.C.: World Bank, 1997).

ministrative reform programs. During roughly the same period, Kenya had eight commissions or other public bodies undertake administrative reform assignments; Nigeria had five.[32] Even Mauritius launched several official inquiries in the 1950s and 1960s into its system of public administration. The Mauritius bureaucracy had come under intense local criticism for ineptitude.[33]

These African administrative renewal exercises were mainly indigenous. A series of external donor-driven programs, oriented toward downsizing, succeeded them in the 1980s.[34] The first steps in these more recent civil service reforms usually were wage and hiring freezes, followed by the more politically difficult steps of early retirements and layoffs.

Statistics on central government employment in eleven countries show that the recent downsizing reforms generally had the desired result. As reported in Table 4, the total number of central government workers in these countries dropped by one hundred twenty thousand, or 9 percent, during the 1980s and early 1990s. With public employment down in most of Africa, spending on public wages and salaries also dropped. As Table 5 displays, the wage bill of the region's central governments receded between 1986 and 1996 by 1.2 percent of GDP.

These downward trends do not pertain to Botswana and Mauritius. They moved against the regional tide—Botswana dramatically so, adding over fifty thousand workers to its public employment rolls, a rise

[32] African Association for Public Administration and Management (hereafter cited as AAPAM), *African Public Services: Challenges and a Profile for the Future* (New Delhi: Vikas, 1984).

[33] Martin Minogue, "Public Administration in Mauritius," *Journal of Administration Overseas* 15, no. 3 (1976).

[34] James Nti, "Civil Service Reform Priorities and Strategies: An Overview of the African Experience," *African Journal of Public Administration and Management* 5–7, no. 2 (1996).

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TABLE 4
GOVERNMENT EMPLOYMENT ('000 EMPLOYEES)
SELECTED AFRICAN COUNTRIES

	Late 1970s	*Mid–1990s*	*Change*
SSA[a]	1,384	1,264	−120
Botswana[b]	24	82	+58
Mauritius	55	62	+7

SOURCE: Peter S. Heller and Alan A. Tait, "Government Employment and Pay: Some International Comparisons," International Monetary Fund Occasional Paper, no. 24 (Washington, D.C.: International Monetary Fund, 1983); Salvatore Schiavo-Campo, Giulio de Tommaso, and Amitabha Mukherjee, "An International Statistical Survey of Government Employment and Wages," World Bank Policy Research Working Paper, no. 1806 (New York: World Bank, 1997).

[a] Burundi, Cameroon, Congo, Kenya, Senegal, South Africa, Tanzania, Togo, Uganda, Zambia, Zimbabwe. Figures are for Central Government Employment (includes all employees paid by the central government budget). Public enterprises are not included.

[b] Separate figures for Botswana and Mauritius are for General Government (central, state, and local government, but not public enterprise).

of 240 percent! Public employment increased by seven thousand workers, or 13 percent, in Mauritius (see Table 4). (These head counts include local government employees, and thus are not strictly comparable with the central government figures cited above.) The wage bills of the two countries were a larger share of GDP in 1996 than a decade earlier. In both years, Botswana and Mauritius spent proportionately more than the average African country on central government wages and salaries (see Table 5).

African countries that cut central government wages did not grow any faster in the 1986–96 period. If anything, the opposite is true—economic growth has tended to be highest in countries where the civil service wage bill has been getting bigger, not smaller. Correlation is not causation. Still, it is plausible that civil service cuts would hurt more than help economic performance due to the difficulty in maintaining (let alone improving) the quality of essential public services while retrenching. Once the ghosts and part-timers have been eliminated, who should be the next to go? If retrenchment is voluntary, a moral hazard problem arises: the most desirable workers will be the most likely to take advantage of early retirement packages because they have the best prospects for finding other jobs. The resulting staff reductions are apt to be arbitrary leaving some units or some skill areas below the strength needed to function. In Ghana, for example, retrenchment and hiring freezes deprived many field organizations of support staff in the late

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TABLE 5
CENTRAL WAGE BILL AS PERCENT OF GDP
SELECTED AFRICAN COUNTRIES

	1986	*1996*
SSA[a]	7.0	5.8
Botswana	8.6	9.8[b]
Mauritius	7.3	8.0

SOURCES: Ian Lienert and Jitendra Modi, "A Decade of Civil Service Reform in Sub-Saharan Africa," IMF Working Paper, no. 97/179 (1997); International Monetary Fund, *Government Financial Statistics Yearbook* (Washington, D.C., IMF, 1997).

[a] Unweighted average of 32 countries: Benin, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cameroon, Central African Republic, Chad, Comoros, Congo, Equatorial Guinea, Ethiopia, Gabon, The Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Ivory Coast, Kenya, Lesotho, Madagascar, Malawi, Mali, Mauritania, Mozambique, Niger, Rwanda, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Tanzania, Togo, Uganda, Zambia, and Zimbabwe.

[b] 1995.

1980s. Minus messengers, typists, and clerks, the senior officers who still drew checks sometimes simply closed their offices.[35]

A more serious problem in many African civil services is overstaffing in the lower grades according to a study done for the United Nations.[36] Less skilled positions are numerous and thus politically costly to eliminate, and they are too poorly paid to save much money anyway. It is the skilled personnel who are most likely to find other jobs leaving gaps at the top of the bureaucratic pyramid. Sufficient resources are not available to tempt back the specialists and professionals, so the bureaucracy continues to decay.

Regardless of the level, however, simply adding more civil servants will not automatically revive the profit-seeking sectors of the economy. If agricultural extension agents seldom see any farmers, hiring more extension agents will not improve farm productivity and output. Ditto for teachers who do not teach, health workers who do not heal, or police officers who commit crimes rather than prevent them. The point Richard Crook once made about Ghanaian officials applies across the continent: a basic problem is lack of authority in the sense that officials *cannot be counted on to do what they are told.*[37] To help raise national

[35] S. K. Asibuo, "Inertia in African Public Administration: An Examination of Some Causes and Remedies," *Africa Development* 17, no. 4 (1992).

[36] See Moses Kiggundu, "A Longitudinal Study of the Size, Cost and Administrative Reform of the African Civil Service," *Journal of African Finance and Economic Development* 2, no. 1 (1996).

[37] Richard C. Crook, "Bureaucracy and Politics in Ghana: A Comparative Perspective," Peter Lyon and James Manor, eds., in *Transfer and Transformation: Political Institutions in the New Commonwealth* (Leicester: Leicester University Press, 1983).

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TABLE 6
STATE-OWNED ENTERPRISES' SHARE OF ECONOMIC ACTIVITY[a]
SELECTED REGIONS AND COUNTRIES, 1985–90

	Percent of GDP
Latin America and Caribbean (17 countries)	8.0
Asia (5 countries)	8.7
SSA (16 countries)[b]	10.2
Botswana	5.6
Mauritius	1.9

SOURCE: World Bank, *World Development Indicators* (Washington, D.C.: World Bank, 1998).

[a] A state-owned enterprise is a government-owned or controlled economic entity that generates the bulk of its revenue from selling goods and services.

[b] Botswana, Burundi, Cameroon, Central African Republic, Congo, Gambia, Ghana, Kenya, Malawi, Mauritius, Niger, Senegal, South Africa, Tanzania, Zambia, Zimbabwe.

income levels, African societies need experienced and reliable extension agents, educators, nurses, and law enforcement personnel, who can serve as instruments of appropriate public policies. Hiring freezes and layoffs could lead away from that goal, making the bureaucracy even less dependable than it was in the first place.

As stated earlier, the relationship between bureaucracy and growth is mutually reinforcing. A growing economy makes it possible to support a larger bureaucracy, and a larger bureaucracy may create conditions that support a growing economy—with the proviso that the bureaucracy be reasonably effective at delivering public services. The reverse is also true. A shrinking economy makes it difficult to maintain a stable level of public employment leading to cutbacks in the bureaucracy and perhaps creating even more unfavorable business conditions—especially if the remaining bureaucrats choose not to do what they are meant to do, either by slacking on the job or by engaging in outright corruption.

THE SPECIAL PROBLEM OF PARASTATALS

So far our discussion has not included employment in parastatal companies, known in the rest of the world as state or public enterprises. African governments, despite their lack of administrative capacity, have long embraced the principle of state enterprise. A state enterprise differs from an ordinary government organization because it sells goods or services and is expected to turn a profit. It is similar, however, because the government implicitly (or sometimes explicitly) stands behind a

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public enterprise with the offer to make good any losses. Some of the SSA parastatal entities date from the colonial period, when marketing boards tried to assert control over leading exports. Most of the growth in parastatals took place after independence, as African governments tried to jump-start national development by direct public investment.[38] These state corporations are familiar in mineral extraction, communication, and transportation.

All countries of course have some public enterprises. Gaps in the international data make it hard to compare the extent of public enterprise across regions. However, Africa does not seem to have significantly more than its share.[39] Table 6 reports recent comparative data. As of 1985–90, state-owned companies came to represent about 10 percent of GDP in the African countries reporting data—marginally higher than the average in Latin America and Asia. Nonetheless, these firms probably represent a larger segment of the small nonagricultural sector, which is proportionately smaller than in other developing areas. Parastatals are by all accounts a major drain on the national economies in region.

How many people work for Africa's public companies? Overall numbers are difficult to come by, though featherbedding clearly is a problem. Data from a few countries suggest that parastatal employment was on a par with civil service employment in the early 1980s.[40] As with the regular government service, today's head count must be lower. According to a World Bank study, close to four hundred African state-owned firms were liquidated or sold to private investors in the 1980s.[41] The pace of privatization appears to be accelerating, with nearly six hundred privatizations in SSA from 1990 to 1995, according to another source.[42] The total value of these transactions is modest, however—about $2.7 billion as of 1996, or only around 1 percent of the regional GDP.[43]

[38] John R. Nellis, "Public Enterprises in Sub-Saharan Africa," Barbara Grosh and Rwekaza S. Mukandala, eds., in *State-Owned Enterprises in Africa* (Boulder, Colo.: Lynne Reinner, 1994).

[39] By the 1970s, one study suggested public enterprises represented on average 17.5 percent of the weighted average of the GDP of several African countries—nearly twice the average of developing countries. However, this figure included two outliers: Morocco (a North African country) and Zambia. Other African countries in the sample had more modest levels of public enterprise. R. P. Short, "The Role of Private Enterprise: An International Statistical Comparison," in *Public Enterprise in Mixed Economies: Some Macroeconomic Aspects,* by Robert H. Floyd, Clive S. Gray, and R. P. Short (Washington, D.C.: International Monetary Fund, 1983).

[40] Daniel Swanson and Teferra Wolde-Semait, "Africa's Public Enterprise Sector and Evidence of Reform," World Bank Technical Paper, no. 95 (1989); David L. Lindauer, "Parastatal Pay Policy in Africa," *World Development* 19, no. 7 (1991).

[41] Sunita Kikeri, John Nellis, and Mary Shirley, *Privatization: The Lessons of Experience* (Washington, D.C.: World Bank, 1992).

[42] Paul Bennell, "Privatization in Sub-Saharan Africa: Progress and Prospects during the 1990s," *World Development* 25, no. 11 (1997), 1789.

[43] Oliver Campbell White and Anita Bhatia, *Privatization in Africa* (Washington, D.C.: World Bank, 1998), 68.

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The pretext for most SSA parastatals is that the local private sector is too backward to take advantage of market opportunities. With multinational corporations supposedly uninterested in investing in the region either, state-owned enterprise is offered as the only recourse. The examples of Botswana and Mauritius cast doubt on this argument.

Botswana held direct public involvement to a few parastatals providing utilities and infrastructure despite the windfall of mineral wealth.[44] Mauritius established a port authority and other bodies but did not go the route of building a large public enterprise sector. At 5.6 percent of GDP between 1990 and 1995, Botswana's parastatals represent about half the average economic activity in the Africa sample; Mauritius's parastatals are even more modest (1.9 percent of GDP), or one-fifth the average in the sample (see Table 6).[45] These two cases show that the profit-seeking sector can step forward, even in Africa. Heavy investment in public sector companies is not necessary for an economy to develop. The secret is to create a welcoming environment (including an effective bureaucracy) for private investment and commerce, which both countries have done.

Moving beyond the Numbers

Unfortunately for policymakers, fashioning an effective bureaucracy is not easy. Yet having one probably does more for the business environment than meeting arbitrary quantifiable targets, such as a certain number of civil servants or a particular aggregate government wage bill. Regarding Botswana and Mauritius, the fact they now possess large bureaucracies (and small parastatal sectors) is less interesting than their reputations for administrative integrity and capability—reputations that accompanied (and to some extent preceded) their rapid economic growth.

Consider how they score on Transparency International's Corruption Perception Index. TI's index assesses the degree to which public officials are seen to accept bribes, take illicit payment in public procurement, embezzle public funds, and commit similar offenses. In 1998 Botswana and Mauritius were first and second respectively among SSA countries for having the least perceived corruption. Another "good governance"

[44] Andreas Danevand, "Responsiveness in Botswana Politics: Do Elections Matter?" *Journal of Modern African Studies* 33, no. 3 (1995).

[45] As elsewhere in Africa, the trend in these two countries is for further reductions in the parastatal sector. Botswana has commercialized its postal service and railways, and the country continues to look for further privatization opportunities. L. Nfila, "Public Sector Management Reforms: Botswana's Experience," *African Journal of Public Administration and Management* 4, no. 1 (1995).

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evaluation system, the Economic Freedom Network's rule of law rating, shows a similar pattern for 1997. A panel of experts gives Botswana and Mauritius top marks in the region (exceeded only by Namibia and South Africa) for possessing established institutions to implement laws and adjudicate disputes.[46] These are the kinds of states that can attract private investment.

To understand how Botswana and Mauritius got to this point, we need to look into their histories beginning in the late colonial period. In all SSA colonies, policymakers were as worried then as they are today about how to uphold the standards of public administrators. At the time, senior staff were well-educated, experienced, and socialized to professional norms. But they were mostly European. Local people mainly held menial positions. A shift had to happen, and Africanization of the professional and managerial levels of the civil service became a universal goal in the waning days of colonialism. The debate was how to do it without diluting quality.

Putting aside for a moment the need to expand government services in the postcolonial era, just to keep offering the existing level of services was a challenge for the new states of Africa. How could local people be integrated into the upper ranks of the public service and not disrupt it? Given the small number of Africans with university degrees, there was no obvious solution. Local educational institutions could not supply enough trained people for several years, and overseas education could not fill the gap either. Another issue was socializing new recruits to the bureaucratic ethos, which required mentoring from more seasoned staff. A. L. Adu warned at the time of the dangers "in the acceleration of the Africanisation programme beyond the point which may be regarded as wise or prudent. Precipitate or reckless action could result in falls in standards of efficiency which might have a disastrous effect on the whole program of services and development of the Government."[47]

Still, most countries did move quickly to Africanize. Whether the reason was fear of sabotage by Europeans or simply the need to find "jobs for the boys," local people flooded the bureaucracies in most countries. In Tanzania, for example, Tanzanian nationals holding senior

[46] For details, see the websites of Transparency International, www.transparency.de, and the Economic Freedom Network, www.freetheworld.com.

[47] A. L. Adu, *The Civil Service in New African States* (New York: Praeger, 1965), 115. Kenneth Younger issued a similar warning about the danger in rapidly replacing the experienced European civil servants: "Should it prove impossible, for whatever reason, to retain the necessary overseas personnel for a sufficient period, the price paid by the new states will be heavy. . . . If this period of creative endeavor ends in frustration for want of a governmental machine to carry the burden, the new state's political stability and its capacity for democratic development may well be endangered." Younger, *The Public Service in New States* (London: Oxford University Press, 1960), 72–73.

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or middle-level positions in the civil service rose from 12 percent of the total to 90 percent during the 1960s.[48] The pace was similar in Kenya. Africans held barely 6 percent of the top eight thousand administrative posts at independence. Less than ten years later, the figure was 90 percent.[49] Thus, the majority of African public services got off to an unsteady start with too many novice personnel occupying too many demanding positions.[50]

The African "Tigers" handled the passage to Africanization differently. Mauritius benefited from a long transition to independence during which time the local population participated heavily in administrative work.[51] That country's unusually high education levels aided this gradual, tutelary changeover. Botswana also followed a more deliberate course of Africanization, though starting with a much poorer human-resource base (the country had reportedly produced only eight university graduates as of 1960).[52] Local people occupied 39 percent of senior and middle-level staff positions in 1964, two years before independence. Disregarding pressure from below to hire more of its own citizens, the new government's policy was self-consciously to avoid sacrificing standards for the sake of engaging underqualified or inexperienced local people. By 1972 the percentage of citizens at the senior and middle-level had climbed to 81 percent, but it dropped again to 76.5 percent in 1982. The absolute number of expatriates in high public-service positions actually rose during these years.[53]

There may be less contrast here than meets the eye, however. Even now, Tanzania, Kenya, and most African states rely heavily on foreign advisers and technical experts, whatever the official employment statistics show.[54] After independence, a multitude of professional workers from the industrial world moved to Africa to fill gaps in the public sector. The largest share was educators, but foreigners took on a range of advisory positions in government ministries and managerial positions in foreign aid projects. Eliott Berg reports that there already were

[48] AAPAM (fn. 32), 31.

[49] William N. Wamalwa and M. Jide Balogun, "Public Service Reform Commissions and Administrative Reform in Africa: A Comparative Assessment," *African Journal of Public Administration and Management* 1, no. 1 (1992), 30.

[50] Gelase Mutahaba, Rweikiza Baguma, and Mohamed Halfani, *Vitalizing African Public Administration for Recovery and Development* (West Hartford, Conn.: Kumarian, 1993), 82.

[51] Minogue, (fn. 33).

[52] Pierre du Toit, *State Building and Democracy in Southern Africa* (Washington, D.C.: Institute of Peace Press, 1995), 28, 35.

[53] Louis A. Picard, *The Politics of Development in Botswana: A Model for Success*? (Boulder, Colo.: Lynne Reinner, 1987).

[54] John M. Cohen, "Foreign Advisors and Capacity Building: The Case of Kenya," *Public Administration and Development* 12, no. 5 (1992).

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thirty-one thousand technical assistance personnel in SSA in the early 1960s; by the late 1980s the number had probably grown to around forty thousand.[55] So many African countries remain heavily dependent on expatriate teachers, doctors, economists, and so forth, despite formal Africanization.

What still sets Botswana apart, according to a World Bank report, is that it assesses its technical assistance requirements for the economy as a whole, not project-by-project as most countries do. Taking a global view supposedly helps reduce ad hoc arrangements and makes it easier for people in public service actually to learn from the foreign experts. Also, the expatriates are usually put in executive positions and do not serve simply as advisers. They are common in middle-level management, where African bureaucracies are apt to be weakest.[56] Botswana's government continues to acknowledge and encourage the contribution of expatriates to national development though the issue is a constant source of lively debate within the country.[57]

Gradual Africanization was not always the answer either, as proven by the case of Côte d'Ivoire. That country continued to rely heavily on French managers and experts for years after independence. While once seen as a model performer in Africa, that positive view ceased about 1980. One distinction with Botswana and Mauritius, however, is the higher degree of politicization of the Ivoirian bureaucracy. This may help explain Côte d'Ivoire's poor showing. Ghana and Nigeria are two other examples of countries that made gradual transitions to independence but whose civil services were quickly politicized and rendered inefficient.

Civil Service Professionalism

How do Botswana and Mauritius avoid politicizing their bureaucracies? Part of the answer lies in the way they recruit and manage their national staff. The Weberian model's criterion for recruitment and promotion is merit, based on competitive selection and subsequent advancement of the best-qualified applicants. These individuals are supposed to serve whomever their political masters happen to be. To ensure that they make objective decisions and apply rules impartially,

[55] Elliott J. Berg, *Rethinking Technical Cooperation* (New York: United Nations Development Program, 1993).

[56] Nimrod Raphaeli, Jacques Roumani, and A. C. MacKellor, "Public Sector Management in Botswana: Lessons in Pragmatism," World Bank Staff Working Paper, no. 709 (New York: World Bank, 1984).

[57] Ronald K. Hope, "Managing the Public Sector in Botswana: Some Emerging Contrasts and Administrative Reform Responses," *International Journal of Public Sector Management* 8, no. 6 (1995).

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public bureaucrats should be allowed to remain in their positions without fear of political retribution.

Obviously, real countries only approximate the Weberian model of apolitical, technocratic public administration. Both Botswana and Mauritius come reasonably close to it; most other African countries fall far short.[58] In anglophone Africa, standards are supposed to be guarded by public service commissions, which, according to British practice, are independent bodies for supervising hiring and personnel procedures. Botswana fits the mold. The country's president is entitled to make only a few senior appointments; there is a strong commitment to the value of neutrality. Recruitment is open to all, promotion is meritocratic, and employees have the right to appeal personnel decisions.[59] The process in Mauritius is similar with heavy emphasis on achievement as the means for climbing up the ranks. A strong public service commission operates here as well to insulate the bureaucracy from inappropriate political meddling.[60]

Other SSA national bureaucracies are subject to far more interference from politicians. Kenya is a good illustration. At independence, the constitution, as usual in former British colonies, provided for an independent public service commission. However, Kenya's first constitutional amendment reduced the commission to a rubber stamp and gave the country's president broad authority over the civil service. In effect, the civil service became an instrument of personal political power used by the chief executive to support a system of clientele relationships. The public service commissions in Tanzania and Zambia suffered a similar fate, quickly losing power to the executive through changes in the constitution.[61]

Weber's term for this sort of personalized system of public rule is patrimonialism, as distinct from the rational-legal authority of bureaucratic administration. In a patrimonial administration, getting ahead becomes a matter of connections more than performance. The work environment is intimidating under patrimonial regimes, and people are discouraged from speaking their minds or using their expertise if it

[58] Gøran Hydén, *No Shortcuts to Progress: African Development Management in Perspective* (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1983); African Association for Public Administration and Management, *The Ecology of Public Administration and Management in Africa* (New Delhi: Vikas, 1986).

[59] Clay Westcott, "Civil Service Reform: Lessons from Africa," *Poverty and Development* 12 (1996).

[60] Barbara W. Carroll and S. K. Jaypaul, "The Mauritius Senior Public Service since Independence: Some Lessons for Developing and Developed Nations," *International Review of Administrative Sciences* 59, no. 3 (1993); Barbara W. Carroll and Terrance Carroll, "State and Ethnicity in Botswana and Mauritius: A Democratic Route to Development?" *Journal of Development Studies* 33, no. 4 (1997).

[61] Gelase Mutahaba, *Reforming Public Administration for Development: Experiences from Eastern Africa* (West Hartford, Conn.: Kumarian, 1989).

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threatens the power structure. Corruption becomes commonplace, further complicating the process of building a reliable, professional administrative apparatus.[62] According to some interpretations, SSA bureaucrats became a self-serving interest group in their own right, or even a new bourgeoisie.[63] Doing their job was often a secondary consideration to personal aggrandizement.

We should not be surprised that, in a recent survey, business executives in Botswana and Mauritius agreed that their civil services have the strength and expertise to avoid drastic interruptions in government service. In fourteen of the fifteen other SSA countries, business executives who responded to the survey expressed less confidence in the stability of their civil service. In Burkina Faso, however, executives expressed higher confidence than their counterparts in Botswana and Mauritius. Not that the Botswanan and Mauritian bureaucracies lack serious flaws.[64] Administrative reform exercises in both countries refute such a naïve suggestion. The issue is one of degree: when it comes to neutrality and competence, most other African countries do not measure up to Botswana and Mauritius.

The fact that the Botswanan and Mauritian bureaucracies are reasonably apolitical does not mean that they are cut off from outside influence. The statist literature sometimes sees an autonomous civil service as a factor in rapid economic growth, particularly at the "wholesale" level where policy is determined. Autonomy is supposed to foster objectivity among bureaucrats and free them to act for the larger social good, as opposed to protecting narrow interests. Classic examples are Japan and South Korea, where this model of an insulated state supposedly worked. Peter Evans argues, however, that the successful Asian states are less insulated than the statist literature usually says. They do have internally coherent bureaucracies, but those organizations are actually connected to society in many ways. Without such links, the bureaucrats would not know what to do or what they could count on the

[62] Ernest Harsch, "Accumulators and Democrats: Challenging State Corruption in Africa," *Journal of Modern African Studies* 31, no. 1 (1993).

[63] Irving L. Markovitz, "Bureaucratic Development and Economic Growth," *Journal of Modern African Studies* 14, no. 2 (1976); Richard Sklar, "The Nature of Class Domination in Africa," *Journal of Modern African Studies* 17, no. 4 (1979); René Dumont, *L'Afrique noire est mal partie* (Paris: Seuil, 1962).

[64] World Economic Forum and Harvard Institute for International Development, *Africa Competitiveness Report 1998* (Geneva: World Economic Forum and Harvard Institute for International Development, 1998). It should be noted that in the same survey respondents in neither Botswana nor Mauritius expressed a high opinion of the competence of civil servants as compared to private sector employees. Public sector workers got better evaluations in several countries including Tanzania and Zambia. However, the results could reflect a greater regard for the private sector in Botswana and Mauritius, as opposed to a poor absolute impression of the public sector in those two countries.

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private sector to do. Evans calls this model, where state institutions exhibit apparently contradictory elements of internal *and* external cohesion, "embedded autonomy."[65] The term describes the bureaucracies of Botswana and Mauritius reasonably well.

Botswana has a technocratic elite who sometimes play an independent role in policy formulation in that country. Even so, elected officials make the key choices, even when they must ignore the bureaucracy's interests.[66] Senior public servants interact frequently with interest groups in Mauritius, which,[67] according to Deborah Bräutigam, notably lacks an elite group of experts who call the shots on tough issues. Rather, such decisions flow from the give-and-take of politics, as you would expect in a democratic system.[68]

If we move further down the bureaucratic ladder, to the "retail" level of service delivery, insulating public employees from society becomes less and less defensible. We know that schools, clinics, police, and the like often succeed best when the community they service assists in their design and execution. Citizen participation is not a silver bullet, but it results in the adaptation of public services to what people need and are willing to support.[69] The alternative is usually arbitrary decision-making by bureaucrats or politicians that fails to account for local conditions.

Wage Erosion and Compression

To encourage good people to take government jobs and stay with them, wages must be fair. Not surprisingly, civil servants in Mauritius are well compensated.[70] In fact, a decade ago the magnitude of public sector pay raises there provoked concern in a World Bank report.[71] A similar pattern can be found in Botswana. Pay lags somewhat for skilled positions compared with the private sector, but the levels have at least kept pace with inflation.[72]

[65] Peter Evans, *Embedded Autonomy: States and Industrial Transformation* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1995).

[66] Roger Charlton, "Bureaucrats and Politicians in Botswana's Policy Making Process," *Journal of Commonwealth and Comparative Politics* 29, no. 3 (1991).

[67] Carroll and Carroll (fn. 60), 477.

[68] Deborah Bräutigam, "Institutions, Economic Reform, and Democratic Consolidation in Mauritius," *Comparative Politics* 30, no. 1 (1997).

[69] Norman Uphoff, John M. Cohen, and Arthur A. Goldsmith, *Feasibility and Applicability of Rural Development Participation: A State-of-the-Art Paper* (Ithaca: Cornell University Rural Development Committee, 1979).

[70] Crispin Grey-Johnson, "Capacity Building, Strengthening, and Retention for Socio-economic Development in Africa: Lessons from Mauritius and Madagascar," *African Journal of Public Administration and Management* 3, no. 2 (1994).

[71] World Bank, *Mauritius: Managing Success* (Washington, D.C.: World Bank, 1989).

[72] Mogolori Modisi, "Civil Service Reform in Botswana since the 1980s: Lessons of Experience," in Lapido Adamolekun et al., eds., *Civil Service Reform in Francophone Africa* (Washington, D.C.: World Bank, 1996).

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The situation in other countries in Africa is very different. Many observers assume that civil service pay in the region is excessive. It was perhaps too high during the transition to independence,[73] but not by the 1980s. Official pay for many government workers fell substantially in real terms during the decade, sometimes below poverty levels. Allowances also fell. Workers adjusted in many ways, by, for example, pilfering and cutting hours.[74] There also was substantial leveling of salaries across the board, with compensation at the top levels lagging the most. Payment was not even assured, and employees often went for months without a check. George Ayittey reports that a civil servant in Nigeria died of exhaustion while waiting to collect his $20 monthly wage.[75] With wages and benefits kept to a minimum, spending on O and M also suffered, further incapacitating the civil service.

Putting it mildly, such working conditions did not favor first-rate performance. The absence of pay raises, the lack of connection between effort and reward, the missing basic supplies were all highly unmotivating. The best workers fled to the private sector, where they could command more for their services. Those who stayed behind could hardly be blamed for moonlighting. Petty corruption also is understandably prevalent under these conditions, especially when national leaders are setting the example for how to misappropriate public funds on a grand scale. Botswana and Mauritius simply never had these problems to the same degree.

Implications

The civil services of Botswana and Mauritius are case studies of what organizational theorists term the "path dependence" of organizations. The public bureaucracies of both countries started off on the right foot. Unusually for Africa, their political leaders remained faithful to their initial visions of how to structure and run the civil services, making a series of prudent choices that reinforced themselves in a positive way. Corruption never got as far out of hand as in other African countries, because relatively transparent and competitive political systems would not tolerate it. Democratic processes provided reasonable assurance that policymakers had popular support and cooperation. As Botswana and

[73] David Abernethy, "Bureaucracy and Economic Development in Africa," *African Review* 1, no. 1 (1971).

[74] David C. Chew, "Internal Adjustment to Falling Civil Service Salaries: Insights from Uganda," *World Development* 18, no. 7 (1990).

[75] George B. N. Ayittey, *Africa in Chaos* (New York: St. Martin's, 1998), 9.

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Mauritius grew more affluent, they could afford to hire more public workers, who in turn appear to have provided the policy advice, health care, education, and other services needed by a growing economy.

In the rest of Africa, most bureaucracies were *mal partie*, to paraphrase René Dumont.[76] Political interference and low standards set the wrong tone at the beginning and interacted later with poor working conditions and low pay in a classic vicious circle. Embezzlement, extortion, and nepotism took root, typically abetted by political leaders who might have been in a position to curb such misbehavior but who instead joined in. Authoritarian political systems provided little independent check on incompetence and thievery in the public sector. The people's respect for the state and its officials faded. These bureaucracies provided inadequate services due to economic decline, and economic decline in turn allowed for even less adequate services. Breaking out of the vicious circle will be difficult.

When any organization (or set of organizations) builds up expectations of how its members should behave, the behavior tends to reinforce itself. Thus, formal groupings develop distinct personalities and cultures and oppose change. Routines provide paths of least resistance. The best time to establish the basic direction for organizations, therefore, is at the beginning. In creating their public services, the fledgling states in Botswana and Mauritius were fortunate to have avoided many mistakes made elsewhere in Africa (and in other developing areas, too)—mistakes that would have been hard to correct later. Once teachers, nurses, or extension agents become accustomed to lax performance, they have little reason to change.

Fortunately, opportunities to start over with a clean slate sometimes do arise. In Ghana, for example, tax collection had become a critical problem in the early 1980s. The ministry of finance in charge of revenue was corrupt and marred by absenteeism, which fueled the growing public budget deficit. The National Revenue Secretariat was created in 1984 as an elite unit to oversee taxes and customs.[77] Steps were taken at the beginning to sustain a performance-based culture in the new organization. Base salaries were set on a par with those in the banking sector, and working standards were high—paid for in part by allowing the secretariat to meet operational expenses by taking a cut of all revenue collected. These efforts paid off. By 1988, tax and customs revenues almost doubled as a share of GDP.

[76] Dumont (fn. 63).

[77] Mamadou Dia, *Africa's Management in the 1990s and Beyond* (Washington, D.C.: World Bank, 1996), 86–90.

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On the one hand, the liability of an approach like Ghana's is that it creates an enclave and does little to help other units of the government. It may even harm them by denying resources and creating interdepartmental jealousies. On the other hand, the enclave can perhaps be employed as a model to inspire similar changes elsewhere in the bureaucracy on an incremental basis.

Creating one new agency, as in Ghana, obviously is far easier than renovating an entire civil service system from top to bottom. For such renovation to succeed, radical new leadership, unbeholden to the interests in the existing bureaucracy, is needed. Uganda, for example, after the depredations of Idi Amin and Milton Obote, developed a much needed, far-reaching civil service reform program, beginning in 1989.[78] The rise to power of the National Resistance Movement provided the opening for a fresh start in the civil service. The World Bank and the IMF have celebrated Uganda's staff cuts, which eliminated about 60 percent of central government employees by 1995. Civil service reforms, however, involve much more than layoffs. Indeed, net hiring has begun again. Additional teachers are needed to make good Uganda's new universal primary education scheme.[79] The government wage bill also has been rising, from 1 percent of GDP in 1990 to a still modest 3 percent of GDP in 1996, in an effort to improve motivation within the civil service.[80]

While retrenchment is easier to measure, a more important aspect of Uganda's endeavor may be its effort, effective or not, to create a new outlook in the bureaucracy. The government has promulgated a code of conduct meant to encourage civil servants to adhere to high ethical standards in their public lives. The code is part of a wider program of results-oriented management, which attempts to define objectives with measurable performance standards.[81] There also is a new inspectorate of government charged with rooting out corruption and proposing regulatory and administrative reforms of public interest. The inspectorate's investigations have resulted in the dismissal of hundreds of corrupt officials.[82] Some independent observers, however, are skeptical that there has been much change in mentality.[83]

[78] Prisca B. M. Szei, "Reaffirming the Values of Professionalism in Public Administration: The Ugandan Experience," *International Review of Administrative Sciences* 63, no. 3 (1997).

[79] Brixiova (fn. 16).

[80] Ian Lienert and Jitendra Modi, "A Decade of Civil Service Reform in Sub-Saharan Africa," IMF Working Paper, no. 97/179 (Washington, D.C.: International Monetary Fund, 1997).

[81] Petter Langseth, "The Civil Service Reform Program," in Petter Langseth and Justus Mugaju, eds., *Post-Conflict Uganda: Towards an Effective Civil Service* (Kampala: Fountain Publishers, 1996).

[82] Dia (fn. 77), 92–93.

[83] John Munene, personal communication.

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Can Ghana, Uganda, and other SSA countries emulate Botswana or Mauritius over the long haul? Authentic and sustained civil service reform is possible, despite domestic political consensus that bureaucratic incapability and corruption are serious obstacles to development. Sadly, building the esprit de corps and skills of the public sector takes far longer and far more effort than does destroying these organizational assets. The history of public administration in most of Africa raises doubts that rational-legal systems will replace patrimonial ones in many places soon.

This conclusion is troubling. Rational-legal administrative systems may not be a sufficient condition for sustained economic growth and social improvement. But, as Weber argued and as Botswana and Mauritius show, such systems appear to be necessary for long-term capitalist development. Countries that fail to bring their public bureaucracies closer in line with Weberian precepts are going to have a hard time meeting their populations' economic and social needs.

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WOMEN IN THE LEGISLATURES AND EXECUTIVES OF THE WORLD
Knocking at the Highest Glass Ceiling

By ANDREW REYNOLDS*

MODERN liberal democracy came into being in 1893, when New Zealand offered the franchise to women. The commonwealth state was the first to institutionally open up the public sphere to both men and women—a sphere that for hundreds, if not thousands, of years had been the monopoly of the patriarchal heads of family and business in almost every part of the globe. After a century of slow, incremental gains for women in politics, the results are mixed. Women are involving themselves in grassroots party structures in higher numbers than ever before. There are more women parliamentarians,[1] and increasingly cabinet portfolios are in the hands of women politicians. However, the numbers involved remain vastly disproportional to the importance women bring to societies, and in many parts of the world the representation of women remains little more than a blip on the male political landscape.

This article reports the results of a survey of the governments of the world as they were constituted in 1998. The aim was threefold: (1) to map the number of women in legislative lower houses in 180 nation-states and related territories with autonomous governments; (2) to identify and categorize women in the executives of these 180 cases by type of ministerial portfolio; and (3) to test the leading hypotheses, which speculate about the factors hindering or facilitating women's access to political representation. The models reported in this paper juxtapose a cocktail of institutional, political, cultural, and socioeconomic variables with the following dependent variables: (1) the percentage of

* I am indebted for the research assistance of Katharine Belmont, for the helpful comments of two anonymous reviewers, and to countless individuals who assisted me in my data detective work.

[1] In 1998 the Women's Environmental and Development Organization argued that "the entry of women in greater numbers to electoral politics is a sign that it is the beginning of the end of tokenism." See WEDO, *Mapping Progress: Assessing Implementation of the Beijing Platform 1998* (New York: WEDO, 1998).

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members of parliament (MPs) who are women and (2) the percentage of cabinet ministers who are women.

A number, although not all, of the cited hypotheses were confirmed statistically, and the results advance our understanding of the comparative impact of various barriers to the representation of women. To date, research in this field has been confined to statistical analyses of a few established democracies in the West. This article broadens that data set to include both democratic and nondemocratic states, established and fledgling democracies.

The Normative Case for Having Women in Positions of Power

While "descriptive representation"[2] is merely one component of an adequate system of representation, there are substantive reasons why the paucity of women in the legislatures of the world injures good governance and global progress. John Stuart Mill noted nearly a century and a half ago that a talented and efficient government included the representatives of both the majority and minority, and he extended that definition to women who were very much a disenfranchised "minority" at the time. In *On Liberty*,[3] Mill addressed ideas of how to represent and articulate competing interests and the utility of tolerating different views from diverse quarters of the population. He cited censorship, or the exclusion of opinion, as an evil that hindered the striving for truth. If the excluded opinion were correct, then the opportunity would be lost to realize this; and if it were wrong, then again the ability to substantiate already held theories would be lost. The most common case would be that both conflicting views held grains of truth and the real challenge would be to synthesize the two. In *Considerations on Representative Government*, Mill transferred this logic to the arena of competitive electoral politics and argued for intellectual and social diversity in government, including giving the franchise to women. For Mill, denying suffrage to half the population and thus losing their talents in society was an exercise in nonutilitarian idiocy—ideas he reinforced in *The Subjection of Women*.[4] Mill saw participatory politics as having a desirable intellectual and moral educative effect on citizens, although he

[2] That is the view that parliament should be a mirror of the nation as a whole. See Hanna Pitkin, *Representation* (New York: Atherton Press, 1969), 10.

[3] John Stuart Mill, *On Liberty* (1859) and *Considerations on Representative Government* (1861), ed. Geraint Williams (London: Everyman, 1993).

[4] John Stuart Mill, *The Subjection of Women* (1869), ed. Susan Orkin (Cambridge: Hackett, 1988).

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still saw the need for an elite, perhaps technocratic, leadership to remain the ultimate possessors of decision-making power.

If the mechanics of a particular electoral system exclude to a large degree members of a particular ascriptive group (women or otherwise), then more often than not that is damning evidence that the system is excluding the *interests* of that particular group from the structures of decision-making power. Rule and Zimmerman[5] note that a parliament with few women may fail to recognize or comprehend issues of great importance to women in society; this in turn brings up broader questions of accountability, responsiveness, and alienation. Absence is not merely a sign of disadvantage and disenfranchisement, but the exclusion of women from positions of power also compounds gender stereotypes and retards the pace of equalization. Grofman and Davidson's observation about the election of African-Americans from minority voting districts in the United States is highly relevant. They argue that "quite simply, the presence of minority officeholders makes it harder for racism to persist inside a legislature."[6] Indeed, the degree to which a system successfully includes women can indicate a propensity for the system to include other disenfranchised minorities.

Perhaps most important and most controversial is the argument that having a substantial number of women in elected positions of power will lead to the enactment of more women-friendly policies. Lijphart found that democracies with higher proportions of women in the legislature passed more laws to benefit children.[7] Thomas finds that U.S. state legislatures with higher numbers of women pass more bills dealing with women, children, and families,[8] while Saint-Germain finds the same pattern in her longitudinal study of the Arizona state legislature.[9] Saltzstein presents evidence that female mayors in the United States have an impact on changes in women's representation in different areas of employment.[10] The correlation between women MPs and women-friendly legislation, however, remains an understudied

[5] Wilma Rule and Joseph Zimmerman, "Women and Minorities in Parliaments and Legislatures," in *The Encyclopedia of Democracy* (Washington, D.C.: Congressional Quarterly Press, 1997).

[6] Bernard Grofman and Chandler Davidson, eds., *Controversies in Minority Voting* (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1992), 314.

[7] Arend Lijphart, "Debate-Proportional Representation: III. Double Checking the Evidence," *Journal of Democracy* 2 (Summer 1991), 42–48.

[8] Sue Thomas, "The Impact of Women on State Legislative Policies," *Journal of Politics* 53, no. 4 (1991).

[9] Michelle Saint-Germain, "Does Their Difference Make a Difference? The Impact of Women on Public Policy in the Arizona Legislature," *Social Science Quarterly* 70, no. 4 (1989).

[10] Grace Hall Saltzstein, "Female Mayors and Women in Municipal Jobs," *American Journal of Political Science* 30 (February 1986).

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area. Moreover, what counts as a piece of women-friendly legislation in itself is a highly debatable issue. Nevertheless, the arguments in favor of female representation in elected positions of power are compelling. While political life undoubtedly reflects and parallels social life, electoral politics can take the lead in the reorientation of a society toward gender equality.

Hypothesized Barriers to the Representation of Women

Powerful socioeconomic, cultural, and institutional barriers have blocked all but the most tenacious women from the public sphere; and while the last four decades have witnessed the erosion of such barriers, the process has been painfully slow. Rule succinctly sums up the obstacles as "narrow gender roles, restrictive religious doctrines, unequal laws and education, discriminatory socioeconomic conditions, male-biased party leaders or other political elites and some voters, and 'women-unfriendly' election systems. [Such barriers are] typically interrelated and mutually reinforcing."[11] For the purposes of this article the salient variables have been divided into four families from which I draw twelve testable hypotheses: (1) social culture and socioeconomic development, (2) political culture, (3) the nature of the state, and (4) political institutions.

Social Culture/Socioeconomic Development

Chauvinism and patriarchy come in many forms and each of the cases incorporated within this study is imbued with some degree of cultural negativity toward the presence of women in high political office. Such narrow gender roles may be least rigid in Scandinavia, but even there substantial barriers still remain, blocking the achievement of a gender-neutral political sphere. Most politicians, male and female, come from a pool of citizens who are highly educated, have professional jobs, and have access to the resources of public life. When the dominant social culture precludes young women from enjoying a full education and socializes them from birth into roles that are removed from the world of public decision making, then the pool of likely women politicians is substantially reduced. Furthermore, women find it much more difficult to break into electoral office en masse when they are socioeconomically disadvantaged due to the burdens of poor health care, poor child care, and un/underemployment.

[11] Wilma Rule, "Parliaments of, by, and for the People: Except for Women?" in Rule and Zimmerman, eds., *Electoral Systems in Comparative Perspective: Their Impact on Women and Minorities* (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1994), 15.

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In a study of nineteen democracies between 1970 and 1972, Rule found that 70 percent of the variance in the number of women in legislatures was explained by the number of women college graduates, women in the workforce, the length of women's suffrage, and the level of unemployment.[12] Many scholars have argued that women-unfriendly cultural norms retard the prospects for women taking up the reins of power.[13] Indeed, narrow gender roles are virtually omnipresent —from religiously based exclusion in the Middle East to patriarchal communalism in the South Pacific. The root may vary but the resulting discrimination against women rarely alters.

Oftentimes the cultural barriers to the representation of women are drawn from the religious inclination of the state. Rule notes that most "nondemocratic countries' cultures have dominant religions (such as Islam), philosophies (such as Confucianism), or tribal beliefs [animist] that generally confine women to a subordinate role."[14] However, it is important to note that very few mainstream religions can reasonably be interpreted as friendly to the election of women to political office. Rather, it is a matter of the degree of discrimination and the pace of religious liberalization in gender matters. Interestingly, for democracies in the early 1970s, Rule found that Roman Catholicism was negatively correlated with the recruitment of women candidates. In the 1980s the negative correlation was diminished in importance but still significant. Nevertheless, Rule's findings about the impact of Catholicism are contradicted by the results of this survey, which includes democratic and nondemocratic nations in the late 1990s.

The sociocultural barriers to the representation of women can be overcome, but the evidence seems to suggest that the process evolves over time and entails voters, both male and female, slowly coming to accept the legitimacy of women in positions of power. The Scandinavian example demonstrates that women can be present in substantial numbers once voters no longer see their election as something avant-

[12] Although subsequent research in the 1980s found unemployment to be a diminishing factor. See Rule (fn. 11), 20.

[13] This has been documented for the Middle East. See As'ad Abu Khalil, "Women and Electoral Politics in Arab States," and Avraham Brichta and Yael Brichta, "The Extent of the Impact of the Electoral System upon the Representation of Women in the Knesset," both in Rule and Zimmerman (fn. 11). For Africa, see Gisela Geisler, "Troubled Sisterhood: Women and Politics in Southern Africa," *African Affairs* 94 (October 1995). For Latin America, see Michelle Saint-Germain, "The Representation of Women and Minorities in the National Legislatures of Costa Rica and Nicaragua," in Rule and Zimmerman (fn. 11); and Lisa Baldez, "In the Name of the Public and the Private: Conservative and Progressive Women's Movements in Chile, 1970–1996" (Ph.D. diss., University of California, San Diego, 1997).

[14] Rule (fn. 11), 26.

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garde or unusual.[15] Three hypotheses are drawn from the above observations.

H_1. The position of women within society will affect the number of women elected. The level of female socioeconomic development will help determine the number of women in the legislature and cabinet.

H_2. A nation's dominant culture will affect the number of women who achieve political office. Where the dominant religion is particularly hostile to the advancement of women in the public sphere, the number of women elected to office will be lower.

H_3. Those countries with a long history of women participating in the political and electoral sphere will evidence more women politicians than those countries with limited experiences.

Political Culture

Ideology has been cited as a strong influence on the access that women can achieve as candidates and the electoral success that they can expect. Norris argues that in candidate recruitment "social democrat and green parties are far more likely to believe intervention in the recruitment process is necessary and appropriate."[16] Rule finds that in Western Europe "women were particularly successful in socialist and several center parties,"[17] and Duverger,[18] Beckwith,[19] Jenson,[20] and Caul[21] all hypothesize that the egalitarian ideologies of left-wing parties are likely to give rise to more women candidates and MPs. While these arguments make intuitive sense, Caul rightly notes that the simple "left/right ideological continuum may be too simple to capture how ideology affects women's representation."[22] With the growth of postmaterialist and environmentalist parties (particularly in Western Europe) a distinction needs to be made between the "old left" industrial working-class parties and the "new left" parties defined by their social concerns and preoccupation with diversity and participation. Ideology should affect the presence of women in both the legislature and the executive.

[15] See Jill Bystydzienski, "Norway: Achieving World-Record Women's Representation in Government," in Rule and Zimmerman (fn. 11).

[16] Pippa Norris, "Conclusions: Comparing Legislative Recruitment," in Joni Lovenduski and Pippa Norris, eds., *Gender and Party Politics* (Thousand Oaks, Calif.: Sage, 1993), 320.

[17] Rule (fn. 11), 20.

[18] Maurice Duverger, *The Political Role of Women* (Paris: UNESCO, 1995).

[19] Karen Beckwith, "Comparative Research and Electoral Systems: Lessons from France and Italy," *Woman and Politics* 12, no. 1 (1992).

[20] Jane Jenson, "The Modern Women's Movement in Italy, France, and Great Britain: Differences in Life Cycles," *Comparative Social Research* 5 (1982).

[21] Miki Caul, *Women's Representation in Parliament: The Role of Political Parties*, Center for the Study of Democracy Research Monograph Series (Irvine, Calif.: Center for the Study of Democracy, 1997).

[22] Ibid., 5.

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Party fragmentation in both the legislature and the executive may well also affect the numbers of women. Norris argues that the growth of new parties and the enhanced electoral competition found in Scandinavian countries suggests that a fragmented multi-party system provides increased access points for women to participate in electoral politics.[23] But she points out that, while "it does appear that multi-party systems . . . tend to have a higher number of women in office than systems with few parties," the evidence, even from the limited data set of established democracies, is mixed.[24] Despite the implications from the fragmented party systems of Western Europe, there may actually be a stronger argument that suggests the opposite hypothesis. That is, a system where a few strong parties dominate the legislature is more likely to see women *elected* than a system where many parties win a small number of seats each. This theory rests on two premises. (1) New parties are less likely to win a substantial number of parliamentary seats than are established parties. (2) Even in the more enlightened established parties women are more likely to be elected if the party has a pool of "safe seats" in which they can place women candidates. In single-member-district systems women are more often elected from safe seats, while in list-proportional representation systems women rarely dominate the top positions of the party list. In sum, high party fragmentation may well increase the number of women nominated as candidates, but to actually win seats the fragmentation needs to be lower.

The same theory can be applied to cabinet formation. A single-party government will have more portfolios to play with and so up-and-coming women can be accommodated along with the party leadership. But in a coalition government each partner will have fewer ministerial positions to allocate and these will be taken up by the very top echelon of the party, who will usually be male. Four related hypotheses are drawn from these observations about the possible effect of political culture.

> H_4. The orientation of the party system will affect the number of women in elected office. As the vote for women-friendly or gender-neutral parties increases, so should the number of women elected to the legislature.
>
> H_5. The number of parliamentary parties will affect the number of women in the legislature. As party fragmentation increases, the number of women MPs will decline.

[23] See Norris (fn. 16), 317–19. See also Diane Sainsbury, "The Politics of Increased Women's Representation: The Swedish Case," in Lovenduski and Norris (fn. 16).

[24] Norris (fn. 16), 319.

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H_6. The ideological outlook of the government will affect the number of women in the cabinet. As the influence of women-friendly parties increases so will the number of women in the cabinet.

H_7. The number of parties in government will affect the number of women cabinet ministers depending on the ideological orientation of those parties. The number of women ministers will decrease as the number of coalition partners increases.

Nature of the State-Regime

As noted earlier, historical experience often leads to gender advancement, and political liberalization enables women to mobilize within the public sphere. Therefore, we might expect higher numbers of women in office in established democracies than in transitional or fledgling democracies, and the more illiberal a state is, the fewer women will be in positions of power. Waylen argues that authoritarian regimes "rest on gendered foundations, relying particularly on the construction of masculinity and femininity which assigns particular 'traditional' roles to women."[25] Within the class of nondemocratic regimes it is fair to hypothesize that the type of regime will affect the opportunities for women. Regimes that profess a leftist ideology will be more likely to place women in high office—even if such gestures are essentially tokenistic. Therefore:

H_8. The previous history of the state should affect the propensity of women to reach high political office. Consolidated democracies will have more women in office than will fledgling democracies.

H_9. The impact of authoritarianism is tempered by the nature of the state. Nondemocratic regimes with a pronounced left-wing ideology will display more women in office than personalistic or militaristic authoritarian regimes.

Political Institutions

Chief among institutional variables, electoral systems[26] have most often been cited as the key determining factor in the number of women elected to legislative office.[27] Rule goes so far as to say that "favorable

[25] Georgina Waylen, *Gender in Third World Politics* (Boulder, Colo.: Lynne Rienner, 1996), 114.

[26] For definitions and descriptions of the electoral system typology used in this article, see Andrew Reynolds et al., *The International IDEA Handbook of Electoral System Design* (Stockholm: International IDEA, 1997).

[27] See Duverger (fn. 18); Enid Lakeman, *Twelve Democracies: Electoral Systems in the European Community* (London: Arthur McDougall Fund, 1991); Wilma Rule, "Electoral Systems, Contextual Factors and Women's Opportunity for Election to Parliament in Twenty-three Democracies," *Western Political Quarterly* 40 (September 1987); idem, "Women's Underrepresentation and Electoral Systems," *PS: Political Science and Politics* 27, no. 4 (1994); Lovenduski and Norris (fn. 16); Rule and Zimmerman (fn. 11); Reynolds et al. (fn. 26); and the Inter-Parliamentary Union, *Democracy Still in the Making: Men and Women in Politics* (Geneva: IPU, 1997).

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societal conditions will not substitute for unfavorable electoral systems for women to reach their optimal representation in parliament and local legislatures. But unfavorable contextual conditions—including cultural biases and discriminatory practices—can be overcome to a great extent by alternate electoral systems."[28]

Plurality-majority single-member-district systems, whether of the Anglo-American first-past-the-post (FPTP) variety, the Australian preference ballot alternative vote (AV), or the French two-round system (TRS), are deemed to be particularly unfavorable to women's chances of being elected to office. Each of these systems creates an incentive for party bosses to stand lowest-common-denominator candidates in geographical districts; these rarely turn out to be women or minorities. The literature on established democracies has long suggested that the most women-friendly electoral systems are list-proportional representation (list PR) systems with high district magnitude and low effective thresholds.[29] In these systems of high proportionality between seats won and votes cast, small parties are able to gain representation and parties have an incentive to broaden their overall electoral appeal by making their candidate lists as diverse as possible.

There are, however, important variations within the category of list PR electoral systems. Chief among these is the level of choice a voter is given, not just between parties, but between candidates as well. In free or open-list systems voters can influence the party list through their vote, but in closed-list systems the voter is constrained from indicating such a preference and is unable to alter the ordered party list. After analyzing mostly Western European democracies, Shugart,[30] Rule,[31] Rule and Zimmerman[32] find that open lists favor the election of women candidates because women-friendly voters can influence the less friendly party bosses who originally placed women candidates low down on their candidate lists. While such arguments may hold water in the progressive cultures of Scandinavia, translating the same argument to the use of list PR in less socially progressive countries in the developing world may be more troublesome. When list PR is used in Africa, Asia, or Latin America, there is some evidence to suggest that the relationship switches 180 degrees between closed- and open-list PR. In South Africa and Mozambique the ANC and Frelimo were able to use the

[28] Rule (fn. 27, 1994), 689.
[29] For a summary, see Rule (fn. 11).
[30] Matthew Shugart, "Minorities Represented and Unrepresented," in Rule and Zimmerman (fn. 11).
[31] Rule (fn. 11).
[32] Rule and Zimmerman (fn. 11).

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closed-list system to place a high number of women candidates in winnable slots. If voters in these still patriarchal societies had been able to reorder the lists, women candidates may not have fared quite as well.

There are competing plausible hypotheses about the impact presidentialism or parliamentarism could have on the representation of women in the cabinet, but on both sides the arguments are foundationally weak. It might be argued that in a presidential system the executive need not be drawn from the legislature and the powerful head of state has the freedom to place women in the cabinet proactively without suffering the constraints of male-dominated legislative campaigning (for example, President Clinton's cabinet in the United States). Conversely, in a parliamentary system women have more points of access to executive power through majority and minority political parties that may be in a coalition government (for example, Norway). It seems likely that the presidential versus parliamentary division is not salient standing alone but will become important when conditioned by other factors, such as party ideology and the effective powers of the presidential office—in particular, who appoints and dismisses cabinet ministers.

Last, there is an increasing practice in legislatures for the state, or the parties themselves, to utilize formal or informal quota mechanisms to promote women as candidates and MPs. In 1997 the Inter-Parliamentary Union identified five countries that had national legislation establishing a compulsory quota of women MPs (Argentina,[33] Belgium [candidature], Brazil, North Korea, and Nepal), a further four had national legislation that reserved seats for women (Bangladesh, Burkina Faso, Uganda, and Tanzania [with India considering a 30 percent rule]).[34] And in thirty-six nations some, or all, of the political parties had quotas for women's candidatures for legislative elections.[35] Thus, on the question of the impact of political institutions three hypotheses can be stated.

> H_{10}. The electoral system used for legislative elections will affect the number of women elected to the legislature, but it will not necessarily affect the number of women who are awarded cabinet office. Majoritarian single-member district electoral systems with personal voting (that is, FPTP, AV, TRS) will allow fewer opportunities for women to be elected than proportional systems without personal voting (that is, closed-list PR). Mixed systems (that is, parallel and mixed-

[33] See Mark Jones, "Increasing Women's Representation via Gender Quotas: The Argentine Ley de Cupos," *Women and Politics* 16, no. 4 (1996).

[34] See Jane Everett, "Reservation of Seats for Women in India: Toward the Engendering of Politics?" (Paper prepared for delivery at the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, San Francisco, August 29–September 1, 1996).

[35] Inter-Parliamentary Union (fn. 27), 64, 67.

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member proportional, or MMP), proportional systems with personal voting (that is, STV and open-list PR), semiproportional systems (that is, SNTV and LV), and majoritarian multimember district systems (that is, the block vote) will fall somewhere in between the two extremes.

H_{11}. Whether the system is presidential or parliamentary will not directly affect either the number of women in parliament or the number of women in the cabinet.[36]

H_{12}. The existence of quotas for women in office (whether formal or informal) will increase the number of women in the legislature.

Other Variables Not Considered in This Study

There are, of course, a number of other variables that, because of the global (each unit case equals one country) nature of this project, were immeasurable in a quantitative sense. Norris[37] stresses the role of party organization and recruitment in affecting the number of women who are first selected as candidates and then take the next step of being elected to office. Caul[38] notes that the existence of women as party activists lays the ground for the advancement of female candidates, while Bystydzienski[39] demonstrates that the representation of women in politics is sometimes preceded by windows of opportunity that enable women to integrate themselves into civil society. Finally, there are the barriers erected by the niceties of campaign and election law. Zimmerman[40] notes that both incumbency and campaign finance issues are blocks to women's access to representation.

Overview of Survey Results

The survey found 4,209 (12.5 percent) women sitting in the lower houses of the 180 national parliaments, out of a total of 33,715 MPs. Data were collected primarily from Keesings Record of World Events, the Women's Environment and Development Organization, the Inter-Parliamentary Union (IPU), relevant embassies, and country desk officers at the U.S. State Department. This figure is marginally higher than the IPU's figure of 3,956 women (12.0 percent) in 167 states at the be-

[36] The presidential or parliamentary nature of the system will interact with the broader constitutional framework of the executive and the ideological orientation of the elected executive. The related evidence in this article suggests that such interactions may well influence the number of women chosen to fill ministerial positions.

[37] Norris (fn. 16).

[38] Caul (fn. 21).

[39] Bystydzienski (fn. 15).

[40] Joseph Zimmerman, "Equity in Representation for Women and Minorities," in Rule and Zimmerman (fn. 11).

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ginning of 1997.[41] Since 1945 the IPU has tracked the slow growth in the number of women MPs—based on an increasing number of parliamentary affiliates. In 1945 women constituted only 3.0 percent of all MPs (based on data from twenty-six mostly Western democratic parliaments). That figure rose to 7.5 percent in 1955 (61 cases), 8.1 percent in 1965 (94 cases), 10.9 percent in 1975 (115 cases), 12.0 percent in 1985 (136 cases), and 11.6 percent in 1995 (176 cases). The highest proportion occurred in 1988, when the IPU found that 14.8 percent of the MPs within their survey were women.[42] It is striking that despite the advances women have made in representation, for the last fifteen years the numbers have plateaued at approximately 12 percent.

At the executive level, as of 1998, there are 302 (8.7 percent) women cabinet ministers across the globe out of 3,486 ministers in total. As data on women in cabinet positions have not been systematically collated on such a broad scale before, it is difficult to ascertain the trajectory of women's participation at the executive level. However, Davis gathered data on fifteen West European countries (176 new cabinets and 278 midterm reshuffles) and found that cabinet representation increased from 3 percent in 1968 to 13 percent in 1992.[43] The number of women who lead their nations as presidents or prime ministers has remained consistently minuscule in each decade since the Second World War. As of July 1998 there were only five current women leaders (or 2 percent of the total).

Women in National Parliaments

The 4,209 women sitting in the lower houses of national parliaments at the end of the 1990s are disproportionately found in the parliaments of Western Europe, North America, and Asia. Western European legislatures include the most women MPs—18.4 percent—while the Middle East brings up the rear with 4.4 percent. The parliaments of North America and the Caribbean (18.2 percent) and the Asian states (13.8 percent) also have an above-average percentage of women in legislative office (see Table 1). When averages are taken the electoral system used for legislative elections does appear to affect the number of women elected. But the variance is not quite as high as one might have been

[41] Cases included in this survey that were not in the IPU survey are Belarus, Bermuda, Burundi, Ecuador, Gabon, Ghana, Gibraltar, Iraq, the Isle of Man, Niger, Pakistan, Vanuatu, and Yugoslavia. Cases excluded from both studies are Bosnia and Herzegovina, Nigeria, Libya, Marshall Islands, Burma, Qatar, Afghanistan, and Saudi Arabia.

[42] IPU (fn. 27), 83.

[43] Rebecca Howard Davis, *Women and Power in Parliamentary Democracies: Cabinet Appointments in Western Europe, 1968–1992* (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1997), 13, 16.

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TABLE 1
WOMEN IN LEGISLATURES[a]

	Africa	*Asia*	*CIS, C & E Europe*	*Middle East*	*N America & Caribbean*	*Oceania*	*S & C America*	*Western Europe*	*Totals*
# of ♀ MPs	654	1,140	457	69	338	68	354	1,129	4,209
Total # of MPs	7,297	8,230	4,997	1,555	1,857	725	2,926	6,128	33,715
% ♀	9.0	13.8	9.1	4.4	18.2	9.4	12.1	18.4	12.5
# of cases	48	20	26	10	16	13	20	27	180

[a] Figures based on national assemblies in unicameral systems and the lower house in bicameral systems.

led to expect by the literature, which has historically concentrated upon established democracies in the developed world.

PR systems do on average have nearly twice as many women MPs as plurality-majority systems (13.7 percent versus 7.8 percent), but the six MMP systems perform slightly better than the seventy list PR systems, while STV systems do not significantly increase the number of women elected when compared with the average.

The presence of women in both legislative and executive positions of power relates, to some degree, to the religious orientation of the nation-state (see Table 2). Dominant or majority Christian countries have, on average, 12.8 percent of legislative positions filled by women MPs. This figure is largely due to the above average number of women MPs in Catholic and Protestant countries, while Eastern Orthodox nations have a much lower number of women in office. Potentially the finding that Christian countries have more women in power than non-Christian states might be washed out by a correlation between Christianity, industrial development, and established democracy, but this is not clearly so. Of the sixty-seven states that are either dominantly Catholic or Protestant, only twenty-three are established industrial democracies. Among other religions, Hindu and Buddhist nations have the next highest number of women in parliament, with Muslim, traditional (animist), and Jewish states having fewer, but the variance is not great. However, the Muslim and Jewish states of the Middle East do particularly poorly when it comes to the inclusion of women, seemingly irrespective of socioeconomic factors.

Finally, it comes as little surprise that the number of women is higher when some form of quota is used to advantage women as candidates. In those states that have either (1) national legislation establish-

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TABLE 2
THE RELIGIOUS CONTEXT UNDERLYING THE NUMBER OF WOMEN IN POLITICS[a]

			Legislature		*Cabinet*			
Religion		*(# Cases)*	*%*	*All*	*Mean # of ♀*	*%*	*All*	*# of states*
Christianity	Catholic	dominant (40)	15.8		2.4	16.5		
		majority (12)	10.4	13.9	1.5	7.6	13.0	64
		minority (12)	10.8		1.6	6.8		
	Protestant	dominant (27)	15.5		2.5	14.0		
		majority (14)	10.2	13.5	1.3	6.3	10.6	53
		minority (12)	13.0		1.4	7.5		
	Orthodox	dominant (12)	6.7		1.0	4.6		
		majority (2)	7.4	6.6	1.5	7.7	5.1	15
		minority (1)	3.3		1.0	5.3		
	Overall			12.8			11.1	132
Islam		dominant (34)	6.0		1.2	5.3		
		majority (5)	6.4	6.4	1.8	7.8	6.4	46
		minority (7)	8.6		2.0	10.5		
Traditional		dominant (3)	7.0		1.3	6.3		
		majority (7)	9.2	7.0	2.3	10.1	6.9	22
		minority (12)	5.8		1.2	5.2		
Buddhism		dominant (6)	5.4		0.8	4.8		
		majority (4)	13.1	9.1	1.0	2.9	4.1	12
		minority (2)	12.5		1.0	4.4		
Hinduism		dominant (2)	5.5		0.5	2.4		
		majority (2)	11.6	9.7	1.0	5.3	6.0	6
		minority (2)	12.1		2.0	10.3		
Taoism		dominant (0)	0		0	0		
		majority (1)	21.8	21.8	1.0	4.0	4.0	1
		minority (0)	0		0	0		
Shintoism		dominant (0)	0		0	0		
		majority (0)	0	4.6	0	0	0	1
		minority (1)	4.6		0	0		
Confucianism		dominant (0)	0		0	0		
		majority (0)	0	20.1	0	0	5.5	1
		minority (1)	20.1		2	5.5		
Judaism		dominant (1)	7.5		0	0		
		majority (0)	0	7.5	0	0	0	1
		minority (0)	0		0	0		

[a] Dominant = over 70 percent; majority = the largest numerical group; minority = a minority but over 30 percent.

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ing a compulsory quota of women MPs, or (2) national legislation providing for a proportion of seats to be reserved for women, or (3) some or all of the electoral parties setting, by rule or custom, a quota for women candidature, the average for women in the legislature is 15.0 percent (N = 39). The fact that this figure is only marginally higher than the worldwide average illustrates the variety of weight that such quotas carry. In many states quotas are set but never filled.[44] Parties may set formal thresholds but then perform badly and win few seats; other times national legislation is perceived more as an idealistic goal rather than a legal compulsion.

Women in Cabinets

There were 3,486 cabinet ministers in the 180 nation-states categorized in this study, of which 302 (8.7 percent) were women while 3,184 were men (see Table 3). The most women cabinet ministers were from the continent of Africa (eighty-four), closely followed by the eighty cabinet ministers in Western Europe. There does seem to be significant regional variation in the numbers of women making it into high ministerial executive office. While 20 percent of the cabinet ministers of Western Europe are women, in Oceania and the Middle East the totals are less than 4 percent. Both figures are best explained by a variety of sociocultural factors that foster male political dominance. Nevertheless, the nature of patriarchy is somewhat different between the two regions.

The island states of the Caribbean, along with the United States and Canada, display the next highest number of women cabinet ministers (14.7 percent), which can be understood as a product of the combination of advanced industrialized democracies (the United States and Canada), social democratic Caribbean island governments (St. Kitts and Nevis, Jamaica, St. Lucia, and Dominica), and the communist orientation of Cuba. Thirty-three of the 313 (10.5 percent) cabinet ministers in Central and South America are women, while, from a much larger pool, Africa manages to score 7.8 percent.

As Table 2 illustrates, societies that are either dominant (over 70 percent) or majority (the largest numerical group) Christian or have a significant Christian minority have on average the highest number of women in the cabinet (11.1 percent). While all other religions appear to give rise to a roughly equal number of women in the cabinet (traditional = 6.9 percent, Islamic = 6.4 percent, Hindu = 6.0 percent, Con-

[44] For example, in Senegal the Socialist Party did not, in practice, respect the quota it had set, and in Costa Rica the mandatory 40 percent requirement for women on all party lists is often disregarded; see WEDO (fn. 1), 8.

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TABLE 3
WOMEN IN CABINETS

	Africa	*Asia*	*CIS, C & E Europe*	*Middle East*	*N America & Caribbean*	*Oceania*	*S & C America*	*Western Europe*	*Total*		*Established Democracies*
# of women in cabinets	84	26	31	5	36	7	33	80	302		108
# of cabinet ministers	1,082	437	587	241	245	180	313	400	3,486		633
♀ % of cabinet	7.8	5.9	5.3	2.1	14.7	3.9	10.5	20.0	8.7		17.1
Share of world total (%)	27.8	8.6	10.3	1.6	11.9	2.3	10.9	26.5			
Portfolio									#	%	
Foreign Affairs	2	0	2	0	2	0	1	5	12	3	7
Finance-Treasury	0	1	0	0	1	0	0	1	3	1	0
Home Affairs	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	2	1	1
Defense	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	1	2	1	1
Health-Social Welfare	13	6	4	2	5	0	3	14	48	14	15
Education	11	1	4	1	3	1	4	6	32	9	7
Labor-Employment	2	1	4	0	2	0	3	11	23	6	12
Environment-Energy	5	1	0	1	5	1	2	6	21	6	12
Planning and Development	7	0	1	1	0	0	2	6	17	5	6
Law-Justice-Security	0	0	2	0	3	2	2	5	14	4	11
Communication-Information	5	0	1	0	1	1	1	4	13	4	4

Trade-Industry-Science	5	2	0	0	1	0	1	4	13	4	5
Agriculture-Fishing-Sea	5	1	0	0	0	0	2	3	11	3	4
Regional-Local-Minority	2	1	0	0	3	0	1	2	9	3	4
Transport	1	0	0	0	0	0	1	6	8	2	6
Oil	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	2	3	1	2
Civil Service	3	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	3	1	0
Housing	1	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	2	1	0
Women's Affairs	23	5	1	0	6	3	3	7	47	13	12
Culture-Arts-Heritage	4	1	7	0	4	1	3	12	32	9	14
Family and Children	14	2	1	0	3	0	1	8	30	8	10
Sport	3	1	0	0	1	0	0	4	10	3	2
Tourism	3	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	4	1	1
Displaced persons	2	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	2	1	0
# of women categorized	84	19	26	4	32	7	26	80	278 (92% of total)		108
# of portfolios categorized	113	24	27	5	40	9	32	108	358		142
# of countries	48	20	26	10	16	13	20	27	180		36

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fucian = 5.5 percent, Buddhist = 4.1 percent, Taoist = 4.0 percent, there are no women ministers in the dominantly Jewish state of Israel or in Shinto-influenced Japan.

Focusing in on dominant Christian countries the figure is 16.5 percent for Catholic states, 14.0 percent for Protestant countries, and a lower 5.1 percent for Eastern Orthodox nations. These more detailed figures may raise some eyebrows due to the fact that Catholic countries appear to be more progressive than Protestant countries in the representation of women.[45] This appears to be a possible anomaly considering the widespread belief that Catholicism is less sensitive to gender equality than are many strands of Protestantism. It is also significant that the number of women in cabinets declines as Christian dominance declines, whereas the number of women in Islamic countries increases as the proportion of Muslims declines. The pattern for Muslim states is mirrored in states with a Hindu population. Nevertheless, the mere existence of a religious community should not predestine a cabinet to be light on the representation of women. In the seven states that have a significant minority population of Muslims the level of women's executive representation is almost as high as that in dominant Christian countries. The same is true for those countries where traditional religions exist alongside other, imported religions.

PORTFOLIO ALLOCATIONS

Looking at ministerial positions broken down by portfolio allocation, one sees a worldwide tendency to place women in the softer sociocultural ministerial positions rather than in the harder and politically more prestigious positions of economic planning, national security, and foreign affairs, which are often seen as stepping-stones to national leadership (see Table 3). While women are making it into cabinets in more countries than ever before (indeed only 38 nations out of 180 states did not have a woman cabinet minister), even within the more gender-advanced states women are skewed toward the positions that are, no doubt wrongly, viewed as lesser offices by their male colleagues. What is remarkable about the 358 portfolios categorized in Table 3[46] is the consistency across region. Whether in Europe, Africa, or Asia, there remain only a handful of women across the continent in the four key ministries of Foreign Affairs, Finance, Home Affairs, and Defense.

[45] Indeed, the same pattern was repeated in the number of women in legislatures.

[46] I was able to categorize 278 (or 92 percent) of the 302 women cabinet ministers by portfolio. In all these 278 women held 358 portfolios.

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But each region (aside from the Middle East) is well stocked with women in the social ministries of Women's Affairs, Culture, Family Affairs, Sport, and Tourism (in Oceania 44 percent of all women ministers handle such portfolios; in Africa, 43 percent; in Asia, 37 percent; in Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), Central, and Eastern Europe, 33 percent; in North America and the Caribbean, 35 percent; in Western Europe 29 percent; and in South and Central America, 25 percent). The most popular portfolio to be handled by a woman worldwide is Health (48, or 14 percent of the total), which is closely followed by Women's Affairs (47, or 13 percent), Education (32, or 9 percent), Culture/Arts (32, or 9 percent), and Family/Child Affairs (30, or 8 percent).

As Heads of State (Presidents or Prime Ministers)

The number of women leading their nations (as presidents or prime ministers) at any one time has never reached double figures. As of July 1998 there were only five women at the political helms of their nations: Janet Jagan in Guyana (since 1997), Chandrika Kumaratunga in Sri Lanka (since 1994), Jenny Shipley in New Zealand (since 1997), Pamela Gordon in Bermuda (since 1997), and Shaikh Hasina Wajed in Bangladesh (since 1996). Mary McAleese, the president of Ireland, although not without influence, holds a largely ceremonial position, while Aung San Suu Kyi was never allowed to take up her democratically won position as prime minister of Burma. Sirimavo Bandaranaike became prime minister of Sri Lanka in 1959, but it took another decade until she was joined by Golda Meir (Israel) and Indira Gandhi (India). The highest number of women prime ministers or presidents came in 1990 and 1993–96, when there were seven worldwide; the nadir was in 1978, when there were none.

In the 1980s and 1990s women reached the pinnacle of political life in more and more countries. Following in the footsteps of Golda Meir in Israel (1969–74), Indira Gandhi in India (1966–77, 1980–84), and Sirimavo Bandaranaike in Sri Lanka (1959–65, 1970–77), were Corazon Aquino in the Philippines (1986–92), Benazir Bhutto in Pakistan (1988–90, 1993–96), Begum Khaleda Zia in Bangladesh (1991–96), Eugenia Charles in Dominica (1980–85), Kim Campbell in Canada (1992–93), Margaret Thatcher in Great Britain (1979–90), Vigdis Finnbogadottir in Iceland (1980–96), Kazimiera Prunskiene in Lithuania (1990–91), Gro Harlem Brundtland in Norway (1990–96), Tansu Ciller in Turkey (1993–95), Violeta Barrios de Chamorro in Nicaragua (1990–96), and Ruth Sando Perry in Liberia (1996–97). Nearly half (9 out of 22) of the women mentioned above were either the wives or

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daughters of former national leaders and, of these, only Cheddi Jagan (husband of Janet) and Jawaharlal Nehru (Indira's father) were not assassinated.[47]

The Multivariate Regression Models

By crafting multivariate regression models, we are able to see more clearly the relationship between our twelve hypothesized independent variables and the levels of women in legislatures and cabinets.

Regression Results: Legislative Model

To operationalize the institutional, political, social, and cultural factors, twelve independent variables were included within a preliminary legislative model that uses the percentage of women in the legislature as the dependent variable.

INSTITUTIONS

The *electoral system* dummy variable categorized each country under one of ten systems based upon Reynolds and Reilly.[48] To measure the degree of *party system fragmentation* the Laakso-Taagepera Effective Number of Parliamentary Parties (ENPP) was calculated.[49] The *size of parliament* includes directly elected members, while the *presidential versus parliamentary* dichotomy is a dummy variable.[50]

POLITICAL/HISTORICAL CONTEXT

Years of suffrage measures the number of years from when women were first allowed to stand for office up to the legislative election year for which data are included. *Number of elections* counts multiparty competitive elections since 1945. The *level of democracy* is the Freedom House score for the country for 1996–97.[51] *Left vote %* is the sum of the vote

[47] Gro Harlem Brundtland's father was finance minister in the Labor government in Norway in the 1950s and 1960s.

[48] Reynolds et al. (fn. 26). Electoral systems relate to the system used for the election upon which the legislative data were based; the categorizations were updated from the 1997 IDEA study. Two cases within the study do not have directly elected national parliaments. China was categorized as SNTV because that is the system used at the provincial level, while the United Arab Emirates was categorized as FPTP because it has been used for some elections within the state.

[49] Markku Laakso and Rein Taagepera, "'Effective' Number of Parties: A Measure with Application to West Europe," *Comparative Political Studies* 12, no. 1 (1979). Because no political parties exist in 18 of the 180 cases, the ENPP could not be calculated. These cases were dropped from the legislative model.

[50] In eight cases the president is not directly chosen by the people through multiparty elections, but the system resembles a presidential system nevertheless.

[51] http://www.freedomhouse.org/political/frtable1.html and http://www.freedomhouse.org/political/frtable2.html

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shares of socialist, social democratic, communist, green, and women's parties.[52]

SOCIOECONOMIC VARIABLES

The level of women's socioeconomic development is measured by the United Nations Development Program's *Gender Related Development Index* (GRDI).[53] The *degree of urbanization* is the percentage of the population living in urban areas, and *population size* is taken from 1998 estimates.[54] The dummy variable of *religion* sorted cases on the basis of their majority religion as of 1998.[55] (The figures in Table 2 give a more nuanced breakdown of countries by dominant, majority, and minority religion.)

An initial multivariate regression, where the dependent variable is women as a percentage of the legislative body, sought to test the relationship between our three sets of independent variables (institutions, political context, and socioeconomic) and the presence of women MPs. In that model the level of democracy, the size of parliament, the population size, the percentage urban, and the dummy created for presidential (as opposed to parliamentary systems) were not statistically correlated with the dependent variable. Therefore, a refined model was developed to hone in on the significant variables to assess their relative importance. This model (shown in Table 4) illustrates that the number of women in legislatures in the late 1990s is determined by a patchwork of institutional and cultural variables. The model as a whole explains 45.5 percent of the total variance and the most significant predictors of the number of women MPs are the level of female socioeconomic development (as measured by the GRDI) and the electoral strength of left-wing parties in the system.

A society familiar with women competing for political power has an increased likelihood of electing women to office. That is, the number of years that women have had the right to stand for office, along with the number of multiparty elections, is also significant. The higher the ENPP the fewer women are elected, which confirms the hypothesis that a reservoir of safe seats is required for women to become, not merely

[52] In the few cases where the left vote percentage was unavailable, the left vote seat share was used as a proxy.

[53] The GRDI incorporates measures of the differences between women and men when it comes to life expectancy, literacy, education, and earned income. The disparities are then applied against the UNDP's Human Development Index (HDI) to produce the GRDI. In the cases where the UNDP does not measure GRDI, the HDI score was used as a proxy, as the two measures are autocorrelated. In the few cases where neither the GRDI or the HDI exists, a regional average was applied.

[54] *The New York Times 1998 Almanac* (New York: Penguin, 1997).

[55] Ibid.

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TABLE 4
THE EFFECT OF SALIENT VARIABLES ON THE PERCENTAGE OF WOMEN IN THE LEGISLATURE
(OLS REGRESSION ESTIMATES)

Independent Variables *(Constant)*	*% ♀ in Legislature* *(2.291)*
GRDI	.292 (2.324) ***
Religion dummies	
Buddhist	−.142 (2.322)**
Eastern Orthodox	−.229 (2.063)***
Muslim	−.171 (1.460)**
Other	−.083 (2.649)
Protestant	.117 (1.409)
Traditional	−.061 (2.110)
Religious baseline, Catholic	
Years candidacy	.186 (.022)***
# of elections	.124 (2.570)*
Left vote %	.293 (.018)***
ENPP	−.162 (.229)**
Electoral system dummies	
alternative vote	−.097 (6.139)
block vote	−.124 (2.570)*
first past the post	−.258 (1.304)***
limited vote	−.083 (5.950)
mixed member proportional	−.026 (2.556)
parallel	−.049 (1.606)
single nontransferable vote	−.097 (4.398)
single transferable vote	−.097 (4.308)
two-round system	−.105 (1.680)
electoral system baseline, List PR	
Adjusted R squared	.455
Number of cases	162

Standardized coefficients (standard error)
***p <.01, **p <.05, *p <.1

candidates, but candidates with real prospects for electoral success. As noted earlier, a less fragmented party system is a system with a small number of large parliamentary parties, which implies less competition for the bulk of the seats. The religious orientation of a nation appears statistically significant in suppressing the number of women elected when compared with the Catholic baseline (which had on average the highest number of women in legislatures and executives). Buddhist,

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Eastern Orthodox Christian, and Muslim countries have significantly lower numbers of women in parliament than do Catholic countries.

Last, as expected, the electoral system used to choose members of parliament also has some purchase on the number of women elected. All nine electoral system dummies suppress the number of women MPs (as compared with the list PR baseline) but only two systems (FPTP and the block vote) are statistically significant. In the theory underlying the regression model, both of these systems were predicted to be disadvantageous to the election of women.

In sum, the multivariate regression suggests that what primarily determines the number of women in a nation's legislature is neither the level of democracy nor the size or degree of urbanization of the state. Rather, women are elected in significant numbers when the parties that are ideologically sympathetic to gender neutrality do well, the national culture and religion are not overly hostile to women in positions of power, there is a history of women playing a role in consecutive multiparty elections, there are a small number of political parties who dominate elections, and the electoral system does not place undue barriers in the way of women candidates being elected.

Regression Results: Executive Model

The independent variables included within the executive model were slightly different from the twelve used in the legislative model.

INSTITUTIONS

The ENPP and legislative electoral system variables were dropped from the model, as there is no strong hypothesis about why such parliamentary issues should directly affect the composition of the cabinet. Thus, the only institutional variable kept in the executive model was the *presidential/parliamentary* dummy.

POLITICAL/HISTORICAL CONTEXT

The *years of suffrage*, *number of elections*, *level of democracy*, and *left vote %* (for the legislature) variables were retained. The percentage of *women in the legislature* was added as an independent variable, and two new variables were created: the *number of parties represented in the cabinet* and the *ideological orientation of the government*. For the latter, cases were classified as (1) single-party cabinets with a left-wing majority, (2) coalition cabinets with a left-wing majority, (3) coalition cabinets with a left-wing minority, (4) single-party cabinets with no left-wing presence, or (5) coalition cabinets with no left-wing presence.

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SOCIOECONOMIC VARIABLES

All of the socioeconomic variables used in the legislative model were retained: the *Gender Related Development Index*, the *degree of urbanization*, the *population size*, and the majority *religion* dummy.

A preliminary model taking the percentage of women in the cabinet as the dependent variable found that, similar to the legislative model, the index of democracy was not statistically significant. Neither was the population size, the urban percentage, the number of parties in the cabinet, the electoral system, or whether the system was parliamentary or presidential. The Gender Related Development Index, which had been significant in explaining the number of women in the legislature, ceased to be significant in the executive model.

The results in Table 5 focus in on the significant variables that help determine the percentage of women in ministerial office. The model explains 37 percent of the variance; far and away the best predictor of women cabinet ministers is the proportion of women MPs in the legislature. Although the legislative percentage is a stronger predictor, a history of women's participation also matters, as the years of candidacy and number of elections are statistically significant. If institutions do not seem to help determine the number of women making it into the cabinet, culture and ideology clearly do. The Buddhist and Eastern Orthodox Christian[56] dummies statistically correlate with lower numbers of women in cabinets when compared with the Catholic baseline (as they did in the legislative model), but this time the religious dummy *Other*[57] (which includes Hindu, Taoist, and Jewish states) is statistically significant while Islam is not. The importance of the cabinet's ideological basis partially confirms the theory that left-wing governments will have more women than will conservative, authoritarian, or populist administrations. When compared with the baseline of a single-party left-wing government, a coalition cabinet with no left-wing parties present suppresses the percentage of woman and is highly significant. This was

[56] An examination of influence diagnostics provides some inconclusive evidence that the effect of the Eastern Orthodox dummy may not be entirely robust. There were some cases (Sweden, France, Romania, Georgia, Ukraine, and Ecuador) with large dfbetas. When each outlier was removed individually, the measure retained its significance (except when either Romania or Georgia was removed). Nevertheless, there is no theoretic justification for excluding these cases from the sample.

[57] Countries classified as dominantly "other" religions are not significantly different from Catholic countries in this model when one removes the outliers: Sweden, Norway, Finland, the Netherlands, New Zealand, the Seychelles, Mozambique, China, Suriname, St. Kitts, Albania, the Isle of Man, Bangladesh, India, Tuvalu, Israel, Andorra, Malta, Cameroon, Ecuador, and Nepal. When each outlier is removed individually, this measure retains its significance except when either China, Suriname, Israel, or Andorra is removed (that is, when any of these four cases is not included in the sample, "other" countries are not significantly different from Catholic countries in this model).

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TABLE 5
THE EFFECT OF SALIENT VARIABLES ON THE PERCENTAGE OF WOMEN IN THE EXECUTIVE
(OLS REGRESSION ESTIMATES)

Independent Variables (Constant)	*% ♀ in Executive (2.837)*
% ♀ legislature	.368 (.085) ***
Religion dummies	
Buddhist	−.175 (2.536)***
Eastern Orthodox	−.122 (2.479)*
Muslim	−.109 (1.650)
Other	−.114 (3.236)*
Protestant	−.078 (1.556)
Traditional	.025 (2.507)
Religious baseline, Catholic	
Years candidacy	.126 (.026)*
# of elections	.176 (.124)**
Left vote %	−.035 (.030)
Government ideology dummies	
coalition: majority left	−.003 (2.117)
coalition: minority left	−.076 (2.229)
single party: no left	−.092 (2.187)
coalition: no left	−.259 (2.343)**
Government ideology baseline, single party left	
Adjusted R squared	.371
Number of cases	180

Standardized coefficients (standard error)
***p <.01, **p <.05, *p <.1

the composition hypothesized to be the most unfavorable to the representation of women at cabinet level.

The executive regression model tells a related, but slightly different story from that of the earlier, legislative model. History and culture remain important, while the level of democracy, population size, and level of urbanization remain insignificant. The presence of a left-wing political movement is important in both models, but at the cabinet level it is related to the composition of government rather than the vote percentage of the left. But perhaps most importantly the level of women's socioeconomic development (GRDI), while highly significant in determining how many women there will be in the legislature, is statistically insignificant when it comes to determining women in the cabinet.

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Conclusions

It has long been assumed that the global diffusion of multiparty competitive politics would provide increased opportunities for women to enter the public sphere and assume elected positions of power. Since the late 1980s there has been an avalanche of countries attempting to make the transition from authoritarian rule to democracy, and "free and fair" elections have increasingly become the focus of international trade and aid calculations. This article suggests that such expectations have been partially confirmed but need to be accompanied by some important caveats. Democracy in itself is not necessarily a precursor to the presence of substantial numbers of women in political life. Rather, the determining factors are a nation's familiarity with women in positions of power and the sociopolitical cultural acceptance of women as leaders, governors, and national administrators. Religious practices and ideological movements help determine the baseline for women, but these foundations can then be built upon (or perhaps bypassed) by women-friendly political institutions. Such friendly institutions may include list PR electoral systems and electoral quotas at both the legislative and the candidate level.

It is also important to note that institutions affect the cultural propensity to elect women candidates in different ways in different parts of the world. In Western Europe electoral systems appear to have more impact on the representation of women than, for example, in Asia or Central and Eastern Europe. While sociocultural variables are highly salient when it comes to parliamentarians, the presence of women as cabinet ministers is correlated more closely with the political orientation of the government and the success rate of women in the legislature. In many ways the evidence suggests that the glass ceiling for women in politics has been slowly raised over the last fifty years. Women have made advances in parliaments since the end of the Second World War, but it has been only in the last decade or so that they have assumed a significant number of ministerial cabinet positions. The next glass ceiling to be broken through will be women filling the top jobs—as ministers of defense, finance, home, and foreign affairs. Then will come the highest glass ceiling—women competing on a gender-neutral playing field for the very top job as president or prime minister.

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

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

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

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

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

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

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

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

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

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